Yazoo & M.V.R.R. Co. v. Craig

• Decision Date: 08 July 1918
• Docket Number: 20231
• Citation: 79 So. 102,118 Miss. 299
• Parties: YAZOO & M. V. R. R. CO. v. CRAIG ET AL
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

79 So. 102

118 Miss. 299

YAZOO & M. V. R. R. CO. v. CRAIG ET AL

No. 20231

Supreme Court of Mississippi

July 8, 1918

Division B

APPEAL from the circuit court of Warren county, HON. E. L. BRIEN Judge.

Suit by Philip S. Craig and others, executors of W. C. Craig, on behalf of W. C. Craig & Co., against the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs defendant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Judgment affirmed.

Chas N. Burch, H. D. Minor and Robt. B. Mayes, for appellant.

Excluding from consideration the Carmack amendment and independently of it, it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the decisions of this court or the decisions of the United States supreme court. The federal and Mississippi decisions are in accord with what is termed the American rule; that is, that a common carrier accepting goods for transportation to a point beyond its own line, is not liable for loss or damages occurring beyond its own line unless it expressly or impliedly contracts to become liable for loss or damage beyond its own line. Of course, the bill of lading in this case specifically provides that the defendant shall not be liable for loss or damage occurring beyond its own line. Among the Mississippi decisions are Crawford v. Southern Railroad Association, 51 Miss. 222; Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Tupelo Furniture Manufacturing Co., 76. Miss. 35; I. C. R. R. v. Kerr, 68 Miss. 14.

The English rule is that the carrier accepting goods for transportation to a point beyond its own line, thereby (in the absence of any express contract to the contrary), assumes responsibility for loss or damage on connecting lines. Hutchinson on Carriers, sections 228, 231. See also statements of the American and English rules in 6 American & English Encyclopedia of Law (2 Ed.), page 611. Among the United States supreme court decisions, declaring and upholding the American rule are Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Mineral Springs Manufacturing Company, 16 Wall. 324; Ogdensburg & L. C. R. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 129; Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Myrick, 107 U.S. 102; Pa. Railroad v. Jones, 155 U.S. 339.

It will be seen, therefore, that it has long been the rule of the United States supreme court, and of the supreme court of Mississippi that an initial carrier is not responsible for loss or damages to freight occurring on some connecting line unless the carrier expressly or impliedly contracted to be so responsible. The rule of the common law made the carrier liable for any loss or damage occurring on its line, except such as were due to the act of God or the public enemy, but it has long been the rule of the United States supreme court and of this court that as to loss or damage on its own line, the carrier might limit its liability to the damage occurring through the negligence of itself or its servants. Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 509; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1022.

Carmack Amendment. The effect of the Carmack Amendment has been authoritatively announced by the supreme court of the United States several times, but nowhere more clearly than by Judge LURTON in the case of Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491. In that case Judge LURTON stated the rule of liability previous to the Carmack Amendment as follows:

"Prior to that amendment, the rule of carriers' liability, for an interstate shipment of property, as enforced in both federal and state courts, was either that of the general common law, as declared by this court and enforced in the federal courts throughout the United States (Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 28 L.Ed. 717, 5 S.Ct. 151), or that determined by the supposed public policy of a particular state (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477, 48 L.Ed. 268, 24 S.Ct. 132), or that prescribed by statute law of a particular state (Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 42, L.Ed. 688, 18 S.Ct. 289). Northern P. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370, 56 L.Ed. 237, 32 S.Ct. 160; Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 56 L.Ed. 257, 32 S.Ct. 140; Second Employer's Liability Cases: Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38, L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, 32 S.Ct. 169; Greenwald v. Barrett, 199 N.Y. 170, 175, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 971, 92 N.E. 218; Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co., 205 Mass. 254, 259, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 293, 91 N.E. 324, 18 Ann. Cas. 351.

In a very recent case the Croninger decision by Judge LURTON was reviewed by the supreme court of the United States and the doctrine of the Croninger case further announced as follows:

"Counsel concede liability of a common carrier under the long recognized common-law rule not only for the negligence, but also as an insurer, and that unless the Carmack amendment has changed this rule, the railway is responsible for damage, not exceeding specified value. But they insist that in Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 57 L.Ed. 314, 55 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257, 33 S.Ct. 148, we held this amendment restricts a carrier's liability to loss, caused by it, and consequently, they say the trial court erred when it charged: "In this case the carrier is held to the highest degree of care for the safe transportation of the animals.'

Construing the Carmack Amendment, we said through Mr. Justice LURTON, in the case cited (pp. 506, 507): "The liability thus imposed is limited to any loss, injury or damage caused by it or a succeeding carrier to whom the property may be delivered, 'and plainly implies a liability for some default in its common-law duty as a common carrier.' Properly understood, neither this nor any other of our opinions holds that this amendment has changed the common-law doctrine theretofore approved by us in respect of a carrier's liability for loss occurring on its own line.

"The state courts, treating the bill of lading as properly in evidence, undertook to determine its validity and effect. We need not, therefore, consider the mooted question of pleading. The shipment being interstate, rights and liabilities of the parties depend upon acts of Congress, the bill of lading, and common-law rules as accepted and applied in federal tribunals." C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U.S. 323, 326.

Applying these cases to the instant case we find the following: Since the Carmack Amendment, the initial carrier is only responsible for loss or damage caused by it or caused by a connecting carrier. "Caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, means caused by some negligent act of the initial carrier or connecting carrier, whether the negligence be an act of omission or commission. As stated by the supreme court of Massachusetts in Bernhard v. Adams Express Company. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57, L.Ed. 314, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 257. In discussing the Carmack Amendment, it is said in 4 Ruling Case Law, Title "Carriers," sec. 360, as follows: The only liability imposed by the statute beyond that which existed at common law is this responsibility for the undertaking of other carriers into whose possession the property may come. The liability is only for loss, damage, or injury caused by the carrier, which broadly interpreted, includes that resulting from neglect as well as that due to a positive act. Hence it does not include the liability of an insurer against loss for which the common carrier is not culpably chargeable."

It is apparent, therefore, that from these decisions independently of the stipulation of the bill of lading, the defendant cannot be held liable for the loss of cotton in this case, such loss resulting from a fire not caused by the defendant, or its connecting carrier, and for which fire the defendant and its connecting carrier are in no way responsible, and where the loss is not caused by any neglect of the defendant or its connecting carrier in exposing said cotton to fire or any neglect in failing to attempt to rescue said cotton from fire. So, therefore, we see that non-liability of the defendant results by the terms of the Carmack Amendment, independently of any stipulation in the bill of lading, but as stated by Judge LURTON in the Croninger case, and reaffirmed by Judge MCREYNOLDS in the Ranking case: "The shipment being interstate, the rights and liabilities of the parties depend upon acts of Congress, the bill of lading, and the common-law rules as accepted and applied in federal tribunals."

The only Act of Congress applicable is the Carmack Amendment, and according to the terms of that act, there is no liability.

The Bill of Lading: The bill of lading provides for non-liability except for negligence and for non-liability "for unavoidable cause of the loss?" Unavoidable cause does not mean actual or physical impossibility to prevent. Its meaning was well defined by the United States circuit court of appeals from the sixth circuit (Judge LURTON delivering the opinion of the court):

"If defendants have shown, with respect to each possible cause, that the effect could not have been avoided by the use of care, caution and skill, then the effect was in law unavoidable, and the collision, in legal phraseology, inevitable.

It is not meant by the expression, 'inevitable accident,' one which it was physically impossible, from the nature of things, for the defendant to have prevented. We only mean that it was an occurrence which would not be avoided by that degree of prudence, foresight, care and caution which the law requires of every one under the circumstances of the particular case." (The Olympia, 61 F. 127.)

Hence under the bill of lading, the defendant is not...