Yeager v. People, 23074
| Decision Date | 15 December 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 23074,23074 |
| Citation | 462 P.2d 487,170 Colo. 405 |
| Parties | Jerry O. YEAGER, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Janet K. Gaylord, Aspen, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., James F. Pamp, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
One Jerry O. Yeager, who will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, was charged in the first count of a two count criminal information filed in the district court for Pitkin County with the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug, namely, cannabis, 'with the intent to induce and aid another to unlawfully use and possess narcotic drugs,' in violation of C.R.S. 1963, 48--5--20(1). In the second count the defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of cannabis in violation of C.R.S. 1963, 48--5--2. Defendant was convicted by a jury on both counts of the information and sentenced to a term in the state penitentiary of from ten to twelve years on the first count, and to a term of from two to three years on the second count, both sentences to be served concurrently. By this writ of error the defendant seeks a reversal of the judgment and sentences thus imposed.
The defendant initially argues that his conviction on both counts should be reversed because 'unlawful entrapment' was established as a matter of law and under such circumstance he claims that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor. We do not agree that the record shows entrapment as a matter of law and hence find this argument untenable.
It may well be argued that the defendant's testimony, standing alone, would perhaps equate to entrapment. However, the entire record must be considered and the testimony of one Michael Royce, a witness on behalf of the People, indicated that to the contrary there was no entrapment. The gist of Royce's testimony was that the defendant had merely been afforded the opportunity to transgress the law and that this is not the situation where a law enforcement officer has induced one who would not otherwise have committed a crime to violate the law. It was on conflicting evidence, then, that the issue of entrapment was submitted to the jury under an instruction defining entrapment to which neither party objected. We therefore perceive no error in the trial court's handling of this particular matter. For a more detailed discussion of the Colorado decisions bearing on entrapment, see Gonzales v. People, Colo., 452 P.2d 46.
The defendant also contends here that his conviction on the first count in the information should be reversed because of the form of the verdict returned by the jury. With this contention we are in accord.
The trial court gave the jury four forms of verdict: two forms of verdict relating to the first count, I.e., guilty and not guilty 'as charged in the First Count of the Information,' and similar forms of verdict relating to the second count of the information. As concerns the second count, the jury signed the guilty form of verdict provided them by the court. However, as concerns the first count, the jury declined to sign either of the forms provided by the court, and proceeded to draw one of their own. The form of verdict thus prepared and signed by the jury relating to the first count reads as follows:
'We, the jury duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause, do upon our oaths, find the defendant guilty of unlawfully and feloniously selling a narcotic drug as charged in the first count of the information.'
That the jury was having some difficulty with count one is evidence by the fact that during their deliberation they sent a written question to the trial judge relating to the nature of the intent required to warrant a conviction under count one. The trial judge declined to answer this interrogatory, and informed the jury that the instructions already given adequately covered the matter. It was in this setting that the jury refused to sign either verdict submitted by the trial court relating to count one, and proceeded to draw one of their own.
In his motion for new trial the...
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