Yellow Service Co., Inc. v. Human Development Corp. of St. Louis, 37427

• Decision Date: 13 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 37427,37427
• Citation: 539 S.W.2d 713
• Parties: YELLOW SERVICE COMPANY, INC., Respondent, v. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant. . Louis District, Division Two
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 713

539 S.W.2d 713

YELLOW SERVICE COMPANY, INC., Respondent, v. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF ST. LOUIS, Appellant.

No. 37427.

Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, Division Two.

July 13, 1976.

Louis Gilden, Doreen D. Dodson, St. Louis, for appellant.

Robert W. Henry, Clayton, for respondent.

CLEMENS, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff-lessor received a $4,500 jury verdict and judgment for damages done to its building by defendant-lessee's failure to maintain the premises in good repair.

Defendant-lessee, Human Development Corporation, rented office space from plaintiff-lessor Yellow Service Company, Inc., agreeing to keep 'the premises, and all parts thereof . . . in good and substantial repair and in tenantable condition.' Upon inspection when defendant vacated the building, plaintiff found broken venetian blinds, missing ceiling tile, bolt holes in the floor, numerous places in which paint was removed from the walls and names painted in gold spray paint on a wall in a washroom. Plaintiff's witness, Spencer Longhibler, a painting contractor, testified he had examined the building and observed the described damage. He testified to the repair work he had done, the price he had charged and the reasonableness of that price. When specifying the repairs he had done, Longhibler stated he had 'contracted' to do various repair jobs on the premises for $2,439. Defendant unsuccessfully objected and requested a mistrial on the grounds the contract between plaintiff-lessor and Longhibler was not binding upon defendant-lessee. The trial court ruled Longhibler had merely testified as to the work he had done and the price he charged for it. Defendant then asked that the contract between Longhibler and plaintiff be produced, contending the best evidence rule so required. The court disagreed, on the grounds that the facts establishing the reasonableness of the charge for repairs to the premises existed independently of the contract and therefore the contract was secondary, not primary evidence on the issue of damages.

On appeal, defendant urges us to find reversible error in the trial court's actions relating to the contract between Longhibler and plaintiff. We are unable to ascertain from the points relied on portion of defendant's brief exactly what theory of law defendant believes requires reversal: 'The court committed prejudicial error in permitting oral testimony concerning an existing written contract between plaintiff and Mr. Spencer Longhibler for repairs to the premises, when the written contract was available to plaintiff,' and 'the court erred in shifting the burden of proof to defendant by placing the burden of producing the written contract between plaintiff and Longhibler on the defendant.' These are abstract statements and fail to comply with Rule 84.04(d), requiring points relied on to state briefly and concisely what rulings are erroneous and 'wherein and why they are claimed to be erroneous.' See Thigpen v. Dodd's Truck Lines, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 816(5, 6) (Mo.App.1973). The...