Yolanda Saenz v. Industrial Commission, F.W. Woolworth Co. Ins. Co.

Decision Date30 June 1992
Docket NumberL-91-251,92-LW-1977
PartiesYolanda Saenz, Appellee v. Industrial Commission, F.W. Woolworth Company Ins. Co., Appellants Court of Appeals
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

Theodore Bowman, for appellee.

Lee Fisher, attorney general, Cash Mischka and Diane Karpinski for appellants.

OPINION

RESNICK M.L., J.

This worker's compensation case comes before the court on appeal from the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows.

On November 19, 1975, appellee, Yolanda Saenz, was injured in the course of and arising out of her employment with the F.W Woolworth Company. As a result of her injury, Saenz applied for temporary total disability compensation on February 27, 1976, with the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. A district hearing officer granted her application on July 16, 1976. On June 6, 1977, the Toledo Regional Board affirmed her award for the condition of "acute lumbar strain." On May 9, 1978, Saenz's claim was amended by the Industrial Commission to include the condition of "chronic lumbar sprain." Saenz's claim was further amended on April 24, 1985, to include "post-traumatic depression and psychogenic pain disorder."

On April 7, 1987, Saenz applied for permanent total disabil-ity compensation which was granted on April 26, 1988.

On November 9, 1989, Saenz was sentenced in federal court to serve three years in federal prison for the distribution and possession of cocaine.

On April 13, 1990, the Industrial Commission ordered Saenz's permanent total disability benefits to be terminated pursuant to R.C. 4123.54. In its order, the commission further advised Saenz that upon her release from prison she must reapply for reinstatement of her permanent total disability compensation, be re-examined by a medical specialist and have the issue of reinstatement reheard before the commission.

On November 26, 1990, Saenz filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaration that R.C. 4123.54 had no application to her permanent total disability claim and that she should not have to reapply for her benefits upon being released from prison. On June 19, 1991, the court declared that R.C. 4123.54 did not apply to Saenz's claim, that the commission's order of April 13, 1990, was of no force or effect and that Saenz was entitled to a retroactive reimbursement of her benefits from the date of the commission's order. The court also ordered that Saenz'S benefits be immediately reinstated. Appellant, the Industrial Commission of Ohio, now appeals setting forth the following assignments of error:

"I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS SOLE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S EXTENT OF DISABILITY AND TO SUSPEND PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS DUE TO INCARCERATION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER APPELLEE SAENZ'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT COMPLAINT.
"III. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DETERMINING THAT IT HAD PROPER JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN APPELLEE'S DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, APPELLEE'S CLAIM FAILS TO SATISFY THE APPLICABLE TEST FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF."

In its first assignment of error, the commission contends that it was well within its authority in suspending Saenz benefits.

We note at the outset the well-settled law that an employee's cause of action under the workers' compensation statute accrues at the time of injury. The employee's right to recover is measured by the statutes in force at the time of injury rather than by subsequently enacted statutes. State, ex rel. Jeffrey, v. Indus. Comm. (1956), 164 Ohio St. 366; State, ex rel. Westley, v. Indus. Comm. (1939), 59 Ohio App. 486. In August 1986, the General Assembly amended R.C. 4123.54, thereby excluding imprisoned benefit recipients from receiving compensation during their confinement. As Saenz's injury occurred in 1975, approximately ten years before the amendment, the amendment is not applicable to this case.

In support of its first assignment of error, the commission cites State, ex rel. Ashcraft, v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St. 3d 42. Nelson Ashcraft was injured in the course of his Ohio employment in 1978. He applied for and was granted temporary total disability compensation. Temporary total disability is a disability which prevents an employee from returning to his former position of employment. State, ex rel. Ramirez, v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 630, syllabus, citing R.C. 4123.56. An employee who is receiving temporary total disability compensation is entitled to such compensation until one of the following three things occur: (1) the employee returns to his former position of employment, (2) the employee's treating physician issues a written report that the employee is capable of returning to his former position of employment, or (3) the temporary disability has become permanent. Id., at 632.

Approximately two years after Ashcraft began receiving temporary total disability compensation, he was convicted of first degree murder in West Virginia and sentenced to prison. The commis-sion subsequently terminated Ashcraft's compensation for the duration of his imprisonment concluding that Ashcraft had voluntarily abandoned his former position of employment.

Ashcraft instituted an action in mandamus with the Supreme Court of Ohio challenging the commission's ruling. The court denied Ashcraft's writ. In a PER CURIAM opinion, the court explained that the purpose of temporary total compensation was "to compensate an injured employee for the loss of earnings which he incurs while the injury heals." State, ex rel. Ashcraft, supra, at 44; citing State, ex rel. Ramirez, supra; State, ex rel. Bunch, v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St. 2d 423, 427; State, rel. Rubin, v. Indus. Comm. (1938), 134 Ohio St. 12, 16. An employee who voluntarily removes himself from the work force no longer incurs a loss of earnings because he is no longer in a position to return to his former position of employment. State, ex rel. Ashcraft, supra. The court found that the commission was justified in viewing Ashcraft's incarceration as a voluntary abandonment of his former position of employment.

"While a prisoner's incarceration would not normally be considered a 'voluntary' act, one may be presumed to tacitly accept the consequences of his voluntary acts. When a person chooses to violate the law, he, by his own action, subjects himself to the punishment which the state has prescribed for that act. ***
"[W]e find that relator's incarceration constitutes a factor which, independently of his previously recognized work-related injury, would preclude his receipt of temporary total disability compensation. Id. at 44-45.

The commission now asks this court to extend the ruling in Ashcraft to imprisoned benefit recipients who receive permanent total disability compensation. This requires us to distinguish between temporary total disability compensation and permanent total disability compensation. As discussed earlier, the purpose behind temporary total disability compensation is to compensate an employee for the loss of earnings. State, ex rel. Bunch, supra. Temporary total disability requires a claimant to show an inability to return to a former position of employment and exclusively involves work-prohibitive disabilities....

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