York, In re
| Decision Date | 22 February 1994 |
| Docket Number | H011177 and H011242,Nos. H011030,s. H011030 |
| Citation | 22 Cal.App.4th 1217,27 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 22 Cal.App.4th 1217, 28 Cal.App.4th 31, 33 Cal.App.4th 712 22 Cal.App.4th 1217, 28 Cal.App.4th 31, 33 Cal.App.4th 712, 62 USLW 2607 In re David Anthony YORK, et al., On Habeas Corpus. In re Johnny CADENAZ, et al., On Habeas Corpus. In re Paul Blaise ATKINS, et al., On Habeas Corpus. |
Stuart R. Rappaport, Public Defender, Stephen B. Elrick, Deputy Public Defender, San Jose, for petitioners.
George W. Kennedy, Dist. Atty. Joseph V. Thibodeaux, Deputy Dist. Atty., San Jose, for respondents and real party in interest.
In their petitions for writ of habeas corpus, the 11 petitioners ask this court to vacate those portions of their supervised own recognizance release orders which require them to submit to drug testing and warrantless search and seizure. Under direction of the California Supreme Court we issued an order to show cause, returnable before this court.
This case presents the issue of whether a magistrate or judge may require all arrestees accused of controlled substance-related felony offenses to submit to drug testing and warrantless search as a condition of release on their own recognizance (hereafter referred to as OR). Each petitioner was charged with one or more controlled substance-related felonies and then agreed to "[s]ubmit to drug [and, in some instances]/alcohol testing" and to "[p]ermit search and seizure of his/her person, residence, and vehicle by any peace officer without a search warrant" as a condition of OR release.
Petitioners contend that requiring someone accused, but not convicted, of a crime to submit to a warrantless search as a condition of OR release 1 is always unlawful; they claim these conditions "are specifically prohibited by existing case law, unauthorized by statute, unnecessary, irrelevant to petitioners' future appearance in court, and inconsistent with the presumption of innocence." They contend the conditions "unreasonably restrain the liberty which petitioners retain under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, deny the right to privacy under California Constitution Article I, section 1, and deprive petitioners of due process of law under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution," and deny equal protection of the law. In a concomitant argument, petitioners claim the challenged conditions are "invalid because they were imposed as a blanket policy, and not as the result of an individualized determination that they were appropriate to petitioners' specific situations." (Capitalization omitted.)
In opposition, the People argue that "when an accused defendant released on [OR] voluntarily accepts a search clause as a condition of his O.R. release, he should also be adjudged as waiving his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment."
We shall conclude that drug testing and warrantless search and seizure conditions may be imposed in conjunction with OR release if, after considering the specific facts and circumstances in a particular case, the judge or magistrate determines that those facts and circumstances justify the condition or conditions. The drug testing and search and seizure conditions before us were imposed by mechanical rules on a categorical basis. Because the records before us reflect no individualized consideration or determination, we shall issue the writs.
Petitioners, all of whom were released on their OR prior to adjudication of their guilt, were given their OR release upon condition, inter alia, that they submit to drug testing and agree to be subject to search and seizure of their persons, residences and vehicles by any peace officer without a search warrant. Several petitioners objected to the conditions they now challenge when the conditions were first proposed, but the magistrate or judge refused to order OR release without them. In each case, the conditions were listed on a form entitled "RELEASE ON: SUPERVISED OWN RECOGNIZANCE" and an "X" had been placed in the box to the left of each condition. These conditions were imposed without individualized consideration of each case, regardless of considerations such as whether the individual petitioner had any prior drug-related convictions, had admitted drug use, or had received drug test results which indicated drug use.
The record suggests that the magistrate who imposed all but two of the drug testing and search conditions on the petitioners did so as a matter ofcourse or as an established policy in certain kinds of drug cases. The pre-trial release officer assigned to the magistrate's court testified that the public defender routinely objected to these conditions being imposed on petitioners and other public defender clients but that the magistrate denied every motion with no explanation for the imposition of these conditions other than "take it or leave it." Neither the superior court nor the People have produced evidence that the drug testing or search conditions were justified by any of the petitioners' individual circumstances; instead, they claim it is reasonable to require all persons accused of felony drug offenses to agree to warrantless search and seizure conditions before being released on supervised OR release.
Because petitioners have no speedy or adequate remedy at law, habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy. (See In re Catalano (1981) 29 Cal.3d 1, 8, 171 Cal.Rptr. 667, 623 P.2d 228; In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606, 612, 58 Cal.Rptr. 579, 427 P.2d 179; In re Sturm (1973) 11 Cal.3d 258, 265, 113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97; People v. Barbarick (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 731, 737-740, 214 Cal.Rptr. 322.) The Supreme Court has directed this court to address the merits of the petition, "regardless of whether the underlying criminal prosecution of the petitioners has been concluded." (See, generally, In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737.)
Section 1318 specifies the procedure for releasing persons upon their OR:
Until 1989, the above section provided for OR release upon a written promise to appear, to not leave the state, and to waive extradition, along with the accused's acknowledgment that he or she had been informed of the consequences and penalties for violation of these conditions.
In decisions published in and before 1985, California courts made clear that "[t]he sole issue at the OR hearing is whether the detainee will appear for subsequent court proceedings if released on OR" (Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 438, 166 Cal.Rptr. 149, 613 P.2d 210) and that "[a]ccordingly, the '... court's discretion to impose conditions upon [a preconviction] OR release is limited to conditions which are reasonably related to and attempt to insure subsequent court appearances' [Citation.]" (People v. Barbarick, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 735, 214 Cal.Rptr. 322.) Barbarick held that, in the case of an OR release pending appeal from a misdemeanor drug conviction, a condition that a defendant submit to search for narcotics, dangerous drugs or marijuana was "not reasonably related to securing defendant's subsequent appearance." (Id., at p. 736, 214 Cal.Rptr. 322.)
In March of 1988, the attorney general's office sponsored and supported Assembly Bill 4282 (hereafter AB 4282), which added subdivision (2) to section 1318. (Stats.1988, c. 403, § 4.)
The parties focus on the 1988 addition to section 1318. They correctly agree that the addition is ambiguous as to whether it authorizes conditions such as those petitioners challenge and that we may go behind the statutory language and explore legislative history in an effort to determine the Legislature's intent. Because it is unclear from the words used in the statute whether subdivision (2) of section 1318 was intended to encompass Fourth Amendment waivers in any or all cases, we have reviewed the pertinent legislative history in an effort to uncover any indications of legislative intent. (U.S. v. Taylor (6th Cir.1989) 882 F.2d 1018, 1023-1028; see also, Steilberg v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.) We consider the circumstances and events leading up to the introduction of the bill, including statements by various parties concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law, and the actions taken and statements made during legislative consideration. We also take into account "the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times, legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction [citations]." (Steilberg v. Lackner, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 785, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.)
Viewed and analyzed in the light of basic rules relating to the interpretation of statutes, we find that, although nothing in the legislative history sheds light upon whether the Legislature intended OR releases to ever be conditioned upon a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, it is clear the Legislature intended to codify the long-standing practice of courts imposing OR conditions beyond those specifically intended to insure subsequent court appearances. Petitioners concede that "reasonable conditions" under section 1318 "might" contemplate protection of the public and that they are not taking "the position that public safety was irrelevant" or that "public safety was something a court was prohibited from considering" in fashioning OR release...
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York, In re
...re David Anthony YORK et al. on Habeas Corpus. No. S032327. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. May 26, 1994. Prior report: Cal.App., 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 771. Petition for review LUCAS, C.J., and MOSK, KENNARD, ARABIAN, BAXTER and GEORGE, JJ., concur. ...