York v. Place

Citation273 Or. 947,544 P.2d 572
PartiesFern YORK, also known as Fern Place, Respondent, v. George V. PLACE, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gordon Place, Appellant.
Decision Date31 December 1975
CourtSupreme Court of Oregon

Gordon H. Price, Molalla, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.

Philip Hand, Woodburn, argued the cause for respondent. On the briefs were Klein & Hjelte and Marshall C. Hjelte, Woodburn.

Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, DENECKE, TONGUE, HOWELL and BRYSON, JJ.

DENECKE, Justice.

The plaintiff recovered a judgment for the reasonable value of the services she rendered for Gordon Place, the decedent. The services were of the kind that a wife would furnish her husband; however, plaintiff and decedent never married. The defendant, the personal representative of the decedent, appeals.

There was no express agreement that the decedent would pay plaintiff for her services. The plaintiff contends there was an agreement implied in fact that he would pay.

The decedent was a partially disabled exlogger. He had known plaintiff for some time. Commencing in 1965 he and plaintiff started living together on a five-acre farm in the foothills. They continued to live together until he died in 1974. There is testimony that they never married because plaintiff did not want to and other testimony that the decedent did not. Together they built a house and farmed. Plaintiff cooked and did the housework and other chores a farm wife generally does.

Plaintiff had $1,500 which she used to pay for materials for the house and for furniture and appliances. The only income of the two was the decedent's Social Security which was $150 per month in 1965 and was later increased to $200.

The parties held themselves out as a married couple. The decedent had affection for plaintiff. There was testimony that the decedent had stated to other persons that at his death the farm would go to plaintiff.

We start with the principle, well grounded in human nature, that where one renders services for another, payment is expected. This is modified, however, by a principle equally well grounded on human experience, that payment is not expected where there is a close relationship such as that existing between spouses and between parent and child. We stated this principle and its legal application in Wilkes v. Cornelius, 21 Or. 341, 347, 23 P. 473, 475 (1890):

'* * * The rule in such cases is that furnishing support and maintenance to a near relative will be presumed to have been done gratuitously, however valuable it may have been, and that such presumption can only be overcome by showing that payment therefor was intended and expected in some manner to be made. * * *.'

In Franklin v. Northrup, 107 Or. 537, 550, 215 P. 494, 499 (1923), we stated that the principle extended beyond relatives or spouses:

'But the implication of a promise to pay for such services does not arise where the parties are related by blood or marriage and are members of the same family and household, or where there existed between the parties a 'domestic relationship the incidents of which were essentially similar to those which are ordinarily associated with such a relationship when it exists between kinsfolk.' Sargent v. Foland, supra (104 Or. 296, 207 P. 349 (1922)); * * *.'

The plaintiff contends this second principle is not applicable because the plaintiff and decedent were not married and were not related. She construes the principle too narrowly. The basis of this principle is that in the normal course of human affairs persons living together in a close relationship perform services for each other without expectation of payment. Payment in the usual sense is not expected because the parties mutually care for each other's needs. Also because services are performed out of a feeling of affection or a sense of obligation, not for payment.

A legal marriage creates a legal obligation of support. The principle we are considering, however, is grounded upon human experience and not a legal obligation.

We conclude that the relationship of the plaintiff and the...

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11 cases
  • Steffes' Estate, Matter of, 77-171
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • April 8, 1980
    ...e. g., Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich.App. 405, 251 N.W.2d 606 (1977); Lawrence v. Ladd, 280 Or. 181, 570 P.2d 638 (1977); York v. Place, 273 Or. 947, 544 P.2d 572 (1975); In re Gorden's Estate, 8 N.Y.2d 71, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1, 168 N.E.2d 239 (1960). See also, Annot., Establishment of "Family" Rel......
  • Lawrence v. Ladd
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oregon
    • October 25, 1977
    ...only that plaintiff expected to be compensated for such services, but that decedent expected to pay for her services. In York v. Place, 273 Or. 947, 544 P.2d 572 (1975), under facts somewhat similar to those of this case, this court held that a woman who lived for several years with a parti......
  • Northrup v. Brigham
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • April 29, 2005
    ...plaintiff to Lurtsema were gratuitous because of the romantic relationship between them, citing to the Oregon case of York v. Place, 273 Or. 947, 544 P.2d 572 (1975). The Oregon case raises the question of whether it is reasonable to infer reliance on a promise of remuneration in the contex......
  • Northrup v. Brigham, No. 04-P-87 (MA 4/29/2005)
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • April 29, 2005
    ...by the plaintiff to Lurtsema were gratuitous because of the romantic relationship between them, citing to the Oregon case of York v. Place, 273 Or. 947 (1975). The Oregon case raises the question of whether it is reasonable to infer reliance on a promise of remuneration in the context of a ......
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