York v. State
| Decision Date | 21 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. A00A0152-A00A0155, No. A00A0352. |
| Citation | 528 S.E.2d 823,242 Ga. App. 281 |
| Parties | YORK v. The STATE. McCall v. The State. Mathis v. The State. Crawford v. The State. Hill v. The State. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gregory A. Hicks, James K. Luttrell, Woodstock, for appellant (case no. A00A0152).
Carlton C. Carter, Canton, for appellant (case no. A00A0153).
Lawrence W. Daniel, Atlanta, for appellant (case no. A00A0154).
Bernard Mathis, pro se.
Zell & Zell, Rodney S. Zell, Atlanta, for appellant (case no. A00A0155).
Victor A. Cuvo, Atlanta, for appellant (case no. A00A0352).
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Andrew J. Saliba, Debra H. Bernes, Maria B. Golick, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. ELDRIDGE, Judge.
We have consolidated these five interrelated criminal appeals. Viewed to support the jury's verdict, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the facts are these:
On the evening of November 25, 1996, Derrick Andre Crawford arrived at his home, parked his Land Rover beside his Ford Explorer in the attached garage, exited the vehicle, and headed toward the kitchen door. The three Rottweiler dogs in his fenced back yard began barking as Damon Jason McCall, Antonio York, Bernard Mathis, and Antonio Hill drove up in a Nissan Pathfinder. Leaving the motor running, the four jumped out of the Pathfinder and ran toward Crawford. They were wearing dark ski masks, and all four had guns. They forced Crawford into his kitchen. Crawford's wife, Shunda Green, was in the kitchen; a stove burner was on, and a "strange" smell was in the air. When Green saw the armed men, she and her two small children began screaming. In the resulting chaos, Green quickly called 911 and left the telephone line dangling open, as McCall herded Crawford, Green, and the children into the living room.
The 911 operator relayed to patrol officers all pertinent information regarding a robbery in progress, and police officers began to arrive on the scene. Meanwhile, inside the house, there was general chaos, which included a great deal of yelling, demands for money, and demands to know "where the stuff was at." Crawford repeatedly refused to tell the men where the money and "the stuff" were, so McCall shot Crawford. Crawford then gave McCall the information he wanted, and McCall was apprehended shortly afterwards attempting to flee in Crawford's Land Rover with a kilo brick (1,000 grams) of powder cocaine wrapped in brown paper with a horseshoe logo on it. The Smith & Wesson.380 caliber pistol that McCall used to shoot Crawford was lying beside the kilo on the front seat of the Land Rover. McCall had a significant quantity of blood on his shoes and pants; he also had Crawford's wallet in his pants' pocket, as well as nine "hits" of crack cocaine.
When York, Hill, and Mathis realized the police had arrived, panic set in. They demanded to know a way out of the house. They forced Crawford, Green, and the children into the basement and tried to exit the basement door. However, simultaneously, the police approached the basement door and forced it open. Green shouted as the police burst in. York, Hill, and Mathis tried to run back up the basement steps. York made it up the stairs and was apprehended in the living room; Hill was stopped midstairs; and Mathis was apprehended before he could reach the stairs. After Mathis was handcuffed, he told the arresting officer,
The police obtained a search warrant for Crawford's house. Three dark ski masks and three weapons were found discarded in various locations in the kitchen, living room, and basement. Ten thousand dollars in cash was found in a dresser drawer in an upstairs bedroom. A brown paper wrapper with a horseshoe logo was found in the kitchen trash can. Another 57.3 grams of cocaine were found in a clear plastic bag in the kitchen cabinet near the stove, along with some cooking pots and a digital scale.
In his statement to the police, McCall admitted shooting Crawford but claimed it was in self-defense. He claimed that Crawford invited him into the house to discuss a prior business deal, and they began to argue; that he shot Crawford because he thought Crawford was reaching for a weapon and he "felt in fear of [his] life"; that he shot Crawford with a gun he fortuitously discovered in the pillows of Crawford's couch; that, "after the little shoot," Crawford started giving him items, like his wallet and the hits of cocaine found in McCall's pants pocket; and that he was "not in a clear frame of mind," so he just took the items Crawford voluntarily gave to him. McCall stated that there was no armed robbery; that York, Hill, and Mathis had nothing to do with anything that occurred; and that the police should "ask my friends they didn't have nothing to do with this."
Crawford and Green, along with McCall, York, Hill, and Mathis, were indicted for two separate counts of trafficking in cocaine based on the plastic bag of cocaine found in the kitchen cabinet and the kilo brick of cocaine recovered from the Land Rover. In addition, McCall, York, Hill, and Mathis were each charged with one count of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of burglary. McCall also faced one count of possession of cocaine for the nine hits of crack cocaine recovered from his pants pocket.
A Cobb County jury found Crawford and Green guilty on both counts of trafficking in cocaine; they found McCall, York, Hill, and Mathis not guilty on both counts of trafficking in cocaine. The jury found McCall, York, Hill, and Mathis guilty as charged on all remaining counts of the indictment. The five men appeal from their convictions.1 Held:
1. We find the evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found appellants guilty of the offenses for which they were convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.
(a) Despite claims of "mere presence," Crawford's trial testimony, as well as other State's evidence, showed that York, Hill, and Mathis each had guns, wore ski masks, and aided McCall in the burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assaults of Crawford and Green. OCGA § 16-2-20 (); Burks v. State, 268 Ga. 504, 505, 491 S.E.2d 368 (1997). Crawford's testimony further showed that the men were not "invited" into the residence, contrary to their assertions on appeal.
(b) We also reject Crawford's contention that no evidence linked him to the drugs found in the Land Rover and the kitchen. It was reasonable for the jury to determine that the kilo in the Land Rover was removed by McCall from Crawford's home without permission; likewise the 57.3 grams of cocaine were found in Crawford's kitchen cabinet. An inference can be made that the cocaine in Crawford's home belonged to him. Carthern v. State, 238 Ga.App. 670, 672, 519 S.E.2d 490 (1999). The jury apparently made that inference, and that was their prerogative.
2. Appellants raise various Bruton2 issues. As per Bruton, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is violated when: (a) co-defendants are tried jointly; (b) one co-defendant's statement is used to implicate the other co-defendant in the crime; and (c) the co-defendant who made the implicating statement employs his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and thus does not take the stand to face cross-examination about the statement. McDonald v. State, 210 Ga.App. 689, 690, 436 S.E.2d 811 (1993).
Recognizing the above as law, we cannot help but question the tactical wisdom of the State in joining together for trial interrelated Cases A and B, when the result is to make the victim in Case A a co-defendant in Case B. If the victim/co-defendant does not testify because of Fifth Amendment concerns arising from Case B, the State may be left to prove Case A though the victim/co-defendant's pretrial statements and identification. Under Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 800(2), 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998), a Bruton Confrontation Clause violation may be inevitable since cross-examination of the victim/co-defendant is impossible.
In the face of a potential Bruton violation, the issue then becomes: (1) whether the implicating statement falls within a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule that will allow its admission, despite Confrontation Clause issues;3 (2) whether the statement was sufficiently redacted with the use of general terms which do not "obviously refer directly to someone";4 or (3) whether any Bruton violation can be considered harmless.5 With these principles in mind we turn to the specifics of appellants' Bruton allegations.
( a) McCall asserts a Bruton violation in the admission of co-defendant York's statement identifying McCall as the shooter.
Co-defendant York gave a statement to the police that there was no armed robbery or burglary; that Crawford invited the men inside his house to discuss business between him and McCall; that no one, including McCall, was carrying a gun when they entered the house; that McCall and Crawford began arguing; that McCall shot Crawford; that he did not know why McCall shot Crawford; and that he, York, did not have any idea what was going on at the residence. York also told the interviewing officer that McCall wanted to talk to him in order to exonerate York, Hill, and Mathis.
Thereafter, McCall gave a statement to the police which exonerated York, Hill, and Mathis; confirmed exactly what York said; and added details that raised his self-defense claim with regard to his shooting of Crawford. The evidence also showed that McCall, York, Hill, and Mathis were together in the holding cell at the jail for a long period of time. It was there that McCall told York and the others that he would tell the police that he was responsible for the shooting...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Shelton v. State
...(holding that failure to raise motion to sever at trial and to secure a ruling waived issue for appeal); York v. State , 242 Ga. App. 281, 287 (3) (a) (i), 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000) (same); see also Moss , 275 Ga. at 97-99 (2), 561 S.E.2d 382 (assessing potential Bruton violation in considering......
-
Powers v. State
...238-239(III), 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 184, 311 S.E.2d 823 (1984); York v. State, 242 Ga.App. 281, 293(7), 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000). The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circ......
-
Lucas v. State
...263 Ga.App. 686, 693(7), 589 S.E.2d 271 (2003). 7.Hawkins v. State, 302 Ga.App. 84, 86(2), 690 S.E.2d 440 (2010); York v. State, 242 Ga.App. 281, 295(8), 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga.App. 778, 779(2), 310 S.E.2d 556 (1983). 8.Nosratifard v. State, 320 Ga.App. 564, 570(2),......
-
Roberson v. State
...5. 252 Ga. 181, 182, 311 S.E.2d 823 (1984). 6. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 182, 311 S.E.2d 823. 7. York v. State, 242 Ga.App. 281, 293(7), 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000); Pettus, supra, 237 Ga.App. at 144(2), 514 S.E.2d 901; Gibson v. State, 223 Ga.App. 103, 104(2), 476 S.E.2d 863 (19......
-
Evidence - Marc T. Treadwell
...T. Treadwell, Evidence, 44 MERCER L. REV. 1209, 1225-29 (1993). 224. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 225. Id. at 137. 226. Id. at 129 n.3. 227. 242 Ga. App. 281, 528 S.E.2d 823 (2000). 228. Id. at 286, 528 S.E.2d at 831. 229. 270 Ga. 151, 510 S.E.2d 802 (1998). 230. Id. at 155, 510 S.E.2d at 807. 231.......