York v. Washburn

• Decision Date: 06 April 1904
• Docket Number: 1,891.
• Citation: 129 F. 564
• Parties: YORK v. WASHBURN
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

129 F. 564

YORK v. WASHBURN

No. 1,891.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

April 6, 1904

Shubael F. White (Frank F. Price, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

John G Williams and W. D. Bailey, for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN, THAYER, and VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judges.

VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judge.

This was an action at law by York to recover back earnest money paid by him to Washburn upon an unperformed agreement for the procurement and delivery of a mining lease of real property for a term of years. Plaintiff's complaint placed his right of recovery upon two grounds-- one, that the agreement was oral, and therefore void under the statute of frauds of the state of Minnesota, in which the real property is situate; and the other, that defendant failed and refused to deliver a lease conforming in terms to the agreement. There was no allegation that the agreement left any of the terms of the lease to be settled by further negotiations, or that payment of the earnest money was made under any misapprehension or mistake. In addition to a general denial the answer, so far as now material, was to the effect that defendant had been ready, able, and willing to deliver to plaintiff a lease conforming in all respects to the agreement, but that plaintiff had refused to accept such a lease, and, for the purpose of avoiding performance of the agreement, and as a mere subterfuge, had insisted upon receiving a lease differing in terms from those agreed upon. The case was tried to the court, the parties having waived a jury by stipulation. The judgment was for defendant. There was no special finding of the facts, and no exception was reserved to the general finding. Nor was there an application or request at the close of the trial for a finding or judgment for plaintiff, in the nature of a request for a directed verdict, based upon some specific proposition of law, or upon the theory that there was no substantial evidence to sustain a finding or judgment for defendant.

All but one of the assignments of error are to the effect that, upon the evidence, or upon the statements of fact in a written opinion given by the trial judge, the judgment should have been for plaintiff. The assignments seem to be principally directed against portions of that opinion. It was carefully prepared; states the history of the case; quotes from the evidence, and comments thereon; states the judge's conclusions upon the law, with his reasons therefor; sustains defendant's version of the agreement in respect of the terms of the lease, and his claim that he 'was ready willing, and able to obtain and deliver to the plaintiff a lease in conformity with such agreement, and deliver to the plaintiff, without any just cause, failed and refused to accept such lease and carry out the agreement'; and then directs the entry of a judgment for defendant. The opinion was copied into the judgment entry, but it is not, and was evidently not intended to be, a special finding of the ultimate facts, in the nature of a special verdict, such as is contemplated by sections 649 and 700 of the revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 525, 570). Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44, 51, 19 L.Ed. 65; Dickinson v. Planters' Bank, 16 Wall. 250, 257, 21 L.Ed. 278; Lehnen v. Dickson, 148 U.S. 71, 77, 13 Sup.Ct. 481 37 L.Ed. 373; Reed v. Stapp, 3 C.C.A. 244, 246, 52 F. 641; Adkins v. Sloane, 8 C.C.A. 656, 60 F. 344; Kentucky, etc., Co. v. Hamilton, 11 C.C.A. 42, 63 F. 93; Hinkley v. City of Arkansas, 16 C.C.A. 395, 398, 69 F. 768; Minchen v. Hart, 18 C.C.A. 570, 72 F. 294; National, etc., Ass'n v. Sparks, 28 C.C.A. 399, 403, 83 F. 225, 229; Ogden City v. Weaver, 47 C.C.A. 485, 108 F. 564. That which the record discloses is nothing more than a general finding of all the issues in favor of defendant, but, whether the finding be general or special, it has the same effect as the verdict of a jury, and, in the circumstances in which it was given, is conclusive, and prevents any inquiry in this court as to whether it is sustained by the evidence. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125, 19 L.Ed. 608; Martinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U.S. 670, 5 Sup.Ct. 321, 28 L.Ed. 862; Lehnen v. Dickson 148 U.S. 71, 13 Sup.Ct. 481, 37 L.Ed. 373; Dooley v. Pease, 180 U.S. 126, 131, 21 Sup.Ct. 329, 45 L.Ed. 457; Wilson v. Merchants' Loan & Trust Co., 183 U.S. 121, 127, 22 Sup.Ct. 55, 46 L.Ed. 113; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Wood, 8 C.C.A. 658, 60 F. 346; Walker v. Miller, 8 C.C.A. 331, 59 F. 869; Hughes County v. Livingston, 43 C.C.A. 541, 555, 104 F. 306; Barnard v. Randle, 49 C.C.A. 177, 110 F. 906.

The remaining assignment of error challenges certain rulings upon the admission of evidence excepted to by plaintiff, which raise the question whether, if the agreement was in parol, plaintiff could recover back the earnest money, when defendant was not in default, and plaintiff had refused to accept a lease conforming to the agreement. The circuit court answered the question in the negative. The agreement related to real property in the state of Minnesota, and was governed by the law of that state. This is conceded, but counsel differ in their interpretation of the state statute (section 4215, Gen. St. 1894), which provides:

'Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note of memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, and subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized, in writing; and no such contract, when made by such agent, shall be entitled to record unless the authority of such agent be also recorded.'

Counsel have made an exhaustive examination of similar statutes in the several states, and of the decisions interpreting them. This research discloses that states having a statute identical with that of Minnesota differ in its interpretation; the difference being that, by the interpretation prevailing in Wisconsin and some other states, an agreement such as is here under consideration 'is absolutely void and a nullity,' while, by the interpretation prevailing in New York and some other states, the law will lend no aid in enforcing such an agreement, but it is not contrary to law, and the parties are at liberty to act under it. By the first interpretation, the vendee or lessee may, if the agreement be not performed, recover back the money paid, without reference to who is responsible for the default, and as though no agreement had been made. By the second interpretation, no recovery can be had if the vendor or lessor is not in default, but is able and willing to perform the agreement. We are only concerned with the interpretation placed upon the Minnesota statute by the court of last resort in that state. It is a cardinal rule in the courts of the United States that the judicial department of each state is the appropriate organ to construe its legislative enactments, and that in cases depending on the laws of a particular state, and 'not controlled by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or by the principles of the commercial or mercantile law or of general jurisprudence, of national or universal application,' the construction which the highest judicial tribunal of the state has given to the laws of the state is controlling. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 6 L.Ed. 289;Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196, 18 L.Ed. 322; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278, 294, 26 L.Ed. 1090; Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647, 657, 13 Sup.Ct. 466, 37 L.Ed. 316; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 175 U.S. 91, 100, 20 Sup.Ct. 33, 44 L.Ed. 84; Chattanooga, etc., Ass'n v. Denson, 189 U.S. 408, 23 Sup.Ct. 630, 47 L.Ed. 870; First National Bank v. glass, 25 C.C.A. 151, 79 F. 706. The interpretation of a state statute of frauds by the highest court of the state establishes a rule of property, and is within the rule stated. Allen v. Massey, 17 Wall. 352, 21 L.Ed. 542; Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 Sup.Ct. 16, 47 L.Ed. 65. The facts of the present case make Louisiana v. Pilsbury, supra, directly in point. It was there said by Mr. Justice Field:

'The construction, so far as contract obligations incurred under it are concerned, constitutes a part of the law as much as if embodied in it. So far does this doctrine extend, that when a statute of two states, expressed in the same terms, is construed differently by the highest courts, they are treated by us as different laws, each embodying the particular construction of its own state, and enforced in accordance with it in all cases arising under it.'

Repeated decisions of the highest judicial tribunal of the state of Minnesota, rendered before this agreement was made, had uniformly placed upon the statute of frauds of that state an interpretation similar to that prevailing in New York, and unlike that prevailing in Wisconsin; and, as part of the interpretation adopted in Minnesota, it had become established law in that state that when a vendor, under an agreement for the sale of lands which is within the statute of frauds, because not in writing, is nevertheless willing and offers to perform on his part, but the vendee refuses to perform, and repudiates the agreement, the latter is not entitled to recover an installment of purchase money previously paid. Sennett v. Shehan, 27 Minn. 318, 7 N.W. 266; La Du-King Manufacturing Co. v. La Du, 36 Minn. 473, 31 N.W. 938; McKinney v....