Yorktown Central School Dist. No. 2 v. Yorktown Congress of Teachers ('YCT')

• Decision Date: 29 October 1973
• Citation: 348 N.Y.S.2d 367,42 A.D.2d 422
• Parties: , 72 Lab.Cas. P 53,197 YORKTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent, v. YORKTOWN CONGRESS OF TEACHERS ('YCT') and John Roden, Individually and as President of YCT, and as representative of a class consisting of all of plaintiff's employees represented by YCT for purposes of collective negotiations, Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 367

348 N.Y.S.2d 367

42 A.D.2d 422, 72 Lab.Cas. P 53,197

YORKTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent, v. YORKTOWN CONGRESS OF TEACHERS ('YCT') and John Roden Individually and as President of YCT, and as representative of a class consisting of all of plaintiff's employees represented by YCT for purposes of collective negotiations Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Oct. 29, 1973.

Eugene M. Kaufman, New York City (Stephen A. Perelson, Robert E. Sapir, New York City, Noel D. Cohen, New York City, Jack J. Sissman, New York City, Charles D. Maurer, Jamaica and Paul Janis, New York City, of counsel), for appellants.

Poletti, Freidin, Prashker, Feldman & Gartner, New York City (Robert Morris and John T. Rose, II, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Before RABIN, P.J., and MUNDER, MARTUSCELLO, LATHAM and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

With the commencement of this action to enjoin a strike by teachers employed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff made a motion for a preliminary injunction, upon an order to show cause of the Special Term in Westchester County, dated September 17, 1973, which contained a temporary restraint of the strike. Thereafter, the plaintiff made a further motion, by a second order to show cause of the Special Term dated September 20, 1973, to punish the two named defendants and others for contempt of court for violation of the restraining provisions of the September 17th order. The defendants have appealed from two subsequent orders of the Special Term, namely, the first entered on September 24, 1973, which denied their motion to vacate the September 20, 1973 order to show cause, and the second entered October 4, 1973, which granted the plaintiff's above-mentioned motion to punish for contempt as to the two named defendants, that is, the Yorktown Congress of Teachers (hereinafter called the 'union'), and John Roden (the union's president), who is a teacher, and 21 other named teachers.

The union was fined $1,000 a day for the 13 days that the strike had been in effect, that is, from September 18, 1973 to October 4, 1973, inclusive, and $1,000 a day thereafter for as long as the strike would continue. Each of the six teachers who were also officers of the union were sentenced to serve 30 days in the Westchester County Jail and fined $250. Each of the other 16 teachers was sentenced to serve 15 days in the Westchester County Jail and fined $250. Execution of each sentence was stayed by order of the Presiding Justice of this court.

The summons and complaint in this action, together with the September 17th order to show cause, was served on that day upon 42 of the approximately 300 teachers employed by the plaintiff school district and on the union. The next day its president was served with the same papers. On September 20, 1973 the plaintiff caused to be served on the union and 19 of the aforesaid teachers (together with three additional teachers) the above-mentioned order dated that day, which directed them to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for violating the September 17, 1973 temporary restraining order.

As above stated, on September 24, 1973 an order was entered denying the defendants' motion to vacate the September 20, 1973 order to show cause and that is the first order from which an appeal has been taken.

After a hearing on the motion to punish, the Special Term found (1) that the union and 19 of the teachers here involved were served with the temporary restraining order on September 17 or 18, 1973; (2) that teachers Nevin, Lushbaugh and Baker were not served with the temporary restraining order, but had knowledge thereof because they were officers of the union (vice-president, secretary and grievance officer, respectively); (3) that each of these 22 teachers failed to report for work and absented themselves without permission, not only up to the time of the service on them of the September 20th order to show cause, but also thereafter and up to the time of the decision on October 4, 1973, thus continuing to strike; (4) that the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the union and the 22 teachers wilfully disobeyed the order of September 17, 1973; and (5) that, therefore, they are guilty of criminal contempt of court. Thereafter, the 22 teachers were sentenced and fined and a fine was imposed upon the union, as above stated. The order entered thereon is the second order from which an appeal has been taken.

The plaintiff is a central school district which operates five elementary schools plus a middle school and a high school in the Town of Yorktown Heights, Westchester County. Approximately 5,000 pupils attend these seven schools. The defendants argue that the plaintiff does not have capacity to sue and that the suit should have been brought by the Board of Education of the central school district since the latter has the power to manage the district (Education Law, § 1804, subd. 1). Indeed, suits have been brought by boards of education of such school districts under the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law, § 200 et seq.) (Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 282 N.E.2d 109; Board of Educ. Cent. School Dist. No. 1, Town of Grand Is. v. Helsby, 37 A.D.2d 493, 326 N.Y.S.2d 452).

However, even though the cited cases were actions under the Taylor Law and the boards of education were there considered public employers, in our opinion, a school district may also be a proper party plaintiff. A school district is a 'government' or 'public employer' under the express provisions of the law (Civil Service Law, § 201, subd. 6, par. (a), cl. (iii)). A school district under the act has the power to appoint an attorney (Civil Service Law, § 201, subd. 3, cl. (a)) and to negotiate collectively with the teachers and to enter into written agreements with them (Civil Service Law, §§ 203, 204). Besides, a school district is a municipal corporation (General Corporation Law, § 3, subd. 2; General Municipal Law, § 119--n, subd. a). Statutes authorize actions against school districts (CPLR 504; General Municipal Law, § 50--i; see Widger v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 20 A.D.2d 296, 247 N.Y.S.2d 364) and actions have been brought by school districts in their own names (Central School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Colchester et al. v. State of New York, 18 A.D.2d 943, 237 N.Y.S.2d 682, affd. 13 N.Y.2d 1031, 245 N.Y.S.2d 602, 195 N.E.2d 311; Union Free School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Rye v. Town of Rye, 256 App.Div. 456, 10 N.Y.S.2d 333, affd. 280 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E.2d 681).

The defendants argue that the chief legal officer of the district should have brought the application for the injunction in his own name (Civil Service Law, § 211) and not in the name of the plaintiff. It is not claimed that the attorneys representing the plaintiff are not the attorneys duly retained by the district. We reject the defendants' contention and construe the statute to mean that the school district attorneys are the ones required to represent the district in applying for the injunction and that the district may not appear by one not so denominated.

The defendants' further contention that they were entitled to a jury trial is completely devoid of merit (Rankin v. Shanker, 23 N.Y.2d 111, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625, 242 N.E.2d 802; City of New York v. De Lury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 295 N.Y.S.2d 901, 243 N.E.2d 128).

The next contention of the defendants is that they were not proved guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. In criminal contempt, proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt (Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66, 45 S.Ct. 18, 20, 69 L.Ed. 162; People ex rel. Valenti v. McClosky, 8 A.D.2d 74, 185...