Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Oszust, 85-1258

• Decision Date: 02 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1258,85-1258
• Citation: 23 Ohio St.3d 39,23 OBR 57,491 N.E.2d 298
• Parties: , 23 O.B.R. 57 YOUGHIOGHENY & OHIO COAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. OSZUST et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 39

23 Ohio St.3d 39

491 N.E.2d 298, 23 O.B.R. 57

YOUGHIOGHENY & OHIO COAL COMPANY, Appellant, v. OSZUST et al., Appellees.

No. 85-1258.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

April 2, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

A private arbitrator's determination upholding an employee's discharge for "just cause" according to the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement does not preclude the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services from concluding that the employee was not "discharged for just cause in connection with his work" within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).

Charles M. Oszust was employed by the Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Company ("appellant") from 1971 to January 26, 1983. Oszust was a member of the United Mine Workers of America, which had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with appellant.

On April 30, 1982, Oszust sustained a back injury while he was working for appellant. He was unable to work for some time thereafter, and received sickness and accident benefits from appellant's insurance carrier. After having examined Oszust on behalf of the insurance carrier, Dr. Gene Stunkle issued a report on August 25, 1982, in which he stated that "[o]n the basis of objective findings, I see no reason why this man cannot return to his usual work activities. He does not have a permanent disability at this time." On September 1, 1982, the insurance carrier notified Oszust that his sickness and accident benefits would be discontinued as of August 18, 1982. After receiving that notice and with the consent of his physician, Oszust returned to work on September 7, 1982.

Oszust filed a grievance over the denial of his sickness and accident benefits for the period August 18 to September 7, 1982. That grievance proceeded to binding arbitration. The arbitrator denied the grievance, finding that, for the grieved period, and on the facts presented to him, Oszust was not disabled so as to have been prevented from performing his usual work. The arbitrator's decision was dated January 19, 1983; appellant discharged Oszust on January 26, 1983 for violation of Article XXII of the collective bargaining agreement, which provides, in pertinent part: "[w]hen any Employee absents himself from his work for a period of two (2) consecutive days without the consent of the Employer, other than because of proven sickness, he may be discharged."

Oszust filed a grievance over his discharge, and that grievance proceeded to binding arbitration. Based on the above-quoted contract language, the arbitrator denied the grievance, upholding the discharge under the collective bargaining agreement which required "just cause" for discharge.

Oszust also applied for unemployment compensation as the result of his discharge. The Ohio Bureau of Employment Services initially denied Oszust's claim but, after a hearing, the referee for the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review determined that Oszust had obeyed his doctor's instructions and had returned to work as soon as authorized by his doctor. Thus, because Oszust's discharge was not based on any willful or wrongful act, he "was discharged by Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co., without just cause in connection with work" as contemplated by R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). The board of review disallowed appellant's application for further appeal.

Upon appellant's appeal from the board of review, the court of common pleas held that the arbitrator's decision upholding Oszust's discharge for "just cause" in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement was "preclusive with respect to all subsequent proceedings involving the identical issue. * * * " The court of appeals reversed, and remanded the cause to the court of common pleas to review the facts presented at the hearing before the board of review to determine whether Oszust had been discharged for "just cause in connection with work" pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Hanlon, Duff & Paleudis Co., L.P.A., and Gerald P. Duff, St. Clairsville, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Patrick A. Devine, Columbus, for appellee Adm'r, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.

Thomas M. Myers, for appellee Oszust.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Justice.

This appeal requires that we determine whether an arbitrator's determination upholding an employee's discharge for "just cause" according to the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement precludes the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services from concluding that the employee was not "discharged for just cause in connection with his work" for purposes of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).

Appellant maintains that the term "just cause" within the contemplation of its collective bargaining agreement is identical in meaning to the term "just cause" for purposes of eligibility for unemployment compensation. If we were to accept appellant's position, when the parties to the collective bargaining agreement submit the issue of "just cause" for discharge to binding arbitration, the arbitrator would for all practical purposes determine not only the validity of the discharge but also eligibility unemployment compensation. However, the legislature has not provided that the determination as to eligibility for unemployment compensation may be made on the basis of private arrangements for the settlement of grievances.

This court has stated that "[t]he law favors the amicable adjustment of difficulties, and arbitration has been favored by the courts in this state from early times. It is considered that arbitrators are constituted by the parties chancellors, judges and jurors, having jurisdiction of the law and of the facts. In general the award is final." Corrigan v. Rockefeller (1902), 67 Ohio St. 354, 367, 66 N.E. 95. However, we noted there that the very purpose of arbitration "is to reach * * * a final disposition of the controversy between them [the disputants], and to avoid future litigation of the same matters." (Emphasis added.) Id. In the case at bar, the issue which was conclusively resolved by the arbitrator differs significantly from the issue presented to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and the board of review; thus, the arbitrator's determination, while final as to the validity of the discharge for purposes of the collective bargaining agreement, simply did not, and could not, take into consideration the employee's eligibility for unemployment compensation.

The General Assembly created the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services to decide claims for benefits under R.C. Chapter 4141. Appeals arising from the bureau's determinations are heard by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. R.C. 4141.06. The board of review has a statutory duty to hear the evidence, develop a record, and apply the law. On the other hand, an arbitrator's authority is confined to the resolution of issues submitted regarding contractual rights. The arbitrator is bound to interpret and apply the collective bargaining agreement in accordance with instructions from the parties to the agreement. The arbitrator simply has no authority to invoke this state's unemployment compensation laws in reaching a decision, regardless of the similarity of contractual language found within the substantive provisions of the statutes.

A private arbitrator's determination upholding an employee's discharge for "just cause" according to the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement does not preclude the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services from concluding that the employee was not "discharged for just cause in connection with his work" within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). Just as the United States Supreme Court has held that an employee's rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were not foreclosed by submission of a discrimination claim to arbitration under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974), 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147, we conclude that by filing a claim for unemployment compensation, Oszust was "asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process." Id. at 54, 94 S.Ct. at 1022. See, also, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981), 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641; McDonald v. West Branch (1984), 466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302.

In Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 39, 399 N.E.2d 76 , we stated that Ohio's Unemployment Compensation Act "was intended to provide financial assistance to an individual who had worked, was able and willing to work, but was temporarily without employment through no fault or agreement of his own." On the facts of this case, the referee concluded that because Oszust followed his doctor's advice and returned to work only when so authorized by his doctor, Oszust's discharge was not through his own fault or agreement, and thus was not based on acts which constitute "just cause in connection with work" within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). The referee found that "at no time was * * * [Oszust] ever advised by * * * [appellant] that he should return to work effective August 18, 1982, or be subject to termination under the provisions of the contract with the United Mine Workers of America. In effect, * * * [Oszust] has been told by his former employer that since he was told sometime after September 1, 1982, that he was able to work effective August 18, 1982, his not returning to work on August 18, 1982, constitutes an absence without a proven illness." That result may indeed by correct by the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement, but the arbitrator's determination did not foreclose the possibility that Oszust may nonetheless be eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. ¹

Appellant, by its reliance on Ivy v. Dudley (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 261, 217 N.E.2d 875 ; Dowler v. Bd. of Review (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d...