Young Israel of North Woodmere v. Town of Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals

• Decision Date: 27 November 1995
• Citation: 634 N.Y.S.2d 199,221 A.D.2d 646
• Parties: In the Matter of YOUNG ISRAEL OF NORTH WOODMERE, Appellant, v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 199

634 N.Y.S.2d 199

221 A.D.2d 646

In the Matter of YOUNG ISRAEL OF NORTH WOODMERE, Appellant, v. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Nov. 27, 1995.

Brown Raysman & Millstein, New York City (Scott A. Steinberg and Gabriela P. Cacuci, of counsel), for appellant.

Ronald J. Levinson, Town Attorney, Hempstead (Susan P. Jacobs, of counsel), for respondent.

Before JOY, J.P., and ALTMAN, FRIEDMANN and KRAUSMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review conditions identified as numbers 5, 9, 12(d), 13, and 14 in a determination of the Town of Hempstead Board of Zoning Appeals dated December 2, 1992, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O'Shaughnessy, J.), entered September 10, 1993, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is granted, and conditions number 5, 9, 12(d), 13, and 14 of the determination of the Town of Hempstead Board of Zoning Appeals are annulled.

The petitioner, Young Israel of North Woodmere, is a not-for-profit religious corporation that, since 1977, has operated a synagogue in a two-story single-family dwelling in a residentially-zoned neighborhood. On October 12, 1990, the petitioner submitted a building permit application to the Town of Hempstead, requesting that the petitioner's certificate of occupancy be amended to permit the use of the premises as a synagogue. The application was denied because, pursuant to its current use, the premises violated the pertinent off-street parking and side-yard setback requirements of the Town of Hempstead Building Zone Ordinance (see, Town of Hempstead Building Zone Ordinance § 71[B]; § 319[A][5]. Thereafter, the petitioner applied to the Town of Hempstead Board of Zoning Appeals (hereinafter the Board), for side-yard and off-street parking variances.

By decision dated December 2, 1992, the Board unconditionally granted the side-yard variances. The Board also granted a variance from the Town's off-street parking ordinance, subject to various conditions purportedly designed to mitigate problems of traffic congestion. One of these conditions limited to 125 the number of persons who could occupy the subject premises at any given time. The petitioner does not challenge the imposition of this condition.

The petitioner does, however, challenge five of the other conditions imposed by the Board. The petitioner contends that these conditions are not related to any issue concerning off-street parking and therefore must be annulled as irrational, arbitrary, and capricious. The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed the proceeding. We reverse.

The first of the challenged conditions limited the membership of the petitioner to 50 families although the current membership of 56 families was permitted until "by attrition, membership is reduced to 50 families". The second challenged condition prohibited the performing of the ceremony known as a "Bris" in the subject premises. The third limited any lecture by the congregation's rabbi to one per week, attended by no more than five persons. The fourth challenged condition limited the size of the sign that the petitioner could place on the premises. Finally, the fifth challenged condition prohibited the erection of a tent on the grounds of the premises during the Jewish High Holy Days. A tent had previously been erected for a 10-day period during the High Holy Days to handle the additional 35 or so worshipers that attended services at that time.

In the context of zoning regulations, "churches and schools occupy a different status from mere commercial enterprises and, when the church enters the picture, different considerations apply * * * Thus church and school and accessory uses are, in themselves, clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare" (Matter of Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 526, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827; see also, Cornell Univ. v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 593, 510 N.Y.S.2d 861, 503 N.E.2d 509). "[W]hile religious institutions are not exempt from local zoning laws, greater...