Young v. Cnty. of San Diego
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 20-cv-02441-H-AHG |
| Parties | JOE M. YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; DEPUTY SHERIFF CHAD FICKETT (0277); SERGEANT JOSEPH BARRY (4722); DEPUTY SHERIFF ALEJANDRO SILVA (0248); DEPUTY SHERIFF MICHAEL CRUZ (5622); DEPUTY SHERIFF DANIEL GUTIERRAZ (7441); and DEPUTY SHERIFF CLAUDIA VALENCIA (unknown), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO'S MOTION TO DISMISS
[Doc. No. 3.]
On February 24, 2021, Defendant County of San Diego filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Joe M. Young's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 3.) On March 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 4.) On March 22, 2021, Defendant filed its reply. (Doc. No. 5.) A hearing on the motion is currently scheduled for Monday, March 29, 2021. The Court, pursuant to its discretion under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), determines the matter is appropriate for resolution without oral argument, submits the motion on the parties' papers, and vacates the hearing. For the reasons below, the Court denies Defendant County of San Diego's motion to dismiss.
Background
The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint. On or about December 21, 2019, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Plaintiff's son, a minor, was riding in a car with some friends after having gone to see a movie. The car was stopped in Imperial Beach California, at a routine DUI checkpoint that was being conducted by the San Diego County Sheriff. (Id.) Plaintiff's son and the other occupants of the car were detained because they were minors in public after curfew, and the driver of the car was driving without possession of a driver's license. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Representatives of the San Diego County Sheriff called Plaintiff, woke him up, and informed him that his son had been detained and that Plaintiff should come to the DUI checkpoint to retrieve his son. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff left immediately to pick up his son, but Plaintiff forgot his driver's license. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Upon arriving at the DUI checkpoint, Plaintiff spoke to the deputy sheriffs at the scene, and they told him that he could not take his son because he did not have any photo identification on his person. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff alleges that one or more of the officers began to question Plaintiff's son in a threatening, menacing, and accusatory tone. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff told his son that he did not need to answer any questions. (Id.) Upon telling his son this, one or more of the officers told Plaintiff that he was under arrest and told him to place his hands behind his back. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff asked why he was being arrested, and he was told it was because he was interfering with the officers. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Thereafter, one of the Officer Defendants discharged his taser at Plaintiff striking Plaintiff in his thigh near his pants pocket and causing a lighter to explode that was in the pocket. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) The Officer Defendants had to stomp out the fire. (Id. ¶ 23.) The Officer Defendants then tackled Plaintiff, forcing him to the ground. (Id. ¶ 24.) One of the Officer Defendants discharged a taser again directly into Plaintiff's back. (Id.)
Subsequently, Plaintiff was taken to jail, then to the hospital to treat his injuries and burns, and then back to jail. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff's wife was called to retrieve her son. (Id. ¶ 27.) The Officer Defendants allowed Plaintiff's wife to take Plaintiff's son without checking her photo identification. (Id. ¶ 28.) Eventually, Plaintiff was released on bail, and the charges against him were subsequently dismissed. (Id. ¶ 29.)
On December 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants County of San Diego, Deputy Sheriff Chad Fickett, Sergeant Joseph Barry, Deputy Sheriff Alejandro Silva, Deputy Sheriff Michael Cruz, Deputy Sheriff Daniel Gutierrez, and Deputy Sheriff Claudia Valencia, alleging claims for: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unlawful arrest; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, excessive force; (3) false arrest/false imprisonment; (4) negligence; (5) violation of the Ralph Act, California Civil Code § 51.7; and (6) violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1. (Doc. No. 1, Compl.) In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts all of the causes of action against the Officer Defendants; but Plaintiff only asserts the four state law causes of action against Defendant County of San Diego. (See id. ¶¶ 30-73.) By the present motion, Defendant County of San Diego moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss all of the causes of action asserted against it for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 3-1.)
Discussion
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading stating a claim for relief containing "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The function of this pleading requirement is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains "enoughfacts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper where the claim "lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the claimant. See Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). But, a court need not accept "legal conclusions" as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, it is improper for a court to assume the claimant "can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
In addition, a court may consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and items that are proper subjects of judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). If the court dismisses a complaint for failure to state a claim, it must then determine whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); see Telesaurus, 623 F.3d at 1003 (9th Cir. 2010).
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In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges a claim for negligence against Defendant County of San Diego. Under California law, the elements of a claim for negligence are: (1) a legal duty to use due care, (2) a breach of such legal duty, and (3) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. Vasilenko v. Grace Fam. Church, 3 Cal. 5th 1077, 1083 (2017); Beacon Residential Cmty. Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP, 59 Cal. 4th 568, 573 (2014). "The existence of a duty is a question of law." Vasilenko, 3 Cal. 5th at 1083.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's negligence claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that the individual Officer Defendants owed him a duty to use reasonable care. (Doc. No. 3-1 at 4-5.) Under California law, public employees "are statutorily liable to the same extent as private persons for injuries caused by their acts or omissions, subject to the same defenses available to private persons." Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 628-29 (2013) (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 820). "Also, public entities are generally liable for injuries caused by the negligence of their employees acting within the scope of their employment." Id. (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2). Further, "'[u]nder California law, police officers have a duty not to use excessive force.'" Lawrence v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 258 F. Supp. 3d 977, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Warren v. Marcus, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1251 (N.D. Cal. 2015)); see Mann v. City of Chula Vista, No. 18-CV-2525-WQH-MDD, 2020 WL 5759749, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) (); see also Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629 (2013) ().1
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Officer Defendants used excessive force against him during the incident at issue.2 These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the duty element of Plaintiff's negligence claim at the pleading stage. See Hofer, 2019 WL 4575389, at *18 ...
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