Young v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 07 October 1890
• Citation: 123 N.Y. 226,25 N.E. 363
• Parties: YOUNG v. JOHNSON.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

123 N.Y. 226

25 N.E. 363

YOUNG

v.JOHNSON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 7, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, fifth department.

Butler S. Farrington, for appellant.

F. Brundage, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The plaintiff, being an infant under 21 years of age, brought this action by her guardian ad litem, charging the defendant with having, on the 26th of November, 1880, with force and arms, assaulted her. It is also alleged that the defendant forcibly, and against the will of the plaintiff, defiled and carnally knew her, which resulted in her pregnancy and the subsequent birth of a child, in consequence of which she became sick, and her health was impaired, and she suffered in her peace of mind and in her good name and reputation. At the time of the alleged assault the plaintiff was between 17 and 18 years of age, residing at the house of her aunt, who was married to the defendant's father as his second wife. On the trial the plaintiff testified to the circumstances of the alleged assault, which she claimed occurred in the parlor of the house where she lived, when she was alone, and about the middle of the day. Her version of the means used by the defendant to effectuate his purpose, and of the manner and circumstances of the alleged outrage upon her person, the failure on her part to disclose the facts to any of her female relatives or friends until it was apparent that she was about to become a mother, and her subsequent conduct towards and association with the defendant, were all well calculated to create a doubt in the minds of fair men as to the truth of the narrative. The defendant, who was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, denied, in general and in particular, the charges sworn to by the plaintiff, and he gave other testimony touching the friendly conduct of the plaintiff towards him after the date of the alleged assault, and also in regard to her association with other men prior to the alleged transaction. The case was submited to the jury by the trial judge in a very clear and impartial charge, and a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant, which has been affirmed by the general term.

There are no questions in the case which this court can review but such as are raised by the exceptions taken upon the trial, and which are quite numerous. The defendant denied that he was the father of the plaintiff's child, and the plaintiff testified that, previous to the assault made upon her by the defendant which resulted in her pregnancy, she had never had sexual intercourse with any man. The defendant called a physician and asked him the hypothetical question whether, in his opinion, pregnancy would probably result from first intercourse in a case where the female had been ravished, and the act accomplished against her will. The plaintiff's counsel objected to this question, on the ground, among others, that the subject of inquiry was not such as to admit the opinions of expert witnesses; that it involved no question of science or skill; and that the answer must necessarily be speculative in its character. The court overruled the objection, and the plaintiff excepted, and the witness gave his opinion that it would not. We think that this ruling did not contravene the general rule of evidence that witnesses must state facts and not opinions. The inquiry as to the conditions under which pregnancy may occur is one peculiarly within the range of medical science and skill. The common knowledge and judgment of mankind may be greatly aided in an inquiry of this character by the opinions of learned and scientific men who have made the law governing the complex physical organism of the human race the subject of profound research and study. The principles upon which evidence of this character is received in courts of justice were well stated by EARL, J., in Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 513: ‘Witnesses who are skilled in any science, art, trade, or occupation, may not only testify to facts, but are sometimes permitted to give their opinions as experts. This is permitted because such witnesses are supposed, from their experience and study, to have peculiar knowledge upon the subject of inquiry which jurors generally have not, and are thus supposed to be more capable of drawing conclusions from facts, and base opinions upon them, than jurors generally are presumed to be. Opinions are also allowed in some cases where, from the nature of the matter under investigation, the facts cannot be adequately placed before the jury so as to impress their minds as they impress the minds of a competent skilled observer, and where the facts cannot be stated or described in such language as will enable persons not eye-witnesses to form an accurate judgment in regard to them, and no better evidence than such opinion is attainable.’ The reasons given in all the cases for the admission of the opinions of experts cover the ruling in this case. Scattergood v. Wood, 79 N. Y. 266;Baird v. Daly, 68 N. Y. 551;Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 513;Dilleber v. Insurance Co., 87 N. Y. 79;Turner v. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, 16 N. E. Rep. 344; People v. Willson, 109 N. Y. 345, 16 N. E. Rep. 540; Stearns v. Field, 90 N. Y. 640;Griswold v. Railroad Co., 115 N. Y. 61, 21 N. E. Rep. 726; Van Wycklen v. City of Brooklyn, 118 N. Y. 424, 24 N. E. Rep. 179; Lawson, Exp. Ev. 200.

The defendant was permitted, against the objection and exception of the plaintiff, to give evidence of the association of the plaintiff with two other young men who were servants living in the same house with her. This evidence was confined to a period prior to the alleged assault by the defendant to a time when, from...