People v. Wilson

• Citation: 16 N.E. 540,109 N.Y. 345
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WILSON.
• Decision Date: 24 April 1888
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

109 N.Y. 345

16 N.E. 540

PEOPLE

v.WILSON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 24, 1888.

Appeal from court of oyer and terminer, Orleans county; ALBERT HAIGHT, Judge.

Code Crim. Proc. N. Y. §§ 273, 275, 276, abolish all the old forms of pleading in criminal cases, and prescribe a form for indictments, etc. Section 444 provides that, upon an indictment for a crime consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charge in the indictment, and guilty of any inferior degree.

John H. White, for appellant.

W. P. L. Stafford, Dist. Atty., and Irving M. Thompson, for respondents.

EARL, J.

The defendant was indicted for murdering his wife at Albion, in this state, on the 19th day of January, 1887. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hung. He then appealed directly to this court under section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by chapter 493 of the Laws of 1887. Under section 528, as amended, this court is authorized to order a new trial ‘if it be satisfied that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, or against law, or that justice requires a new trial, whether any exceptions shall have been taken or not in the court below.’ The defendant was 36 years old, and his wife 33, and they were married in 1872. At the time of her death, they had five children, aged, respectively, fourteen, seven, six, and four years, and an infant about three months old. The claim on the part of the prosecution is that the defendant killed his wife by suffocation and he claims that she died from natural causes.

We think there was abundant evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant. Indeed, it has been very rare that the prosecution upon a trial for murder has been able to adduce more satisfactory evidence establishing the guilt of the accused than was adduced in this case, except where the homicide was committed in the presence or observation of witnesses who were called to testify to it. Here there were previous threats of the defendant to take the life of his wife. There was opportunity. With the exception of the children, who were asleep, he was alone with her in the house, and thus had her in his power. He was an athletic man, nearly 6 feet tall, and weighing nearly 200 pounds, while she was a small woman, weighing only about 100 pounds. There was a strong motive. He lived unhappily with her. He had three times abandoned her for other women, and upon each occasion was brought back, twice under arrest. At the time of the homicide, and for nearly a year previous thereto, he was very much infatuated with an unmarried woman living in the same village, in whose society he had apparently spent more of his time than in that of his wife. He saw her several times on the day preceding his wife's death, and was seen in earnest conversation with her; and there is evidence that he remained with her until 2 o'clock on the morning of the day when his wife was found dead, and that he went directly from her to his own house, and there, within a brief time, caused the death of his wife; and that, soon after his wife's death, he was the first in eager haste to inform her of that fact. His wife was apparently in good health down to the time of her death, and the autopsy disclosed no disease, and no natural cause of death. There were several facts relating to his conduct in the morning, about the time of his wife's death, and thereafter, which point strongly to his guilt. The post mortem indications, as testified to by physicians and others, while not conclusive evidence in themselves that her death was caused by suffocation, yet all pointed in that direction. The symptoms of asphyxia caused by suffocation were all or nearly all present, according to the testimony of the medical experts both for the prosecution and the defense. In addition to all this, we have his confession that he caused the death of his wife by suffocation, made to a witness whose character is in no way impeached. Taking all this evidence, we think it excludes the hypothesis of innocence, and points so strongly to the guilt of the defendant that the jury could not justly have reached any other verdict than that which they rendered. We are satisfied, therefore, that the verdict was not against the weight of evidence, and that justice does not require a new trial, unless we find in the record some error of law prejudicial to the defendant.

The learned counsel for the defendant has called our attention to some places in the record where he claims errors of law were committed. We have carefully examined and considered all these alleged errors. It is objected that the indictment is defective in not stating when and where the court was held at which the indictment was found, the name of the justice who held the court, and the names of the grand jurors. These matters are not now required to be stated. The indictment conformed precisely with the requirements of sections 273, 275, and 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

At the close of the evidence on the part of the people, the counsel for the defendant requested the court to rule that the district attorney be compelled to elect which count of the indictment he would rely upon, and the motion was denied. It was conceded that all the counts charged murder in the first degree; the only variance being as to the means used to effect death, and the manner in which it was accomplished. This mode of pleading in an indictment is expressly allowed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, (sections 278 and 279;) and, even before the Code, it was held to be discretionary with the court whether it would compel an election in such a case, and the rule has not been changed in that respect. Armstrong v. People, 70 N. Y. 42;Hawker v. People, 75 N. Y. 490.

Several of the jurors, upon their examination as to their qualifications to act as such, testified that they had read newspaper accounts of the murder, and had heard the same talked about, and had some opinion or impression as to the guilt of the defendant which it might take evidence to remove. But they all declared on oath that they believed that such opinion or impression would not influence their verdict, and that they could render an impartial verdict according to the evidence; and the court, being satisfied that they entertained no such present opinion or impression as would influence their verdict, overruled the challenges of the defendant's counsel, and permitted them to sit as jurors. We have carefully read the examination of these jurors, and are satisfied that they were competent, within section 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Greenfield v. People, 74 N. Y. 277;Balbo v. People, 80 N. Y. 493;Abbott v. People, 86 N. Y. 467;People v. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115;People v. Otto, 101 N. Y. 690, 5 N. E. Rep. 788; People v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238, 6 N. E. Rep. 584. Several of the persons called as jurors had read evidence taken on the coroner's inquest upon the body of the deceased, and those persons were by the judge excluded. Their exclusion cannot be complained of by the defendant as error. The judge was not, as we must assume, satisfied that they could render an impartial verdict, or that the opinion or impression which they had formed upon reading the evidence would not influence their verdict.

The prosecution was permitted to give evidence that Mr. Pierson, the stepfather of the defendant's wife, had made a will giving his property to the defendant and his wife, and, after their death, to their heirs; that he had made the contents of the will known to the defendant; that, after Mr. Pierson heard that the defendant had left his wife, and gone away with another woman, he destroyed his will. There was an effort on the part of the district attorney to show that the defendant had been informed of the destruction of the will, but in this he failed. Therefore, upon motion of the defendant's counsel, the trial judge struck out the evidence as to the making and destruction of the will. If there was any error in the reception of the evidence, it was cured by striking it out, and nothing was left for the defendant to complain of.

The overseer of the poor of the town where the defendant lived was called by the prosecution, and he testified that in May, 1883, he, as overseer of the poor, furnished the defendant's family aid and assistance. This was at the time the defendant had abandoned his family, and gone away with another woman. His counsel moved to strike out this evidence. The trial judge denied the motion, and such denial is now complained of as error. All the relations of the defendant with his wife were material evidence, as bearing upon the question of his guilt; and it was competent to show that he abandoned his wife and children, leaving them destitute while he was away consorting with another woman. It showed a want of affection for his wife, a total neglect of her welfare and happiness, and a shameful disregard of decency and duty in his treatment of her.

When his wife was seen by her neighbors, who were called in shortly after her death, there were two cuts through her under-lip, made by her lower teeth, as she had no upper teeth. It was the theory of both parties that those cuts, and the laceration of the lower lip, were made by two of her lower teeth. On the part of the prosecution it was claimed they were caused by the pressure of the lower lip while the defendant was smothering her. On the part of the defense it was claimed that they might have been made by herself while in a spasm. Dr. Lewis, who was the first physician called to see the body after her death, was asked these questions: ‘Did you form any opinion as to whether these contusions or wounds or abrasions were made before or after death? Answer They were made before. Q. What do you say as to their being made in the absence of mechanical cause? Could they be made in the absence of mechanical cause?’ The counsel explained that by mechanical...