Young v. Rios

Decision Date10 March 2016
Docket NumberCase No. CIV-15-641-R
PartiesGEORGE SOLER YOUNG, Plaintiff, v. HECTOR A. RIOS, Warden, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff George Soler Young, a state prisoner appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis, brings this federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the United States Constitution. See Compl. (Doc. No. 1). United States District Judge David L. Russell has referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for preliminary review in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636. Defendants have moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. Nos. 49, 68) to dismiss Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff has responded (Doc. Nos. 75, 76), and one Defendant has replied (Doc. No. 77).

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Plaintiff, who is presently incarcerated at Oklahoma State Penitentiary ("OSP") in McAlester, Oklahoma, initially filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. See Compl. at 1.1 Following service upon all 21Defendants, the case was transferred to this Court on the basis of improper venue. See Doc. No. 53.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against former Oklahoma Department of Corrections ("ODOC") Director Robert Patton;2 GEO Group Inc. ("GEO"); GEO Vice-President Reed Smith; Hector A. Rios, Warden of Lawton Correctional Facility ("LCF"); and 17 LCF staff members. See Compl. at 1-2, 12-13.3 LCF is a private prison owned and operated by GEO. Id. at 3. Defendants Patton, Rios, Smith, and GEO are sued in both their official and individual capacities. All other Defendants are sued in their individual capacities only. Id. at 13.

Plaintiff's claims arise from events alleged to have occurred while he was housed at LCF. See id. at 3-4, 6-7. Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 14.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. Liberally and reasonably construed, Plaintiff's Complaint raises the following claims: (1) violation of the Eighth Amendment based upon a 2013 assault by LCF staff members; (2) violation of the Eighth Amendment based upon denial of propermedical, dental, and vision care; (3) violation of the First and Eighth Amendments and unlawful conspiracy based upon a retaliatory transfer of Plaintiff from LCF to OSP; (4) violation of the First Amendment based upon Defendants' refusal to address administrative grievances; and (5) a challenge to a requirement that Plaintiff be required to submit payments or copayments for medical care, based upon the fact that this requirement was not in place in 1994, when he began serving his current prison sentence, and upon the fact that this requirement results in taxpayers being double-billed. See id. at 2, 4-8, 10-11.4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

While the Court construes a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally, all parties must adhere to applicable procedural rules. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007). Under such rules, the plaintiff must state a claim upon which relief may be granted, i.e., the complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

Defendant Patton has filed a Motion to Dismiss ("Def. Patton Mot.," Doc. No. 49), and the remaining 20 Defendants, who are jointly represented, also have filed a Motion toDismiss ("GEO Defs.' Mot.," Doc. No. 68), both relying only upon the pleadings to support their arguments for dismissal. In addition, Defendants have filed a Special Report (Doc. No. 67), in accordance with the Court's order (Doc. No. 62) and Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has filed a response to each Motion to Dismiss, see Pl.'s Resp. to Def. Patton Mot.; Pl.'s Resp. to GEO Defs.' Mot. The undersigned has declined to convert the Motions to Dismiss to motions for summary judgment and has excluded from consideration the Special Report, Plaintiff's proffered exhibits (see Doc. Nos. 76-1 to 76-13), and all other evidence outside the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); Lowe v. Town of Fairland, 143 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1998).

Defendants move to dismiss certain of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In analyzing a motion to dismiss under that rule, the court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view[s] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it lacks factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not entitled to the assumption of truth; "they must be supported by factual allegations" to state a claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

"[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (1991); see also Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1173-74. Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of "judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

ANALYSIS
I. Defendant Patton's Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Suit

Citing the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Defendant Patton moves to dismiss Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims to the extent they seek money damages from Defendant Patton in his official capacity as ODOC Director. See Def. Patton Mot. at 12-13; Compl. at 12, 13; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Court therefore is obligated to address whether Defendant Patton enjoys immunity from suit. See U.S. ex rel. Burlbaw v. Orenduff 548 F.3d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that if a state defendant raises the issue, "addressing the threshold jurisdictional matter [is] obligatory"); Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 558-59 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity "can be waived" but "constitutes a bar to the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction" when effectively asserted).

Pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as adopted in the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court may not hear a claim brought by a private citizen against a U.S. state. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 65 (1996).

But Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute. There are three exceptions. First, a state may consent to suit in federal court. Second, Congress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity by appropriate legislation when it acts under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), a plaintiff may bring suit against individual state officers acting in their official capacities if the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and the plaintiff seeks prospective relief.

Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to any state agencies considered to be "arms of the state." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). A defendant's status as an arm of the state is a question of federal law, but courts make this determination by analyzing the "nature of the entity created by state law." Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"Oklahoma has not consented to be sued in federal court." Berry v. Oklahoma, 495 F. App'x 920, 921 (10th Cir. 2012); accord Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006); Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011). Nor has Congress abrogated state immunity through enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Berry, 495 F. App'x at 921-22; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979). Thus, the State of Oklahoma's Eleventh Amendment immunity from § 1983 claims for money damages in federal court remains intact.

Here, the relevant state agency is ODOC, because Defendant Patton was employed by that agency during the events giving rise to this lawsuit. See Compl. at 12. "ODOC is . . . shielded by sovereign immunity because it is an arm of the state." Berry, 495 F.App'x at 922 (citing Eastwood v. Dep't of Corr. of Okla., 846 F.2d 627, 631-32 (10th Cir. 1988)). And "it is well-established that 'the Eleventh Amendment precludes a federal court from assessing damages against state officials sued in their official capacities because such suits are in essence suits against the state.'" Peterson v. Lampert, 499 F. App'x 782, 786 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 1994)). ODOC's immunity extends to a plaintiff's § 1983 claims against ODOC employees who are sued in their official capacities for damages. Cleveland v. Martin, 590 F. App'x 726, 730 (10th Cir. 2014) ("Because the defendants are employees of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections . . . , the Eleventh Amendment applies to the official-capacity claims for damages."); accord Turner v. Nat'l Council of State Bds. of Nursing, Inc., 561...

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