Young v. State
| Decision Date | 06 December 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 46564,46564 |
| Citation | 255 So.2d 318 |
| Parties | Frank Terry YOUNG v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Kepper & Kepper, Hattiesburg, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Timmie Hancock, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
This case is on appeal from the Circuit Court of Forrest County where the appellant was convicted of armed robbery of the Petal-Harvey Bank, a branch of the Citizens Bank of Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
Shortly before noon on December 3, 1968 two armed men with stockings over their heads entered the bank and held guns on the employees of the bank. On forced the manager to open the grill door to the vault and remove all paper money from the vault, and then forced the manager and two tellers to lie on their face in the vault. The second man, the appellant herein, remained in the front portion of the bank and forced the third teller to give him all the paper money in the tellers' cages. He then forced her to the vault with the others and made her lie down. Before both men left they threatened theemployees that they would 'blow your brains out' if they moved before the robbers were gone.
Of the four employees in the bank at the time the robbery was committed, only one could identify the appellant. It was her testimony that she recognized his chin because the appellant pulled up the stocking covering his face and revealed his chin. The State offered as a witness appellant's accomplice, James Harold Parker, who testified that the appellant participated in the robbery together with the witness and P. A. Green, who remained outside the bank and drove the car that was used on this occasion.
Appellant assigns as error the failure of the court to sustain his motion for a directed verdict after the State had rested and upon renewal of the motion at the conclusion of the testimony when both the State and defense had rested; that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence; and, that the court erred in overruling the motion of defense counsel made before the commencement of the trial. The motion was in the following language:
Comes now the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and moves the Court to dismiss this cause against him on the grounds that the State of Mississippi by statute only allows one hundred and fifty dollars to prepare for a defense in capital criminal cases, and that this si so absurd that it is tantamount to not having adequate funds, which denies a person due process of law, proper access to the courts, and would show that no attorney could possibly do his best to protect the rights of a defendant on such meager, ridiculous and insufficient funds.
We have carefully examined all the testimony in this record and find no merit in the contention of the appellant that the verdict of the jury was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or that he was entitled to a directed verdict. The defendant secured five instructions that properly announced the law with reference to the testimony of an accomplice and the jury was told by these instructions that they were to view the testimony of an accomplice with suspicion and distruct; that it should be weighed with care and caution and they were entitled to disbelieve the testimony of the accomplice altogether if they believed it to be untrue.
The third assignment of error raises the question of whether or not the attorney's fee in the amount of $150.00, allowed at the time of the trial of this cause by Mississippi law, was so inadequate that it is tantamount to denying a person due process of law as provided by both the Constitution of the United States and the State of Mississippi.
A proper consideration of this question requires a brief review of the right of courts to appoint counsel for accused persons who are unable to secure their own counsel, the obligation of counsel so appointed, and their right to compensation for services performed pursuant to such appointment.
In Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), the United States Supreme Court held, in a capital case where the defendant was unable to employ counsel and was incapable of making his own defense, that it was the duty of the court to assign counsel for him, and stated:
Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when required by such appointment. (287 U.S. at 73, 53 S.Ct. at 65, 77 L.Ed. at 172).
In United States v. Dillon, 9 Cir., 346 F.2d 633, certiorari denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966), the court stated:
Appellant's brief contains a very complete and scholarly treatise which in our view establishes an obligation on the part of the legal profession to represent indigents upon court order, without compensation. We include portions of such brief in an appendix to this opinion. As the appendix points out, the obligation of the legal profession to serve indigents on court order is an ancient and established tradition, and that appointed counsel have generally been compensated, if at all, only by statutory fees which would be inadequate under just compensation principles, and which are usually payable only in limited types of cases. Further, as shown in the Appendix, the vast majority of the courts which have passed on the question have denied claims of appointed counsel for nonstatutory just compensation, pointing out that representation of indigents under court order, without, a fee, is a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the court, and that the obligation of the legal profession to serve without compensation has been modified only by statute. An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order. Thus, the lawyer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a 'taking of his services.' Cf. Kunhardt & Company, Inc. v. United States, 266 U.S. 537, 45 S.Ct. 158, 69 L.Ed. 428 (1925). (346 F.2d at 635).
In the case of Jackson v. State, ...
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