Young v. State

• Decision Date: 22 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. AP-75352.,AP-75352.
• Citation: 283 S.W.3d 854
• Parties: Christopher Anthony YOUNG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

283 S.W.3d 854

Christopher Anthony YOUNG, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

No. AP-75352.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 22, 2009.

Rehearing Denied June 10, 2009.

Michael D. Robbins, San Antonio, for appellant.

Crystal Chandler, Asst. Crim. D.A., San Antonio, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was convicted in February 2006 of capital murder.¹ Based upon the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071 §§ 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced the appellant to death.² Direct appeal to this Court is automatic.³ After reviewing the appellant's fifteen points of error, we find them to be without merit. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's judgment and sentence of death.

The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at both phases of trial. We shall address these issues first. The remaining points of error will be addressed in the order presented in the briefs.

In points of error one and two, the appellant contends that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to prove that he committed capital murder. He argues that the State's primary evidence, the store surveillance video, is not enough, legally or factually, to convict him of murdering the victim "while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery."⁴ Specifically, the appellant asserts that: (1) the tape's video sequence does not include conduct by the appellant that would imply that he was robbing or attempting to commit a robbery at the victim's store; and (2) the tape's sound in the corresponding audio is so "muddled" that it would be almost impossible for the jury to decipher any recorded dialogue that indicates that the appellant was in the course of committing robbery or attempting to commit robbery at the victim's store. The appellant also claims that the eyewitness testimonies of convenience store patrons, Raul Vasquez, Jr. and Hattie Helton, contributed little, if any, evidence to prove that the murder occurred in the course of a robbery.

The evidence at trial established that on November 21, 2004, within minutes of stealing a red Mazda Protégé from its owner at gunpoint, the appellant drove the stolen vehicle to the mini-mart/dry cleaners owned by Hasmukhbhai Patel. The following events were captured on the store's surveillance camera:⁵ the appellant, wearing a black shirt and light-colored shorts, entered the store at 9:37 a.m. and appeared to be holding something hidden within his left pocket. The appellant looked around the front of the store before moving behind Patel, who was working in the rear of the store. The appellant asked Patel the cost of cleaning clothes at the store. The appellant's voice immediately changed to a lower tone, and the appellant stated, "Alright [sic], give up the money. I'm not playing. I'm not fucking playing." Patel came into view as he quickly moved behind the counter towards the cash register, and the appellant could be seen leaning over the front counter with his left arm completely extended, pointing a silver handgun at Patel. Again, the appellant ordered Patel to "give up the money," followed by the appellant's firing his first shot in the direction of Patel (now out of view behind the cash register). The appellant then yelled, "You be fucking up. I'm not playing. Give it up!" He fired a second shot in the direction of Patel. At this point, the alarm went off as Patel had apparently pushed the panic button on the system. The appellant, with his handgun still extended, followed the fleeing Patel to the opposite side of the front counter, and he could be heard over the alarm shouting, "I said give up the money, right." The video caught the appellant's movement behind the counter in the direction of the cash register. He was out of view for a few seconds before coming back into view and was then seen concealing his handgun under his shirt as he left the store.

Two of Patel's regular customers, Raul Vasquez, Jr. and Hattie Helton, happened to be in the parking lot of the store at the time of the offense. Vasquez had just pulled into a parking space in front of the store. Before he could exit his truck, he heard gunshots and looked up to see a black male leaning over the counter firing a gun at Patel. When the gunman left the store and got into a small red car, Vasquez called the police and then chased the gunman, but with no success. Vasquez was able to tell the police that the car's license plate had a "W" and that the perpetrator was wearing a black shirt and light-colored shorts. Helton, who was parked directly in front of the door, had just exited the store moments earlier and was in her car checking her "scratch-off" lottery tickets. When she heard the store alarm go off, she looked up to see a black male exit the store and get in a small red car that was parked by the gas pumps. Once he was gone, Helton exited her car and called to Patel. When he did not answer, Helton called the police on a payphone located outside of the store. Both Vasquez and Helton identified the appellant as the perpetrator at trial.

The appellant was apprehended at approximately 11:00 a.m. when an officer spotted the red car parked at a house several miles away. The car's license plate began with a "W." The appellant was wearing a black shirt and light-colored shorts. The appellant's hands, shirt, and the steering wheel of the car all tested positive for gunshot residue. Patel's blood was found on one of the appellant's socks. Patel died from the gunshot wound to his chest. The murder weapon was never recovered.

In reviewing a claim that evidence is legally insufficient to support a judgment, "the relevant question [on appeal] is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."⁶ This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts."⁷ Therefore, in analyzing the legal sufficiency, we will determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.⁸

In a factual-sufficiency review, the evidence is reviewed in a neutral light rather than in the light most favorable to the verdict.⁹ Evidence can be factually insufficient in one of two ways: (1) when the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, and (2) when the supporting evidence is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.¹⁰ Although an appellate court's factual-sufficiency review of the evidence allows the court to second-guess the jury to a limited degree, the review should still be deferential to the jury's verdict.¹¹

Capital murder occurs when a person intentionally commits murder while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery.¹² The State did not bear the burden of proving that the appellant completed the theft of the victim in order to establish the underlying offense of robbery or attempted robbery.¹³ Rather, the requisite intent to rob may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, particularly the appellant's assaultive conduct.¹⁴ In this case, there was ample evidence, circumstantial and direct, of assaultive conduct characteristic of attempted robbery displayed by the appellant in the store surveillance tape.¹⁵

Despite the video sequence being short, and the events occurring quite fast, there is sufficient evidence on the surveillance tape that a jury could reasonably infer that the appellant murdered Patel in the course of an attempted robbery. Assaultive conduct, the gravamen of robbery, is demonstrated in the video by the appellant holding Patel at gunpoint after demanding the surrender of his money, forcing him behind the counter, and firing shots at Patel in response to his apparent refusal to give up the money. Vasquez's testimony that he saw a black man leaning over the front counter shooting at Patel is further evidence of assaultive conduct typical of a robbery.

The appellant insists the tape is devoid of "many of the hallmarks of robbery." To the contrary, the tape clearly evidences the appellant making several statements demonstrative of robbery, such as: "Alright [sic], give up the money. I'm not playing. I'm not fucking playing," and in the midst of firing shots at Patel shouting, "You be fucking up. I'm not playing. Give it up!" and, "I said give up the money, right." The appellant attacks the clarity of the dialogue between himself and Patel, most notably by his reference to State's witness Detective Sean Walsh's admission that he was unable to understand what was being said on the videotape. However, the jury had the opportunity to listen to the audio numerous times: during the presentation of evidence, during the State's closing arguments, and during its deliberations.¹⁶ The jury could reasonably infer that the appellant intentionally committed murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence.¹⁷ Because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict in this case.¹⁸ Even in considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we find that the evidence was not so weak nor so outweighed by the great weight of contrary evidence as to make the verdict seem clearly wrong and...