Young v. State
| Decision Date | 26 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-0992,17-0992 |
| Citation | 241 W.Va. 489,826 S.E.2d 346 |
| Parties | James W. YOUNG, Jr., Petitioner v. STATE of West Virginia and Debra Ditto, Magistrate of Morgan County, Respondents |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Dylan K. Batten, Esq., Stedman & Ridell, Martinsburg, West Virginia, Attorney for Petitioner
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Zachary Viglianco, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for the State of West Virginia
Courtney S. Moore, Esq., Office of the Prosecuting Attorney of Morgan County, West Virginia, Berkeley Springs, West Virginia, Attorney for Respondent
This appeal was brought by the Petitioner, James W. Young, Jr., from the October 10, 2017, order of the Circuit Court of Morgan County that granted relief to the State in a writ of prohibition proceeding. The circuit court’s order prohibited enforcement of an order by a Morgan County magistrate that granted deferred adjudication to the Petitioner, in a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI) second offense.1 In this appeal, the Petitioner alleges the circuit court applied the wrong statute in order to grant relief to the State. Upon careful review of the briefs, the appendix record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable legal authority, we affirm.
In the afternoon of April 27, 2017, the Petitioner was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Morgan County, West Virginia. A deputy sheriff responded to the scene of the accident. The deputy found the Petitioner’s vehicle off the road and stuck in vegetation. After speaking with the Petitioner, the deputy had reason to believe the Petitioner drove the vehicle while impaired. The deputy attempted to administer three field sobriety tests to the Petitioner. However, the Petitioner refused to take two of the tests, walk and turn and one-legged stand, because of an alleged physical disability.2 The deputy determined, based upon the totality of the circumstances, to arrest the Petitioner for second offense DUI.3
After the Petitioner’s arrest, a criminal complaint was filed against him in the Magistrate Court of Morgan County. The Petitioner was provided with court-appointed counsel. At a pretrial hearing on June 22, 2017, the Petitioner made an oral motion for deferred adjudication under W. Va. Code § 61-11-22a (2016). The State opposed the motion on the grounds that W. Va. Code § 61-11-22a was not applicable to DUI offenses, and that Chapter 17C of the West Virginia Code did not permit deferred adjudication for a second or subsequent DUI offense. The magistrate granted Petitioner’s motion and set the case for a final hearing on June 22, 2017. At the final hearing, the magistrate accepted a deferred adjudication agreement drafted by Petitioner, which the State opposed. Under the agreement, the Petitioner was placed on unsupervised probation for two years and was required to forfeit his driver’s license.4 The agreement also stated that if the Petitioner completed probation successfully, he would be convicted of first offense DUI. If the Petitioner did not successfully complete probation, the agreement stated that a conviction for second offense DUI would be imposed.
On July 20, 2017, the State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the circuit court. The State asked the circuit court to prohibit enforcement of the magistrate’s order granting the Petitioner deferred adjudication. The circuit court found that the State was entitled to the writ after concluding "that W. Va. Code §§ 17C-5-2(r) and 17C-5-2b do not permit suspension of a sentence for the offense of DUI or participation in the Deferral program by defendants charged with second offense DUI." The Petitioner filed this appeal challenging the circuit court’s decision.
In this case the Petitioner challenges the circuit court’s order granting extraordinary relief by way of a writ of prohibition. We have held that the "[t]he standard of appellate review of a circuit court’s order granting relief through the extraordinary writ of prohibition is de novo ." Syl. pt. 1, Martin v. West Virginia Division of Labor Contractor Licensing Board , 199 W. Va. 613, 486 S.E.2d 782 (1997). This appeal also involves the interpretation of statutes. In this regard, we have held that "[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review." Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L ., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). With these standards in mind, we proceed to determine whether the circuit court committed error in granting the writ of prohibition.
The Petitioner contends that the circuit court misconstrued the law when it held that deferred adjudication under W. Va. Code § 61-11-22a was not applicable to a second offense DUI. The State argues that the circuit court was correct in concluding that W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2(r) (2016) and W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2b (2016) do not permit a person charged with a second offense DUI to enter a deferred adjudication agreement.
The issues raised by the parties require a review of statutes. "The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature." Syl. pt. 8, Vest v. Cobb , 138 W.Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). We have long recognized that "[w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute." Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars , 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959). In this case we are confronted with different statutes that address the same issue, deferred adjudication. We have held that "[w]hen two statutes relate to the same general subject, and the two statutes are not in conflict, they are to be read In pari materia ." Syl. pt. 2, Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo Cty. Comm'n , 164 W. Va. 94, 261 S.E.2d 165 (1979). See Syl. pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r , 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975) (); Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims , 144 W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958) (). Even "where two statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe such statutes so as to give effect to each." Syl. pt. 4, in part, Graney . On the other hand, "when it is not reasonably possible to give effect to both statutes, the more specific statute will prevail." Barber v. Camden Clark Mem’l Hosp. Corp ., 240 W. Va. 663, 670, 815 S.E.2d 474, 481 (2018). In this regard, we have held that "[t]he general rule of statutory construction requires that a specific statute be given precedence over a general statute relating to the same subject matter where the two cannot be reconciled." Syl. pt.1, UMWA by Trumka v. Kingdon , 174 W. Va. 330, 325 S.E.2d 120 (1984). See Wells v. State ex rel. Miller , 237 W. Va. 731, 752, 791 S.E.2d 361, 382 (2016) (); In re Chevie V ., 226 W. Va. 363, 371, 700 S.E.2d 815, 823 (2010) (); NewarkIns. Co. v. Brown , 218 W. Va. 346, 351, 624 S.E.2d 783, 788 (2005) ().
In the instant case, the relevant text of W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2b provides the following:
The relevant text of W. Va. Code § 61-11-22a provides the following:
(a) Upon the entry of a guilty plea to a felony or misdemeanor before a circuit or magistrate court of this state entered in compliance with the provisions of West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or Rule 10 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure for Magistrate...
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Frazier v. Maynard, No. 19-0362
...Justice, dissenting: I dissent because the majority decision is inconsistent with this Court's recent opinion in Young v. State, 241 W. Va. 489, 826 S.E.2d 346 (2019). In that matter, this Court held that:A person charged with the crime of driving under the influence (DUI), pursuant to Chap......