Youngblood's Estate v. Youngblood

• Decision Date: 14 September 1970
• Docket Number: No. 55213,55213
• Parties: In re ESTATE of George D. YOUNGBLOOD, deceased, Respondent, v. Lodusca YOUNGBLOOD, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 750

457 S.W.2d 750

In re ESTATE of George D. YOUNGBLOOD, deceased, Respondent, v. Lodusca YOUNGBLOOD, Appellant.

No. 55213.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Sept. 14, 1970.

Ruyle & Henry, Neosho, for Estate of George D. Youngblood, deceased.

Frieze & Crandall, Carthage, for Beneficiaries and Devisees.

A. L. Shortridge, Joplin, for appellant.

ROBERT E. HOGAN, Special Judge.

On appeal from the probate court, the Circuit Court of Newton County held that an antenuptial contract executed by the appellant and her deceased husband constituted a valid waiver of all of the appellant's property rights in her husband's estate. Mrs. Youngblood appealed to the Springfield Court of Appeals, which transferred the cause here for want of jurisdiction. In re Estate of Youngblood, Mo.App., 447 S.W.2d 824. The sole question tendered is whether or not the antenuptial contract is valid and effective under the provisions of § 474.220, RSMo 1959.

At the time of their marriage on October 10, 1966, George and Lodusca Youngblood were about 68 years old. They had attended grammar school together and were well acquainted. Both had been married and both had reared families on nearby farms in Newton County. In 'May or June' of 1966, they went to the office of Mr. George Henry, an attorney in Neosho, advised him that they were contemplating marriage, and asked him to prepare an agreement which would permit each of them to devise his (or her) property to his children, free of claims by the other. Mr. Henry did so, and on October 7, 1966, George and Lodusca executed the contract which is now in question. As material here, the agreement recites that the parties intend to be married; that George is a widower with nine children, eight living and one deceased with issue; that Lodusca is a widow with two children; and that each 'is possessed of both real estate and personal property the extent of which has been fully and frankly disclosed by each of the parties hereto unto the other.' Reciting further that 'the parties intend this agreement to be in full discharge of all rights of inheritance and all other statutory rights under the statutes as they now exist or as they may be amended pursuant to the provisions of Section 474.120 and Section 474.220, Revised Statutes of Missouri, and pursuant to any powers under common law or (in) equity to fully discharge all such rights,' the agreement then provides that during the joint lives of the parties each shall have full power of disposition and control over his or her property as if he or she were single, and that either of the two parties will execute any instrument necessary to carry out the contract. The agreement then concludes: 'Upon the death of either party, this contract shall fully discharge all rights of inheritance and all other statutory rights in the estate of the other and neither shall have any interest, rights or claim in or to the estate of the other by virtue of any law whatsoever so that all of the estate of the first to die shall go and be disposed of as if said party had continued single and unmarried unless either party shall hereafter provide otherwise by inter vivos or testamentary instrument, but if there be such a will there shall be no right to elect to take against such will.' The contract is signed and acknowledged by both parties.

At the time the contract was signed, George owned two farms, one a 240-acre farm 'about half a mile or three quarters north' of the farm on which Lodusca lived, and the other a 20-acre farm which is referred to as the 'home place.' The 240-acre farm was encumbered by a deed of trust securing payment of a note to the Federal Land Bank in the sum of $11,094.65. The 'home place' was mortgaged to secure a note in the sum of $1,500. George also had some personal property, inferably worth $5,000--$5,500 at the time the agreement was made. Lodusca owned an 83-acre farm and some personal property--four or five cows, some farm machinery and 'household stuff,' but the value of her property was not established. The record does show that a short time after she signed the antenuptial contract Lodusca executed a last will and testament leaving all her property to her two children and a grandchild. This will does not mention the antenuptial contract.

On July 12, 1967, George sold the 240-acre farm to a concern identified only as Moark Construction Company for $45,000. Of this amount, George realized a little more than $34,000 after the encumbrance was discharged and taxes and expenses of the sale were paid. The purchaser gave a note in the sum of $31,950 in partial payment. Although Lodusca joined in the conveyance, the note was made payable to George only. On September 11, 1967, George made a last will and testament which contained no provision for Lodusca, but recited that 'prior to our marriage we entered into a premarital agreement fully and finally determining and settling all rights to the property of the other * * *.'

George died on April 3, 1968. His will was admitted to probate and the inventory and appraisement filed shows that he still owned the 'home place,' valued at $10,000, and that he owned personal property valued at $35,298.84. Lodusca filed an election to take against the will, and applied for her exempt property, a family allowance, and a homestead allowance. In the probate court, the antenuptial agreement was set up in bar of the election and in bar of the statutory allowances for which she prayed, and after a hearing the probate court found that the antenuptial contract was valid and that it constituted a bar to Lodusca's election.

Lodusca then appealed to the circuit court. In that court she testified, as we have said, that she and George had attended grammar school together; as she put it, '(j)ust the eighth grade is all we went to.' She had been 'just on the farm a housewife,' and had had no training in business affairs. Prior to her marriage to George, she had lived on the farm we have mentioned, but she didn't 'know what it would be valued at, not too high because the buildings are old.' This farm was, as we have noted, within a mile of George's 240-acre tract.

George had told Lodusca he was 'heavy in debt,' but, she added, 'I didn't know he was in debt so much.' She had known that George owned the two tracts of realty, and she was familiar with both, but she did not know what either was worth. She testified that she had signed the antenuptial contract so her children would receive the property which she and their father had owned. She had gone to Mr. Henry's office, she testified, but when she started to say something or ask a question, Mr. Henry and George had said, 'No argument,' and in her words, 'I never did have a word to say in it.' Lodusca emphatically denied that the terms of the antenuptial agreement had been explained to her, and she denied that any of the applicable law was discussed or explained by Mr. Henry before she signed the instrument.

Mr. Henry testified at length, and without objection, concerning the execution of the antenuptial contract. In substance, his evidence was that George and Lodusca had come to his office several months before they were married, and had said, in his words, that '* * * they wanted to get married and they wanted their own kids to have what each of them had * * *.' Mr. Henry knew generally hat George owned, and Lodusca told him that she owned a farm. Lodusca gave Mr. Henry the names of her children, George gave the names of his, and Mr. Henry set a tentative date for execution of the agreement. They did not come back at once, but delayed execution of the agreement to inquire whether or not Lodusca's 'social security' payments would be diminished or cut off if she married. Finally, on October 7, 1966, George and Lodusca returned and signed the contract.

Mr. Henry's recollection was that George and Lodusca had consulted with him on three occasions. On the first occasion, Mr. Henry had explained a surviving spouse's property rights in an intestate estate, had compared those rights with those which accrue in a testate estate, and had tried to explain the nature of the allowance of exempt property, the family allowance and homestead allowance. Mr. Henry had gone over these same matters again in October before the contract was finally signed. He was unable to say whether the parties read the contract or whether he read it to them, 'but one or the other happened.'

Mr. Henry testified that he asked George and Lodusca specifically if they had 'made full disclosure to the other of what they had,' and whild the words 'full disclosure' were his, they, George and Lodusca, said they had done so. He had tole them a full disclosure was necessary, and while there was no discussion of specific property values, he 'went down the list as to what each would take in the absence of a will and with a will * * * and in the absence of a contract.' In Mr. Henry's office, George and Lodusca had discussed George's two farms, his cattle and his farm machinery and Lodusca's farm, but they did not mention money values and Mr. Henry was unable to say 'what conclusions they drew as to value.'

Upon this evidence, the trial court made rather elaborate findings of fact and conclusions of law. It concluded, among other things, that the antenuptial contract was made upon a valid and adequate consideration, that a full disclosure was made by both parties, and that the agreement was fair and reasonable to Lodusca Youngblood. It found no evidence that the appellant had been imposed upon or overreached, and concluded that the contract in suit constituted a valid waiver of all the appellant's property rights in the estate of her deceased husband. Procedurally, the case is before us for review of the same scope as any other court-tried case we review the case upon both the law and the evidence, giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the witnesses' credibility. We do not set...