GARY
A. J.
This is
an action for damages sustained by the plaintiff while in the
employment of the defendant as switchman in its yard in the
city of Columbia on the 3d day
of December, 1898. The complaint alleges that on said day the
defendant, in disregard and violation of its duty,
negligently and carelessly provided and furnished to the
plaintiff a car which was not good, safe, or secure, in that
the coupler and the coupling appliances thereof were worn,
broken, and defective; that, while the said car was in the
use and service of the defendant, the plaintiff, while
adjusting the coupler and coupling appliances thereof, in the
endeavor to couple the same with those of another car of, and
in the use and service of, the defendant, had his right
forearm, by reason and in consequence of the unsafeness,
defectiveness, and insecurity aforesaid, caught between the
couplers of said cars, and crushed, bruised, and broken; that
by reason thereof the plaintiff suffered great bodily pain,
and was ill and incapacitated for work for about three
months, and was compelled to have his forearm amputated, and
was permanently injured in the loss of said forearm. The
defendant answered the complaint, denying its allegations,
and setting up the defense of contributory negligence. At the
conclusion of plaintiff's testimony the defendant made a
motion for a nonsuit, which was refused. The jury rendered a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,700.
The
defendant appealed upon exceptions, the first and second of
which are as follows: "(1) Excepts because the presiding
judge erred in allowing the plaintiff to testify, over the
objection of defendant, as to being a married man, and as to
the number of his children, and their ages, because, it is
submitted, such evidence was irrelevant to any issue raised
by the pleadings, and was incompetent upon the question of
the amount of damages claimed. (2) Excepts because the
presiding judge erred in overruling
defendant's objection to, and allowing the plaintiff to
answer, the question: 'Has your wife and those children
any means of support, except what you provide for them?
Answer. No, sir.' Such evidence, it is submitted, being
irrelevant to any issue raised by the pleadings, and
incompetent upon the question of the amount of damages
claimed." The questions presented by these exceptions
arose during the examination in chief of the plaintiff, as
follows: "Q. Are you a married man? A. Yes, sir. Q. How
many children have you? Mr. Abney: We object. By Mr. Nelson:
What means have you for support, besides what you can make by
your labor? A. None at all. Q. Are you dependant upon that
for a support for yourself and family? A. Yes, sir. What
family have you? Mr. Abney: We object to the testimony with
regard to the condition of the plaintiff,--as to his
financial condition, as to his family relations, or anything
else. The Court: A man is bound by law to provide for the
support of his family, so far as he can do so. Now, if this
man's children were independent, self-supporting,--if
they were of age,--I think the question might be irrelevant,
whether he had any children; but if he has those who are
dependent upon him for support, and for whose support the law
imposes on him the obligation of providing for them, then it
becomes competent, under the allegation of the complaint that
he is permanently injured, in ascertaining the question of
the extent of the injury, in so far as it may or may not
incapacitate him to meet the obligations which are imposed
upon him by law. I think the question competent. Q. How many
children have you? A. Five. Q. How old is the oldest one? A.
Ten. Q. And the youngest? A. About five months. Q. Has your
wife and those children any means of support, except what you
provide for them? Mr. Abney: We continue to object to the
whole line of the evidence. The Court: Note the objection,
which is overruled. A. No, sir." The grounds of
objection are not stated. When objection is made to the
introduction of testimony, the ground thereof
should be clearly and specifically stated, in order that the
circuit judge may know upon what question he is requested to
rule. "A ground of objection which was not ruled upon by
the presiding judge cannot be urged in this court."
Allen v. Cooley, 53 S.C. 80, 30 S.E. 722; Norris
v. Clinkscales, 59 S.C. 243, 37 S.E. 821. But, waiving
this objection, the testimony was admissible, not for the
purpose of showing that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
damages sustained by the members of his family by reason of
his injury, but as tending to show that one of the direct and
proximate results flowing from the defendant's alleged
negligence was to deprive him of the capacity to meet the
obligation, imposed upon him by law, of supporting his
family. Johns v. Railroad Co., 39 S.C. 162, 17 S.E.
698; Mathis v. Railway Co., 53 S.C. 258, 31 S.E.
240. If this was a direct and proximate result of the injury,
we see no reason why it should not have been considered by
the jury in estimating the damages which he sustained.
Pickens v. Railroad Co., 54 S.C. 498, 32 S.E. 567. A
person is certainly damaged when he is deprived of the
ability to meet a legal obligation. These exceptions are
overruled.
The
third exception is as follows: "(3) Excepts because the
presiding judge erred in overruling defendant's objection
to, and allowing the plaintiff to answer, the question:
'And your general health since you lost this arm; your
general health--Has it been good or impaired? Answer. Been
bad. I have suffered from rheumatism ever since.'
Whereas, it is submitted that, the complaint containing no
allegation that plaintiff's health had been affected,
such evidence should have been excluded." In 5 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 746, 747, under the head of "Describing
Injuries," it is said: "It is not necessary, in an
action for personal injuries, that the petition should
undertake to give a specific catalogue of the plaintiff's
injuries. It is enough that the declaration shows the
injury complained of, without describing it in all its
seriousness, and a recovery should be had in proportion to
the extent of the injury." And under the head of
"Effect or Result of Injury" we find
the following, on page 747: "Nor do the rules of
pleading require that every effect or result following the
infliction of particular injuries shall be set forth in the
declaration, in order to recover therefor, since such course
would, in effect, require the pleading of the entire
evidence." In 3 Suth. Dam. 2663, the rule is thus
stated: "The general rule in tort is that the party who
commits a trespass or other wrongful act is liable for all
the direct injury resulting, although such injury could not
have been contemplated as the probable result of the act
done. The plaintiff may show specific, direct effects of the
injury without specially alleging them,--as that he was
thereby made subject to fits. If they were a part of the
result of the injury, the plaintiff may recover for such
damage without specially alleging it, as well as the pain and
disability which followed." This language is quoted with
approval in Croco v. Railroad Co. (Utah) 54 P. 985,
44 L. R. A. 285, in which the rule just stated is sustained
both by reasoning and authorities. This exception is
overruled.
The
fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh exceptions were argued
together, and are as follows: "(4) Excepts because the
presiding judge erred in overruling defendant's objection
to, and allowing the plaintiff to answer, the question
'One engaged in the service you were, as coupler; is it
usual to furnish them with any implement,--anything to work
with; a car coupler or stick? Answer. Yes, sir; the Southern
road requires you to use sticks'. Such evidence, it is
submitted, was irrelevant to any issue raised by the
pleadings. The evidence admitted was as to a charge of
negligence not covered by the allegations of the complaint.
(5) Excepts because the presiding judge erred in allowing
plaintiff to testify, against the objection of defendant,
that he had not been furnished with any coupling stick. For
the same reason as in (4), supra. (6) Excepts because the
presiding judge erred in overruling defendant's objection
to, and allowing the plaintiff to answer, the question:
'After this accident happened, and your arm was crushed,
were you asked about any coupling stick, or to receipt for
one? Answer. Yes, sir'. For the same reason as stated in
(4), supra. (7) Excepts because the presiding judge erred in
allowing plaintiff to testify, over the objection of
defendant, that the yard master who hired him, and under
whose direction he was, tried to get him to receipt for a
coupling stick. For the same reason as stated in (4), supra,
and that the authority of such yard master had not been
shown." These questions arose as follows, when the
plaintiff was recalled, to wit: "Q. One engaged in the
service you were as coupler; is it usual to furnish them with
any implement,--anything to work with; a car coupler or
stick? A. Yes, sir; the Southern road requires you to use
sticks. Mr. Abney: We object. Has no bearing on this issue at
all. The charge is, he went in there to couple. No charge of
negligence that we did not furnish him with implements. The
Court: I think it competent. Q. by Mr. Nelson: Were you
furnished with any coupling stick? A. No,...
