Yourtee v. Hubbard
| Decision Date | 19 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 22885,22885 |
| Citation | 196 W.Va. 683,474 S.E.2d 613 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Georgia D. YOURTEE, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Yourtee, Deceased, Appellant, v. Robert A. HUBBARD, Appellee. |
1. Syllabus Point 2, Alkire v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996).
2. "The granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point 3, in part, Alkire v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996).
3. A person who participates in the theft of a motor vehicle, and is injured thereafter as a result of the operation of that stolen motor vehicle, is not within the class of persons that the Legislature designed the unattended motor vehicle statute, W. Va.Code 17C-14-1 (1951), to benefit. Therefore, W. Va.Code 17C-14-1 (1951) does not create a private cause of action for a thief against the owner of the automobile whose conduct may have facilitated its theft.
4. The owner of a motor vehicle does not owe a common law duty of ordinary care to those who participate in the theft of that motor vehicle; with regard to those who participate in the theft of a motor vehicle, the owner need only refrain from willful or wanton misconduct.
David M. Hammer, Joseph R. Ferretti, Hammer, Ferretti & Schiavoni, Martinsburg Norwood Bentley III, Kimberly S. Croyle, Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, Martinsburg, for Appellee.
[196 W.Va. 685] and Byron Craig Manford, Martinsburg, for Appellant.
This is an appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of Berkeley County, which granted the motion of the defendant, Robert Hubbard, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict returned in favor of the plaintiff below, Georgia Yourtee, Administratrix of the estate of her son, Michael Yourtee. The plaintiff's decedent was killed when a stolen automobile, in which he was a passenger and which he assisted in stealing, crashed into a brick wall following a high speed chase in an attempt to elude capture. The trial court granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the grounds that the theft of the automobile and subsequent negligent acts of Mr. Yourtee and his friends constituted an intervening efficient cause which broke the chain of causation and was the proximate cause of Mr. Yourtee's death, rather than the conduct of the defendant in creating the condition that permitted the automobile to be stolen. We agree with the decision of the circuit court in granting the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not necessarily for the reasons announced by the trial court, but for a more fundamental reason based on a lack of a duty owed to a person participating in the theft of a motor vehicle.
On March 3, 1989, the defendant, Robert Hubbard, parked his automobile in front of his video rental store located in a strip style shopping center in Berkeley County, West Virginia. At the same time, the plaintiff's decedent, Michael Yourtee, and three other youths under the age of eighteen, were on a mission to steal a motor vehicle. One of the youths was James L. Tomblin II, a lad of seventeen years. The young men happened upon the defendant's automobile, which they found to be unlocked with the ignition key available. 1
Mr. Tomblin was designated to steal the defendant's automobile and drive around the shopping center until he found Mr. Yourtee and his companions waiting at another location within the center. During the remainder of that day and into the early hours of the next morning, the young men alternated as drivers of the stolen automobile. At one point in the early morning hours of the following day, the crime spree included stealing a case of beer from a convenience store. Upon leaving the convenience store, the driver (who was not Mr. Yourtee) moved the automobile through a stoplight without stopping. Believing that they were being followed by a security guard from a bank they had passed, the driver began to accelerate the speed of the automobile in excess of ninety miles per hour in an effort to elude those who were thought to be chasing the stolen car. During this high speed maneuvering, and while the automobile was in motion, Mr. Tomblin traded places with the driver. Mr. Tomblin continued the high rate of speed until he came upon a left turn that could not be successfully negotiated. The automobile, which was traveling at approximately eighty miles per hour, struck a brick wall. Mr. Yourtee did not survive the impact.
The plaintiff, as Administratrix of her son's estate, filed a wrongful death claim under W. Va.Code 55-7-5 (1931). 2 Named as defendants The only defendant at the time of trial was Robert Hubbard. The jury returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff damages in the amount of $275,324.64, and apportioned fault as follows: James L. Tomblin II (60%); Mr. Yourtee (30%); Robert Hubbard (10%); and the plaintiff, Georgia Yourtee (0%). 4 The defendant filed post-trial motions, including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 The circuit court granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the reasons that we have previously stated. It is from this order that the plaintiff now appeals.
[196 W.Va. 686] were Robert Hubbard (the owner of the automobile), James L. Tomblin II (the driver of the automobile), and Teresa E. Tomblin (the mother of James L. Tomblin II). 3
We recently had an opportunity to formulate the standard of review in those cases where a trial court grants a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as compared to those cases where a trial court denies a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Compare Alkire v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996) with Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995) and Mildred L.M. v. John O.F., 192 W.Va. 345, 452 S.E.2d 436 (1994). As in Alkire, we are concerned in this case with reviewing the trial court's granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which we review as follows:
In reviewing a trial court's granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, it is not the task of the appellate court reviewing facts to determine how it would have ruled on the evidence presented. Its task is to determine whether the evidence was such that a reasonable trier of fact might have reached the decision below. Thus, in ruling on the granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. If on review, the evidence is shown to be legally sufficient to sustain the verdict, it is the obligation of the appellate court to reverse the circuit court and to order judgment for the appellant.
Syllabus Point 2, Alkire v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996).
We review the granting of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict de novo. Syllabus Point 3, in part, Alkire v.
[196 W.Va. 687] First Nat'l Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996). Our charge is to determine if, after review, the evidence is shown to be legally sufficient to sustain the verdict, then it is the obligation of this Court to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and reinstate the verdict for the appellant. Alkire v. First Nat'l Bank, 197 W.Va. 122, 475 S.E.2d 122 (1996). Through the following analysis, we do not conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, so our obligation is satisfied by affirming the order granting the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The focal point of the plaintiff's theory of recovery against the defendant is W. Va.Code 17C-14-1 (1951), also known as the unattended motor vehicle statute, which provides:
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the key, and effectively setting the brake thereon and, when standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.
The plaintiff contends that by allowing the ignition key to be easily accessible to the defendant's unattended automobile, the defendant violated W. Va.Code 17C-14-1 (1951). The theory continues that the violation of W. Va.Code 17C-14-1 (1951) is prima facie evidence of negligence and is actionable because the violation was the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's decedent. See Syllabus Point 1, Anderson v. Moulder, 183 W.Va. 77, 394 S.E.2d 61 (1990).
Is the application of W. Va.Code 17C-14-1 (1951) dispositive of the facts of this case? This case presents the first occasion that we have had to discuss the scope of the unattended motor vehicle statute as it relates to injuries caused to third persons. W. Va.Code 55-7-9 (1923) expressly authorizes civil liability based on a violation of a statute:
Any person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he...
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