Yumori-Kaku v. City of Santa Clara

• Decision Date: 30 December 2020
• Docket Number: H046105, H046696
• Citation: 59 Cal.App.5th 385,273 Cal.Rptr.3d 437
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: LaDonna YUMORI-KAKU et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITY OF SANTA CLARA, Defendant and Appellant.

59 Cal.App.5th 385

273 Cal.Rptr.3d 437

LaDonna YUMORI-KAKU et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.CITY OF SANTA CLARA, Defendant and Appellant.

H046105, H046696

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Filed December 30, 2020

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant City of Santa Clara: Steven G. Churchwell, Karl A. Schweikert, J. Scott Miller, Sacramento, Liah Burnley, Churchwell White, John C. McCarron, Sacramento, Downey Brand, Kevin A. Calia, Boersch & Illovsky, Brian L. Doyle, Sujata Reuter, Santa Clara City Attorney's Office

Amicus Curiae in support of Defendant/Appellant City of Santa Clara: John K. Haggerty, In Propria Persona

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Respondents LaDonna Yumori-Kaku, Wesley Kazuo Mukoyama, Umar Kamal, Michael Kaku, Herminio Hernando: Morris J. Baller, Laura L. Ho, Anne P. Bellows, Ginger L. Grimes, Oakland, GOLDSTEIN, BORGEN, DARDARIAN & HO, Robert Rubin, San Francisco, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT RUBIN, Richard Konda, San Jose, ASIAN LAW ALLIANCE

Premo, Acting P.J. Five Asian American residents sued the City of Santa Clara (City) contending that at-large elections for the office of city council violated the California Voting Rights Act of 2001. The trial court agreed after a bench trial that occurrences of racially polarized voting impaired the ability of Asian American voters, as a result of vote dilution, to elect their preferred candidates to Santa Clara's seven-member city council. It ordered the City to implement district-based city council elections and awarded attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs totaling more than $3 million.

On appeal, the City challenges the trial court's liability finding and the resulting award of attorney fees and costs. The City contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that racially polarized voting in five of 10 city council elections satisfied the standard for a cognizable voting rights claim, which requires a showing that the majority voting bloc in Santa Clara's electorate "usually" voted to defeat the candidate preferred by Asian American voters. The City also challenges the trial court's use of statistical evidence to support its findings of racially polarized voting. The City argues that the trial court's imposition of "race-based districts" based on legally inadequate findings of racially polarized voting violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the City's plenary authority as a charter city under the California Constitution to control the manner and method of electing its officers.

We find no reversible error in the trial court's interpretation of the governing legal principles and its application of the law to the evidence presented at trial.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of Legal Framework on Racially Polarized Voting

This case concerns enforcement of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 ( Elec. Code, §§ 14025 - 14032, hereafter "the Act")¹ and the interpretation of federal voting rights law upon which the Act was in part modeled.

The Act provides a private right of action for members of a protected class to challenge at-large election methods in their political subdivision. Section 14027 states that "[a]n at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class, as defined pursuant to Section 14026." To prove a section 14027 violation, the protected class must prove that the challenged voting method impairs its ability to elect preferred candidates or influence election outcomes because of the dilution or abridgment of its voting rights. (§ 14027.)

A plaintiff must show racially polarized voting to prove a violation of section 14027. (§ 14028, subd. (a); Sanchez v. City of Modesto (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 660, 667, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 821 ( Sanchez ).) Section 14028, subdivision (a) provides that a violation is established "if it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision or in elections incorporating other electoral choices by the voters of the political subdivision." The City in our case challenges only the trial court's finding of racially polarized voting under section 14028. We turn our attention accordingly to the factors and preconditions relevant to proving racially polarized voting.

We begin with California's statutory definition of racially polarized voting. " ‘Racially polarized voting’ means voting in which there is a difference, as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 ( 52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq. ), in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and in the choice of candidates and electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate. The methodologies for estimating group voting behavior as approved in applicable federal cases to enforce the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 ( 52 U.S.C. Sec. 10301 et seq. ) to establish racially polarized voting may be used for purposes of this section to prove that elections are characterized by racially polarized voting." (§ 14026, subd. (e).)

We take note of two directions in the statutory definition. First, racially polarized voting draws a comparison between the voting preferences of the "voters in [the] protected class" and those of "voters in the rest of the electorate." (§ 14026, subd. (e).) Second, it is the difference between the voting pattern of the two groups that determines racially polarized voting, as that difference is defined in case law based on the federal Voting Rights Act. (Ibid. ) Federal cases also demonstrate the methodologies that may be used to prove that elections are characterized by racially polarized voting. (Ibid. ) The landmark voting rights decision in Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 ( Gingles ) serves as our principal guide.

The United States Supreme Court in Gingles construed section 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act, which like California's voting rights law creates liability for vote dilution. ( Gingles, supra , 478 U.S. at p. 34, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) A section 2 violation is established by a showing, "based on the totality of the circumstances, ... that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." ( 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301, subd. (b).) The Gingles Court delineated three threshold requirements to proving a section 2 violation, sometimes referred to as the " Gingles factors" or " Gingles preconditions." These are: "(1) The racial group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district; (2) the racial group is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate." ( Mo. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Ferguson-Florissant Sch. Dist. (8th Cir. 2018) 894 F.3d 924, 930 ( Missouri State ) see Gingles, supra , 478 U.S. at pp. 50-51, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) As we explain below, only the second and third Gingles factors are required to prove a violation of California's Act.

Under the federal Voting Rights Act, a plaintiff who satisfies the three Gingles preconditions must then prove the ultimate issue of vote dilution based on the totality of circumstances. ( Old Person v. Cooney (9th Cir. 2000) 230 F.3d 1113, 1120 ( Old Person ); accord Missouri State, supra , 894 F.3d at p. 930.) The focus at this stage is on "the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities ...." ( Gingles, supra , 478 U.S. at p. 44, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) In its analysis, the court considers a list of factors based on the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee majority Report that accompanied the bill amending section 2, sometimes referred to as "the Senate Factors." ( Gingles, supra , at p. 36, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) The "list is exemplary, and not exhaustive, and ‘ "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other." ’ [( Gingles , at p. 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752.)]" ( Old Person, supra , 230 F.3d at p. 1128.)

The Senate Factors include "the history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision; the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, ...; the exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction." ( Gingles, supra , 478 U.S. at pp. 44-45, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) The most important factors in assessing a vote dilution claim "are the ‘extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction’ and the ‘extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.’ " ( Id. at p. 48, fn. 15, 106 S.Ct. 2752.) Use of the factors is intended to support a "flexible, fact-intensive" approach to answering the question of whether vote dilution is...