Yvette S. Mitchell v. Speedy Car X, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | 98-LW-1883,18544 |
| Parties | YVETTE S. MITCHELL, Appellant v. SPEEDY CAR X, INC., Appellee C.A. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE NO. CV 96-04-1626
This cause was heard upon the record in the trial court. Each error assigned has been reviewed and the following disposition is made:
Appellant Yvette Mitchell appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
Mitchell filed a complaint against Speedy Car-X, Inc., d.b.a Speedy Brake and Muffler ("Speedy"), in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas on April 25, 1996. The complaint sought damages for bodily injuries that resulted from a breach of contract. In her complaint, Mitchell alleged that she had entered into a contract with Speedy for the repair of her automobile; that on July 21, 1992, a tire fell off of her automobile as she was driving it; that she sustained injuries; that her injuries were caused by Speedy's employees failing to secure her tire properly; and that as a result Speedy had breached its contract with her.
On May 28, 1996, Speedy filed a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing that Mitchell failed to bring the action within the applicable statute of limitations. Mitchell responded. On April 29, 1997, the trial court granted Speedy's motion to dismiss. Mitchell now appeals to this court.
Mitchell asserts one assignment of error:
The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as the complaint states a claim within the applicable statute of limitations.
The trial court held that the applicable statute of limitations was the two year statute of limitations for actions for bodily injury, R.C. 2305.10.[1] Mitchell argues that the applicable limitations period is four years, under R.C. 1302.98,[2] the statute of limitations for the sale of goods.
A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to relief. Wilson v. State (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 487, 491. For purposes of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the trial court must accept all factual allegations as true and make every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party. Shockey v. Wilkinson (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 91, 93. In order for a complaint to be dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as being barred by the statute of limitations, it must be obvious from the face of the complaint that the action is time-barred. Steiner v. Steiner (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 513, 518-19. We review a dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. Hunt v. Marksman Prods., Div. of S/R Industries, Inc. (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 760, 762.
Where a contract is for the sale of goods, R.C. Chapter 1302 (Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code) applies. R.C. 1302.02. The applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, including breach of warranty actions, under R.C. Chapter 1302 is four years. R.C. 1302.98. However, "[w]hen the transaction relates primarily to services, an incidental sale of merchandise does not make it a sales contract governed by the commercial code." Prokasy v. Pearle Vision Ctr. (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 44, 46. Therefore, if Mitchell's contract with Speedy was primarily for the sale of goods, then her claims are not time-barred. If the predominant purpose of the contract was for Speedy to provide services to Mitchell, then the two year limitations period of R.C. 2305.10 applies, and the trial court properly dismissed Mitchell's complaint.
We find that the applicable statute of limitations is the two year limitation for bodily injury under R.C. 2305.10. This is for two reasons. First, in her complaint, Mitchell alleges that she suffered severe bodily injury as a result of Speedy breaching its contract with her to repair her car correctly. Mitchell argues that her contract with Speedy was for the sale of goods. The pertinent portions of her complaint read as follows:
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Taking her allegations as true and construing all inferences in her favor, Mitchell's complaint reveals that the basis for her suit stems from Speedy providing a service%performing some repair on her car. Any goods sold as a result of the transaction would have been incidental to the provision of this service. See Cochran v. Rowe's Transmission (Nov. 23, 1987), Butler App. No. CA87-03-047, unreported (where injury to personal property was alleged after car transmission replacement, R.C. 2305.10 provides the applicable statute of limitations, not R.C. 1302.98). See, also, Jim Bushman's Water Co. v. Bilinovich (Apr. 28, 1993), Summit App. No. 15865, unreported, at 3-4. But, see, Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Prods. Sales Co. (C.A.6 1969), 411 F.2d 850 ( Ohio law).
Second, we also look to the underlying nature of Mitchell's complaint. In a case decided before R.C. Chapter 1302 was adopted in Ohio, the Ohio Supreme...
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