Zabaleta-Martinez v. State
| Decision Date | 07 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-18-00512-CR,NO. 03-18-00514-CR,NO. 03-18-00513-CR,03-18-00512-CR,03-18-00513-CR,03-18-00514-CR |
| Parties | Ronaldo Zabaleta-Martinez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 167TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
THE HONORABLE P. DAVID WAHLBERG, JUDGE PRESIDING
A jury found appellant Ronaldo Zabaleta-Martinez guilty of the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated family-violence assault of Michelle Rodriguez and the aggravated assault of Ramiro Araiza-Mendez.1 See Tex. Penal Code §§ 20.04, 22.02. The jury sentenced appellant to confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for ten years, seven years, and three years, respectively, see id. §§ 12.32, .33, and the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently, see id. § 3.03(a). On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We affirm the trial court's judgments of conviction.
BACKGROUND
The evidence at trial showed that Michelle Rodriguez met appellant through her employment. She believed him to be single, and they began a dating relationship. Through appellant, Rodriguez became acquainted with appellant's brother, Nelson Zabaleta-Martinez,2 and their friend, Felix.3 Rodriguez ended her relationship with appellant when Silvia Pineda, a woman claiming to be appellant's wife or girlfriend, began making threatening phone calls to Rodriguez. Appellant did not respond well to the breakup and continued to call Rodriguez until she blocked his number.
On the night of April 8, 2017, Rodriguez went to a dance club with friends. She saw appellant at the bar, but the two did not interact. She also saw Nelson and Felix before she left the club but had no contact with them there. Rodriguez left the club around 2:00 a.m., getting a ride home from her friend Ramiro Araiza-Mendez in his car. As they were driving around a curve in the apartment complex where Rodriguez lived, they encountered appellant in his pickup truck. Appellant stopped his truck across the path, blocking the way of Araiza-Mendez's car. Nelson came from the bed of the truck with an aluminum bat in his hand. He walked to the car and struck it multiple times with the bat, damaging the windshield and smashing out both the passenger's side window and the driver's side window. Rodriguez screamed, fearing that Nelson wanted to hurt her or get her out of the car.
Araiza-Mendez maneuvered his car onto the sidewalk and drove around appellant's truck to attempt to leave the apartment complex. However, the way out of theparking lot was blocked by Nelson's car, a black Cadillac, from which Felix and Pineda emerged. After Araiza-Mendez's car was blocked by Nelson's car, appellant drove his truck up behind Araiza-Mendez's car, "sandwiching" the car in. At that point, appellant got out of his truck and approached Rodriguez in the passenger's seat. He grabbed her by the hair, causing her "strong" pain, and pulled her from the car "against [her] will." After he forced Rodriguez out of the car, appellant punched her "very hard" on her chest, causing her "very strong pain," while his brother struck her head twice with the bat. The combination of the punch and the bat strikes caused Rodriguez to fall to the ground.
At that point, appellant and his brother turned their attention to Araiza-Mendez, who was still in his car. Nelson approached Araiza-Mendez on the driver's side, attempting to hit him with the bat through the broken driver's side window. Appellant went inside the car through the passenger side—from where he had forcibly removed Rodriguez—and began repeatedly punching Araiza-Mendez. As he did so, appellant urged his brother to "pop him open, hit him."
When appellant and Nelson turned their attack to Araiza-Mendez, Felix and Pineda approached Rodriguez, pulled on her, and attempted to force her inside Nelson's car. Rodriguez confirmed in her testimony at trial that she was unable to move freely when they were holding her and pulling her and that they moved her toward the Cadillac against her will. She also expressed that she did not want to be confined or held in that way, that she did not want to be put into Nelson's car, and that she feared that she would be killed.
Ultimately, Felix and Pineda were unsuccessful in getting Rodriguez into Nelson's car because nearby residents of the apartment complex intervened, telling Felix and Pineda that they needed to let Rodriguez go and that they were calling the police. As Nelson,Felix, and Pineda moved to leave, appellant grabbed Rodriguez by the neck and tried to pull her into Nelson's car. He hit her in the chest, choked her, and covered her mouth with his hand as he dragged her toward the car. Appellant let her go when the residents again intervened, telling him to let her go and threatening to call the police.
Appellant, Nelson, Felix, and Pineda fled the scene in Nelson's car and appellant's pickup truck, while Rodriguez and Araiza-Mendez remained to wait for police and medical assistance. Rodriguez was transported by ambulance to the hospital, where she was treated for injuries sustained during the encounter, including two head wounds that each required multiple staples.
Appellant and his brother were arrested six weeks after the encounter when they were apprehended by the fugitive task force.
DISCUSSION
Appellant raises two points of error, both challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. In his first point of error, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for aggravated kidnapping. In his second point of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for aggravated assault.
Standard of Review
Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979); Lang v. State, 561 S.W.3d 174, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to theverdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 607-08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Musacchio v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 709, 711-12 (2016); Johnson v. State, 560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). In our sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the record, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted, or submitted by the prosecution or the defense. Thompson v. State, 408 S.W.3d 614, 627 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); see Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We assume that the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. We consider only whether the factfinder reached a rational decision. Arroyo v. State, 559 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ().
The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art 36.13 ( that "the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts"). Thus, when performing an evidentiary-sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608; Arroyo, 559 S.W.3d at 487; seeMontgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (). Instead, we must defer to the credibility and weight determinations of the factfinder. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608; Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). When the record supports conflicting reasonable inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733; Cary, 507 S.W.3d at 757; see Musacchio, 136 S. Ct. at 715 (). We must "determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778); accord Arroyo, 559 S.W.3d at 487.
Because factfinders are permitted to make reasonable inferences, "[i]t is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); accord Johnson, 560 S.W.3d at 226. The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599; Nowlin v. State, ...
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