Zablotny v. State Bd. of Nursing

• Decision Date: 20 March 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. Was–13–42.
• Citation: 2014 ME 46,89 A.3d 143
• Parties: John S. ZABLOTNY v. STATE BOARD OF NURSING.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

89 A.3d 143

2014 ME 46

John S. ZABLOTNY

v.STATE BOARD OF NURSING.

Docket No. Was–13–42.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: Nov. 19, 2013.

Decided: March 20, 2014.

Joseph M. Baldacci, Esq. (orally), Law Office of Joseph M. Baldacci, Bangor, for appellant John S. Zablotny.

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Andrew L. Black, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State Board of Nursing.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

JABAR, J.

[¶ 1] John S. Zablotny appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Machias, Romei, J.) affirming the State Board of Nursing's (Board) decision to revoke his professional nursing license for two years. On appeal, Zablotny's primary contention is that the court erred in the manner in which it undertook, in accordance with 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) (2013), a “de novo judicial review” of the Board's decision because it (1) deferred to the Board's factual findings and (2) denied the parties the opportunity to re-present evidence that had previously been submitted to the Board. Because we agree with Zablotny that the court erred in its interpretation and application of “de novo judicial review,” we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¹

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The record contains the following facts supporting the Board's findings. See Zegel v. Bd. of Soc. Worker Licensure, 2004 ME 31, ¶ 2, 843 A.2d 18. John Zablotny was employed as a registered nurse at the Down East Community Hospital in Machias. On December 27, 2007, a sixty-one-year-old patient was taken by ambulance to that hospital, where he was admitted to its emergency room complaining of severe abdominal pain. Over the next five days, the patient was given regular doses of several different medications to try to alleviate his pain. Despite efforts to diagnose his condition and alleviate his pain, the patient's pain persisted and his physical condition worsened.

[¶ 3] On January 1, 2008, a snowstorm hit the region, becoming gradually worse as the day progressed. That morning, the patient was in severe pain and expressed to his attending nurses that he would “rather die” than live. Throughout the day, the patient became increasingly agitated and repeatedly rang hospital staff for additional pain medication. Later that afternoon, the patient expressed his desire to be discharged against medical advice, but hospital staff ultimately dissuaded him from doing so.

[¶ 4] That evening, at about 7:00 p.m., Zablotny began his shift as nurse supervisor. As nurse supervisor, Zablotny was charged with overseeing the overall operation of the nursing staff and attending to his own nursing duties. At the beginning of his shift, Zablotny met with the daytime supervisor, who informed him of the patient's deteriorating condition and increasing dependency on pain medication. Because the patient's family had gone home for the day, the daytime supervisor urged Zablotny to continue discouraging the patient from leaving if he requested a discharge.

[¶ 5] At about 8:00 p.m., Zablotny was informed by another nurse that the patient wanted to be discharged. After notifying the patient's physician of his request to leave, Zablotny met with the patient. Following Zablotny's conversation with the patient, the patient signed the forms necessary to be discharged against medical advice. About twenty minutes later, Zablotny walked the patient to the clerk's desk and pointed him towards the exit. The patient then departed unescorted into blizzard-like conditions without any confirmed transportation. The next day, the police found the patient's body less than 500 feet from the hospital's entrance. Shortly thereafter, the hospital terminated Zablotny's employment.

[¶ 6] In February 2009, the patient's sister filed a complaint against Zablotny with the Board. Pursuant to its authority under 10 M.R.S. § 8003–A (2013) and 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A) (2013), the Board initiated an investigation. About a year later, the Board informed Zablotny that it would be conducting an adjudicatory hearing to determine if grounds existed for disciplinary action against his license. See10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) & 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A)(D) (2013).

[¶ 7] In April and May 2010, the Board conducted a two-day disciplinary hearing. During the hearing, seventeen witnesses, including members of the hospital staff, law enforcement personnel, and Zablotny, testified as to the events that transpired. In June 2010, the Board issued its decision, finding that Zablotny violated several statutes and Board rules. As a result of these violations, the Board revoked Zablotny's professional nursing license for two years, fined him $1,500, and ordered him to pay part of the costs of the disciplinary hearing. See10 M.R.S. § 8003(5)(A–1)(2–A)–(4).

[¶ 8] Following the Board's action, Zablotny filed, pursuant to 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5), a petition for de novo judicial review in the District Court. Zablotny's petition urged the court to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, during which the District Court would not be required to give deference to the Board's findings of fact. In combination with his petition, Zablotny filed a motion for additional evidence. In the motion, Zablotny requested that the court rehear “all of the witnesses who testified before the Board” so that it could independently weigh the evidence and make its own credibility determinations during its de novo review.

[¶ 9] At the court's request, the parties extensively briefed what they considered to be the court's duties in performing “de novo judicial review” pursuant to section 8003(5). In May 2011, the court agreed with Zablotny's interpretation, ruling that it was “of the view that de novo means de novo, essentially,” and therefore concluded that it would be required to conduct a “de novo hearing.” However, after the Board moved the court to reconsider its ruling, the court retracted its initial decision and in doing so determined that “de novo judicial review” precluded it from substituting its judgment for the Board's on questions of fact. The court concluded that, as a result, it would not rehear the evidence presented to the Board but would instead base its review “solely upon the [agency] record filed with the Court.”

[¶ 10] In January 2013, the court, after finding “competent evidence to support the Board's findings,” entered a judgment affirming the Board's decision to revoke Zablotny's license. The court concluded that “the violations found by the Board warranted a revocation of [Zablotny's] nursing license.” After judgment was entered, Zablotny timely filed this appeal. SeeM.R.App. P. 2(b)(3).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 11] This case requires us to interpret the meaning of the phrase “de novo judicial review” as used in 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5). Before doing so, we address two related, but seemingly contradictory, statutes setting forth the procedural requirements necessary for the Board to revoke a nurse's professional license: 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) and 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A)(E) (2013). We take this opportunity to clarify the relationship between the revocation proceedings pursuant to 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5), which apply generally to professional licensing boards, and the proceedings described in 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A)(E), which apply specifically to the nursing profession.

A. Procedures Available to Revoke Professional Licenses

[¶ 12] There are two statutes that the Board of Nursing could use to take disciplinary action against its licensees, namely 10 M.R.S. § 8003(5) and 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A. Title 10 M.R.S. §§ 8001–8011 (2013) governs the regulation of professional licensing in general, and specifically includes within its reach the Board of Nursing. See10 M.R.S. § 8001–A(5). Title 10 grants professional boards certain enumerated powers, including the power to suspend and revoke the licenses of its members. Id. § 8003(5)(A–1)(2), (2–A). The power to revoke licenses under section 8003(5) is not without limitations and can “be precluded by language of denial” in a board's more individualized governing statute. Id. § 8003(5). Nonetheless, when a board has the power to revoke its members' licenses and chooses to do so, section 8003(5) requires that such decisions be “subject to ... de novo judicial review exclusively in [the] District Court.” Id. The meaning of this provision is the issue before us.

[¶ 13] Similar to section 8003(5), the Board's own governing statute provides the Board with the ability to revoke its members' licenses. 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A)(E). However, unlike Title 10, Title 32 states that the Board must “file a complaint in the District Court” if the Board concludes that suspension or revocation of a license is warranted. Id.; see alsoM.R. Civ. P. 80G. Once a complaint has been filed, Title 32 provides that the procedures set forth in 4 M.R.S. § 184 (2013) will govern. 32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A)(E). According to section 184, licensees are afforded the opportunity to have a hearing, to call witnesses, and to present evidence to the District Court. See alsoM.R. Civ. P. 80G(d) (providing that trials involving the revocation of a professional license are governed by the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure).

[¶ 14] At first blush, the procedures for revocation proceedings pursuant to section 8003(5) of Title 10 and section 2105–A of Title 32 appear to be inconsistent. One provision affords the Board the authority to revoke licenses, which is then subject to “de novo judicial review,” see10 M.R.S. § 8003(5), while the other requires the Board to file a complaint in the District Court, see32 M.R.S. § 2105–A(1–A)(E). We faced an almost identical issue with respect to section 8003(5) and the Board of Licensure in Medicine's governing statute in Michalowski v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 2012 ME 134, ¶¶ 12–25, 58 A.3d 1074. In Michalowski, we concluded that the overlapping statutes provided the Board of Licensure...