Zappa v. Fahey
Decision Date | 20 August 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 46433,46433 |
Citation | 310 Minn. 555,245 N.W.2d 258 |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Parties | Phillip P. ZAPPA, et al., Appellants, v. Mrs. Irving J. FAHEY, et al., Defendants, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent, Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company, Respondent. |
James Malcolm Williams, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Murnane, Murnane, Conlin & White, Michael I. Fahey, St. Paul, for American Family, et al.
Karlins, Grossman, Karlins, Siegel & Brill, and James R. Greupner, Minneapolis, for Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co.
Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to an order for summary judgment in favor of defendants Mrs. Irving J. Fahey, Thomas E. Fahey, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, and Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company.
On November 12, 1972, a 1966 Ford automobile owned by Thomas Fahey, registered to Mrs. Irving Fahey, and insured by American Family Mutual Insurance Company was struck by an automobile insured by Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company. Shortly thereafter Melvin Rathman, a claims agent for Preferred Risk, examined the Ford and determined it to be a total loss. He and Mrs. Fahey agreed that $550 would be paid in full settlement. On November 20, 1972, Rathman called Mrs. Fahey to tell her that a check for $550 had been mailed and that someone would come to pick up the Ford. Approximately one week later defendant Stanley Buchta, proprietor of Buchta's Auto Body, went to the Fahey home and identified himself as being from Preferred Risk. 1 Mrs. Fahey gave him the keys to the Ford and the title card which she had signed and on which she had written, 'Junk to Preferred Risk Insurance Company.' Buchta drove the car to his garage and parked it. On December 31, 1972, Buchta's son Dale was involved in an accident with plaintiffs while driving the Ford.
Under Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, in order to grant summary judgment, the trial court must find that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' A material fact is one of such a nature as will affect the result or outcome of the case depending on its resolution. Rule 56.05, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
(Italics supplied.)
Several theories of liability were advanced by plaintiffs, the principal one being vicarious liability based on the Safety Responsibility Act. Minn.St. 170.54 provides as follows:
'Whenever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state, by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.'
On December 31, 1972, the applicable definition of 'owner' was contained in Minn.St.1971, § 170.21, subd. 9, 2 which provided as follows:
"Owner' means a person who holds the legal title of a motor vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor shall be deemed the owner for the purposes of this chapter.'
Thus, the determinative question as to liability was who had legal title to the Ford on December 31, 1972.
Registration of an automobile under the state motor vehicle law is prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of title in the party in whose name the car is registered. However, if there is evidence of other ownership, it presents a question of fact. The applicable statutory provision as to the passage of title is Minn.St. 336.2--401. 3 Paragraph (1) of that section provides in part, '* * * title to goods passes...
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