Zeno v. Comm'r, CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-CV-2004
| Decision Date | 14 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-CV-2004 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
| Parties | DAVID JERMAINE ZENO v. COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY |
Before the court is an appeal of the Commissioner's finding of non-disability. Considering the administrative record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.
The claimant David Jermaine Zeno (DOB 8/21/89) applied for Social Security Disability benefits under Title XVI on February 5, 2010 and March 9, 2010. [Tr. 125-1301] He alleged disability beginning at age 16 due to a seizure disorder, essential hypertension, and brain damage. [Tr. 53] Zeno alleges an inability to function and/or work as of September 7, 2005. His application for benefits was denied on April 5, 2010. [Tr. 60-63] He requested a hearing onApril 27, 2010, and a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Kathleen S. Molinar on January 5, 2011. [Tr. 29-51] On January 21, 2011, ALJ Molinar rendered an unfavorable decision, denying benefits. [Tr.15-25]
Zeno sought review with the Appeals Council, which, after receiving additional evidence, denied his request on April 27, 2012. [Tr. 5-10] Thus, the ALJ's denial of benefits to Zeno is the "final" decision of the Commissioner. This appeal timely followed,2 with Zeno seeking judicial review of the decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). [Rec. Doc. 1] The Commissioner has filed an opposition. [Rec. Doc. 13]
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security in which he was a party may obtain a review of the decision by a civil action. 42 U.S.C. 405(g). This court's review of the Commissioner's decision that the claimant is not disabled is limited to determining whether that decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied in reaching that decision. Alfred v. Barnhart, 181 Fed. App'x 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2006); Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001). The ALJ isentitled to make any finding that is supported by substantial evidence, regardless of whether other conclusions are also permissible, and any findings of fact by the ALJ that are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and must be affirmed. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995).
'Substantial evidence' is such relevant evidence as a responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d at 704; Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d at 704. Finding substantial evidence does not involve a search of the record for isolated bits of evidence that support the Commissioner's decision; instead, the entire record must be scrutinized as a whole. Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d at 823. In applying this standard, the court may not re-weigh the evidence in the record, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, even if the evidence weighs against the ALJ's decision. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d at 704; Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d at 135; Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). To determine whether the decision to deny social security benefits is supported by substantial evidence, the court weighs the following factors: (1)objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions from treating and examining physicians; (3) plaintiff's subjective evidence of pain and disability, and any corroboration by family and neighbors; and (4) plaintiff's age, educational background, and work history. 42 U.S.C.A. §405; Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995). Any conflicts in the evidence regarding the claimant's alleged disability are to be resolved by the ALJ, not the reviewing court. Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ uses a five-step sequential process, which requires analysis of the following: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity (i.e., whether the claimant is working); (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart B, Appendix 1; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work (i.e., whether the claimant can return to his old job); and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271-72 (5th Cir. 2002); Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2000). See, also, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
If the ALJ determines that the claimant is disabled at any step, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ cannot make a determination at any step, he goes on to the next step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). When assessing a claim for disability benefits in the third step, the medical evidence of the claimant's impairment is compared to a list of impairments presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful work. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967(1990). If the claimant is not actually working and his impairments match or are equivalent to one of the listed impairments, the ALJ is required to "consider the combined effect of all of the individual's impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(B). The medical findings of the combined impairments are compared to the listed impairment most similar to the claimant's most severe impairment. See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 531, 110 S.Ct. 885. It is the claimant's burden to prove at step three that his impairment or combination of impairments matches or is equivalent to a listed impairment. Id. at 530-31. For a claimant to demonstrate that his disorder matches an Appendix 1 listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of the specified criteria, no matter how severe, does not qualify. Id. Ultimately,the question of equivalence is an issue reserved for the ALJ. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 1993).
Before going from step three to step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). This is a determination of the most the claimant can still do despite his physical and mental limitations and is based on all relevant evidence in the claimant's record. 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(1). The claimant's residual functional capacity is used at the fourth step to determine if the claimant can still do his past relevant work, and at the fifth step, it is used to determine whether the claimant can adjust to any other type of work. 20 CFR § 404.1520(e). When a claimant's residual functional capacity is not sufficient to permit him to continue his former work, then his age, education, and work experience must be considered in evaluating whether he is capable of performing any other work. Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 705 (5th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The testimony of a vocational expert is valuable in this regard, as such expert "is familiar with the specific requirements of a particular occupation, including working conditions and the attributes and skills needed." Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Vaughan v. Shalala, 58 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir. 1995).
The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, and then the burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step to show that the claimant can perform other substantial work in the national economy. If the Commissioner makes the necessary showing at step five, the burden shifts back to the claimant to rebut this finding. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d at 461; Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d at 272; Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d at 453.
The Administrative Record:
David Jermaine Zeno can speak, read, write, and understand English. He describes the conditions limiting his ability to work to include seizures, high blood pressure, Kowasaki disease of the heart, and brain damage. [Tr. 144-45] He alleges he stopped working September 7, 2005 due to those conditions. He dresses himself, takes medicine, and sits and watches television most of the day. He goes out to pay bills or grocery shop; he takes naps, and occasionally cares for his son with his grandmother's help. [Tr. 157-58] He goes places with friends and family. He must be reminded to take his medication and to keep doctors' appointments.
Medical treatment documented in the record spans the time period from July, 2008 through December, 2010. In July, 2008, Zeno was seen in the Emergency Room of Southwest Medical Center after an auto accident. Documentsreference a craniotomy and internal bleeding. [Tr. 206-210] In December, 2008, he was seen at Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital (Dr. Charles Burness) after reports he suffered a grand mal seizure. His mother reported he had never followed up with a regular doctor, but that he had his prescriptions for seizure medications filled through emergency room visits in the recent years. She acknowledged Zeno may have skipped doses of his medicine. [Tr. 187] On examination, Zeno was noted to have been able to give good history; he had no focal motor/sensory deficits; his cranial nerves were intact, and he was in no acute distress. He had full range of motion in all joints, a normal eye exam, regular heart rate/rhythm, no abnormal murmurs, and clear lungs. He was diagnosed with grand mal seizure, with medical...
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