Zoning Com'n of Town of Sherman v. Lescynski

• Decision Date: 28 December 1982
• Parties: ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SHERMAN et al. v. Thomas LESCYNSKI et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 1144

453 A.2d 1144

188 Conn. 724

ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF SHERMAN et al. v. Thomas LESCYNSKI et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Dec. 28, 1982.

David P. Ball, Danbury, with whom, on brief, was Steven M. Olivo, Danbury, for appellants (defendants).

Robert J. Guendelsberger and Roland F. Moots, Jr., Kent, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Murray J. Kessler, for appellees (intervening plaintiffs).

Before PETERS, HEALEY, PARSKEY, SHEA and SPONZO, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

This case concerns the permissibility of operating a slaughterhouse in an area of the town of Sherman that is zoned for farming and residential use. The plaintiffs, the zoning commission of the town of Sherman and J. Anthony Crawford, its chairman, brought an action to enjoin the defendants, Thomas Lescynski and Margaret K. Lescynski, from maintaining and operating a slaughterhouse and to compel the defendants to remove equipment kept in the conduct of their slaughtering business. In that action, the Sherman Zoning Preservation Group, an informal association consisting of fifteen property owners in the town of Sherman, successfully moved to intervene as co-plaintiffs. The trial court granted the plaintiffs partial relief in the form of an injunction limiting but not entirely forbidding the defendants' slaughterhouse operation. Only the defendants have appealed.

The memorandum of decision and the undisputed pleadings disclose the following facts. The defendants' slaughterhouse was located on a three-acre farm owned by them since 1965. Under the Sherman zoning regulations, this property lay within a residential and farming area wherein businesses were prohibited. ¹

Prior to 1975, Lescynski engaged in slaughtering to a limited extent. Fully employed elsewhere, he slaughtered animals on his own premises only in the evenings and on weekends, and only provided this service for his family and friends. On April 5, 1975, Lescynski applied to the Sherman zoning commission for permission to raise the roof of a half-enclosed shed on his property from a height of eight feet to sixteen feet. In that application, Lescynski indicated that the shed's function was "housing equipment." As part of the application process, Dr. Anthony Crawford, chairman of the zoning commission, and Dexter Bringle, the commission's zoning enforcement officer, inspected the site of the proposed improvement. They observed a shed, then in disrepair, being used to store farm equipment. Although the inspectors were aware that some slaughtering was done on the premises, they were not then informed, directly or indirectly, that Lescynski planned to use the proposed structure to expand his slaughtering operation. The application was approved. Several days later, on April 10, 1975, Lescynski applied for a building permit to raise the roof on the same structure and to build a block foundation beneath it. ² Following an inspection by Edward Dolan, the Sherman building inspector, a building permit was issued.

Thereafter Lescynski converted the shed into a slaughterhouse by raising its roof, by expanding its floor area, and by housing it in steel and concrete. He installed coolers a grinder, cutting tables, slicers, a double sink and other slaughtering equipment. During this construction, Bringle, the zoning enforcement officer, assisted Lescynski with the electrical wiring of an overhead meat hoist.

Between 1975 and 1979, Lescynski greatly expanded his on-premises slaughtering operation until it became his full-time occupation, accounting for almost all of his income. Animals were brought to the farm by their owners, including commercial meat companies, and then were shot, butchered, dressed, packaged and returned to the owners. Neighbors objected that the expanded slaughtering operation generated traffic, noise and odors, all of which interfered with the quiet enjoyment of their properties and diminished the value thereof.

In April 1976, a year after the initial approvals, the building inspector again visited the Lescynski property, this time to certify the new structure for occupancy. On the certificate, duly issued on April 30, 1976, the building inspector noted that the structure now contained a freezer and meat handling room. Printed on the certificate was the statement that the building "conforms substantially to the requirements of the Building Ordinances and the Zoning Regulations of the Town of Sherman." The building inspector testified at the trial that he had no authority to certify the structure as conforming to the zoning regulations.

One month later, upon the Lescynskis' application for permission to undertake additional construction on their property, the zoning commission began investigating whether the slaughtering operation was in violation of the zoning regulations. Meanwhile, in July of 1976, Lescynski's operation was temporarily ordered closed by the town of Sherman until Lescynski installed a 5000 gallon tank for the storage of detritus from the slaughtering. The Sherman first selectman loaned Lescynski a bulldozer for this purpose, and after the installation was complete the slaughtering recommenced. On September 16, 1976, the zoning commission ordered Lescynski to "cease and desist from the slaughtering of animals other than such as may occur as a normal incident of ordinary farming." When Lescynski failed to comply, this litigation ensued.

After a trial to the court, judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs. Although the court refused to require the defendants to remove their slaughtering equipment from the premises, the court restricted the scope of the slaughtering operation to the level at which slaughtering had been carried out before the construction of the slaughterhouse in 1975. In response to a motion for clarification, the court specified days and hours during which the slaughtering operation would be permitted. ³

The defendants, in their appeal from this judgment, raise three issues. They claim that the trial court erred: (1) in concluding that the defendants' slaughtering operation was not a permitted aspect of farming use under the applicable zoning regulations; (2) in refusing to find that actions of the Sherman town officials constituted such approval and ratification of the defendants' slaughtering operation as to estop the town from now restricting it; and (3) in determining that the intervenors, the Sherman Zoning Preservation Group, had standing to seek injunctive relief from the defendants' slaughtering operation. Because we agree with the trial court on the first two of these issues, we need not resolve the third.

The defendants' claim that unrestricted slaughtering is a permitted use in an area zoned for farming is premised on their view that they may rely on the definition of "farming" contained in General Statutes § 1-1(q). ⁴ That definition is concededly broader than the common law definition of farming which excludes stock raising and kindred activities, except "when carried on in connection with and incidental and subordinate to tillage of the soil." Chudnov v. Board of Appeals, 113 Conn. 49, 52, 154 A. 161 (1931). The statutory definition in § 1-1(q), by contrast, includes "management of livestock" and "packing, packaging, processing ... any agricultural ... commodity as an incident to ordinary farming operations...."

The trial court did not find it necessary to determine the overall impact of the enactment of § 1-1(q) on local zoning regulations, and neither do we. In the circumstances of the present litigation, even if we accept arguendo the defendants' contention that the statutory definition rather than the common law definition of farming is applicable, the defendants cannot prevail. The statutory definition, although it includes "management of livestock," does not expressly countenance slaughtering of livestock on a commercial basis; it is noteworthy that § 1-1(q) specifically encompasses "shearing" and "training" of livestock, but does not mention "slaughtering." Furthermore, § 1-1(q) itself limits "packing, packaging, processing" to activities "incident to ordinary farming operations." Nothing in this statutory language nor in its legislative history persuades us that the legislature meant to include within the definition of farming the regular, commercially organized slaughtering of livestock having no relationship to the farm itself.

Even if their slaughterhouse was not, as a matter of law, a permitted use of their Sherman property, the defendants argue in the alternative that the town of Sherman is estopped from applying its zoning regulations to them. In considering this claim, the trial court concluded that the defendants had failed to sustain their burden of proving either wrongful inducement by the town or justifiable reliance by the defendants.

The defendants nowhere take issue with the legal principles concerning municipal estoppel which the trial court found to be applicable. Under our well-established law, any claim of estoppel is predicated on proof of two essential elements: the party against whom estoppel is claimed must do or say something calculated or intended to induce another party to believe that certain facts exist and to act on that belief; and the other party must change its position in reliance on those facts, thereby incurring some injury. Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 242, 413 A.2d 834 (1979); Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., 170 Conn. 344, 353, 365 A.2d 1093 (1976); Pet Car Products, Inc. v. Barnett, 150 Conn. 42, 53-54, 184 A.2d 797 (1962). Although estoppel may not generally be invoked against a public agency in the exercise of its governmental functions; Dupuis v. Submarine Base Credit Union, Inc., supra, 353, 365 A.2d 1093; Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 556, 254 A.2d 898 (1969); State v. Stonybrook, Inc., 149 Conn. 492, 501, 181 A.2d 601, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 185, 83 S.Ct. 265, 9 L.Ed.2d 227 (1962); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations ...