Zorn v. Demetri
| Citation | 158 N.H. 437,969 A.2d 464 |
| Decision Date | 18 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2008–402.,2008–402. |
| Court | Supreme Court of New Hampshire |
| Parties | Daniel ZORN and another v. George DEMETRI and another. |
Law Office of Dennis C. Hogan, PLLC, of Nashua (Dennis C. Hogan on the brief), for the plaintiffs.
Tarbell & Brodich P.A., of Concord (Eaton W. Tarbell, III on the brief), for the defendants.
The plaintiffs, Daniel and Cynthia Zorn, appeal an order of the Nashua District Court (Leary, J.) ruling that the defendants, George and Stella Demetri, are not landlords as that term is defined in RSA 540–A:5 (2007). We affirm.
The relevant facts are undisputed. During the time relevant to this appeal, the defendants owned three properties: the home in which they resided; a single-family home in Hollis; and a vacation home in York Beach, Maine. The defendants rented the vacation home to others on a weekly basis for several weeks during the summer and occasionally during the other seasons.
In November 2006, the defendants rented the single-family home in Hollis to the plaintiffs at a monthly rent of $2,500. In addition to the first month's rent, the plaintiffs paid $10,000 as a security deposit.
After the plaintiffs vacated the single-family home in 2007, they brought suit alleging, inter alia , violations of RSA 540–A:6 (2007), which governs security deposits. The trial court ruled that because the defendants were not landlords as defined in RSA 540–A:5, I, the statutory provisions governing security deposits did not apply to them. The plaintiffs appeal that ruling.
We will sustain the trial court's findings and conclusions unless they are lacking in evidential support or tainted by error of law. Greenhalgh v. Presstek, 152 N.H. 695, 701, 886 A.2d 1000 (2005). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo . Correia v. Town of Alton, 157 N.H. 716, 718, 958 A.2d 992 (2008). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. In re Alexis O., 157 N.H. 781, 785, 959 A.2d 176 (2008). We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. This enables us to better discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id.
(Emphasis added.) The defendants rented a single-family residence to the plaintiffs—the issue is whether the defendants own any other "rental property." If the defendants' vacation home in Maine constitutes other "rental property," then the defendants are "landlords" as defined by the statute.
The trial court found that the Maine home is a vacation property and was not leased for residential purposes; accordingly, the trial court ruled that it is not a "rental unit," since that term is defined as each separate part of any residential premises. The plaintiffs do not dispute this, but contend that the plain meaning of the term "rental property" is broader—they argue that the vacation home is "rental property" by virtue of the fact that it is property that is rented. We disagree.
We considered an analogous argument in Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 702 A.2d 333 (1997). There, we were asked to determine whether the term "rental unit" in RSA 540–A:5 included a tavern in which the tenants resided and operated a commercial venture. The issue turned on whether the term "residential premises" as used in the definition of "rental unit" applied to the tavern. The tenants argued that "residential premises" is undefined in the statute, and its plain...
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