Zortea v. Costco Wholesale Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:22-CV-01316-MJH |
| Parties | MONICA ZORTEA, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED; Plaintiff, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP., Defendant, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Monica Zortea, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, brings a putative class action against Defendant, Costco Wholesale Corp., for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). (ECF No. 2-1).
Costco removed this action from the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas on the basis that this Court has jurisdiction under 1) the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1332(d) & 1453, and (2) diversity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Diversity). Ms. Zortea has moved for remand. (ECF No. 6). This matter is now ripe for consideration.
After consideration of Ms. Zortea's Motion for Remand (ECF No 6), the Complaint (ECF No. 2-1), Costco's Notice of Removal (ECF No. 2), the respective briefs and notices (ECF Nos. 7, 19, 24, 25, and 30), the arguments of counsel, and for the following reasons, Ms. Zortea's Motion for Remand will be granted. Because this Court is directing a remand, Costco's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16), will be denied as moot, without prejudice.
In her Complaint, Ms. Zortea alleges that Costco violated the MMWA's Pre-Sale Availability Rule by not providing consumers with pre-sale access to written warranties. (ECF No. 2-1 at ¶¶ 2-8). Based upon these allegations, Ms. Zortea seeks “injunctive, declaratory, and ... equitable relief' on behalf of a proposed class of “[a]ll persons in Pennsylvania who purchased one or more products from [Costco] that (a) cost more than $15 and (b) included a written manufacturer's warranty.' Id. at ¶¶ 13 and 46). Ms. Zortea avers that she, and any Class Members, are disclaiming monetary damages. Id. at ¶ 19. Ms. Zortea filed her Complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in accord with the provisions under MMWA 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(A).
In its Notice for Removal, Costco asserts that this Court has Jurisdiction under CAFA or traditional diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Diversity). In her Motion for Remand, Ms. Zortea contends that 1) her claim does not satisfy the MMWA's specific claim and jurisdictional prerequisites under MMWA 15 U.S.C. §§ 2310(d)(1)(B); 2) CAFA does not provide an independent basis for jurisdiction for this MMWA claim; and 3) Diversity jurisdiction is lacking.
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1453, a defendant may remove an action or class action brought in state court to federal district court when the claims fall within the federal court's original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and 1453. A plaintiff may challenge removal for lack of jurisdiction by moving to remand the matter to state court. See id. § 1447(c). Such remand motions may be filed at any time before final judgment is entered. Id. If the district court indeed lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must remand to the state court from which the action was removed. Id. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction: ‘It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.'” Hart v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 457 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). As the party asserting jurisdiction, defendants bear the burden of proving that the matter is properly before the federal court. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (same).
Costco is a member-based store that limits entry to card-carrying customers. Likewise, civil litigants in federal courts must meet certain requisites for entry, whether based upon jurisdiction or the nature of their claims. In this civil action, both parties are shopping for their preferred forum, which presents this Court with jurisdictional inquiries of first impression.
Ms. Zortea contends that she properly filed her Complaint in state court pursuant to MMWA § 2310(d)(1)(A); and, because her Complaint does not satisfy the requisites for federal jurisdiction under MMWA § 2310(d)(1)(B), she seeks remand back to state court. Costco asserts that, because the CAFA and Diversity criteria are met in this putative class's MMWA case, this Court is competent to maintain jurisdiction under MMWA § 2310(d)(1)(A). Ms. Zortea maintains that Costco cannot rely on CAFA or Diversity to circumvent MMWA's specific and express requirements for her MMWA claim and for federal jurisdiction as defined under MMWA § 2310(d)(1)(B). She contends that, to hold otherwise, would result in CAFA's implicit repeal of the MMWA. Costco argues that the MMWA permits federal jurisdiction under § 2310(d)(1)(A) where CAFA provides a separate basis for subject matter jurisdiction and federal district courts qualify as “courts of competent jurisdiction” under § 2310(d)(1)(A).
The Third Circuit has not addressed the issues as presented by the parties. The Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts have analyzed the interplay between the language of CAFA and of the MMWA, with divergent results. Cf. Kuns v. Ford Motor Co., 543 Fed.Appx. 572, 574 (6th Cir. 2013) () with Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 966 F.3d 1027, 1035 (9th Cir. 2020) (). Prior to Floyd, Third Circuit district courts had held that CAFA superseded MMWA's class action requirements. E.g., McCalley v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 07-2141, 2008 WL 878402, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2008) (Greenaway, J.); McGee v. Cont'l Tire N. Am., Inc., Civ. No. 06-6234, 2007 WL 2462624, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2007). However, following Floyd, Third Circuit district courts have shifted to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning to mandate that, where the requisite § 2310(d)(1)(B) criteria are not met, a MMWA suit must be filed in state court. In re Subaru Battery Drain Prods. Liab. Litig., Civ. No. 20-3095, 2021 WL 1207791, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2021); Powell v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 502 F.Supp.3d 856, 885 (D.N.J. 2020); Opheim v. Aktiengesellschaft, CV2002483KMESK, 2021 WL 2621689, at *12 (D.N.J. June 25, 2021); Talley v. General Motors, No. 1:20-cv-01137, 2021 WL 7209448 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2021) ().
Absent controlling Third Circuit authority, this remand issue requires analysis of the statutory language from the removal statute under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq., the MMWA under 15 U.S.C. § 2310, CAFA under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), and Diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The operative question is whether the MMWA provides its own exclusive jurisdictional scheme for MMWA claims; or whether, in state court removal circumstances, CAFA or Diversity apply to § 2310(d)(1)(A) and supersedes the federal court limitations set forth in MMWA§ 2310(d)(1)(B). To do so, the Court will examine the plain meaning under the pertinent statutes.
It is the cardinal canon of statutory interpretation that a court must begin with the statutory language.'” Nunez v. Subaru of Am., Inc., Civ. No. 1:19-cv-18303, 2021 WL 9667930, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2021) (). “When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). According to the “anti-surplusage” canon, “[i]t is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” United States v. Jackson, 964 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2020)
Under Supreme Court precedent with regard to seemingly competing statutes, “‘when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.'” J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44, 122 S.Ct. 593, 151 L.Ed.2d 508 (2001) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974)). Also, “[w]hen confronted with two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on the same topic, this Court ... strive[s] ‘to give effect to both.'” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1624 (2018) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). “Implied repeals are generally disfavored.” Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 1308, 1323 (2020). Further, the Court must presume that “Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.” Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 516, 132 S.Ct. 1882, 1889, 182 L.Ed.2d 840 (2012).
For removal of civil actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 provides as follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) “a defendant may remove a civil action to federal court only if the plaintiff could have originally filed the action in federal court.” ...
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