Zuni Indian Tribe v. Mckinley Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs

• Decision Date: 24 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 31,496.,31,496.
• Parties: ZUNI INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. McKINLEY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant–Appellee, and Tampico Springs Ranch 3000, LLC, Intervenor–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

300 P.3d 133

ZUNI INDIAN TRIBE, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.McKINLEY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant–Appellee,andTampico Springs Ranch 3000, LLC, Intervenor–Appellee.

No. 31,496.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Jan. 24, 2013.

Samuel D. Gollis, Attorney at Law, P.C., Samuel D. Gollis, Albuquerque, NM, Jane Marx, Attorney at Law, P.C., Jane Marx, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

Mason & Issacson, P.A., James Jay Mason, Gallup, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

VANZI, Judge.

{1} The New Mexico Subdivision Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 47–6–1 to –29 (1973, as amended through 2009), governs the subdivision review and approval process by counties. The appeals provision of the Act, Section 47–6–15(B), provides that a party adversely affected “by a decision of the board of county commissioners may appeal to the district court pursuant to the provisions of [NMSA 1978, § ] 39–3–1.1 [ (1999) ]”—the statute governing administrative appeals. In this case, we address whether a county's approval or disapproval of a preliminary subdivision plat application constitutes a final, appealable decision for purposes of Section 47–6–15(B) of the Act. We also decide whether a timely filed appeal from a decision on a preliminary plat application is rendered moot simply because the county proceeded to approve the final plat application during the pendency of the appeal.

{2} We hold that a party adversely affected by a county's decision on a preliminary plat application can appeal the decision to the district court and that this appeal, if timely filed, is not rendered moot by the county's decision to approve the final subdivision plat application during the pendency of the appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's ruling to the contrary and remand for the district court to consider the merits.

BACKGROUND

{3} On January 8, 2008, the McKinley County Board of County Commissioners (the County) approved a preliminary plat application submitted by Tampico Springs Ranch 3000, LLC (Tampico) for a proposed 490–home phased subdivision development. On February 7, 2008, the Zuni Tribe (the Tribe) appealed the County's approval of the preliminary plat application to the district court. Tampico filed a motion to intervene in the case, which the district court granted.

{4} Shortly thereafter, the Tribe filed a motion to stay enforcement of the County's decision approving the preliminary plat application to prevent Tampico from proceeding further in the subdivision development process during the pendency of the Tribe's appeal. SeeRule 1–074(Q) NMRA (permitting the district court to stay enforcement of the agency decision under review). The district court denied the Tribe's motion, and the County then proceeded to approve Tampico's final plat application.

{5} Subsequently, Tampico filed a motion to dismiss the Tribe's appeal on two grounds, arguing that: (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction because the County's decision on the preliminary plat application was not a final, appealable order; and (2) the Tribe's appeal from the preliminary plat approval was rendered moot by the County's approval of Tampico's final plat application during the pendency of the appeal. The district court granted Tampico's motion, finding that the Tribe's appeal “puts forth a moot question and the action complained of does not constitute a final decision.” We granted the Tribe's petition for writ of certiorari to review the district court's ruling.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{6} The parties agree that this case presents pure questions of law, which we review de novo. See Santa Fe Pac. Trust, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2012–NMSC–028, ¶ 10, 285 P.3d 595 (“Finality is a question of law we review de novo.”); Baber v. Desert Sun Motors, 2007–NMCA–098, ¶ 9, 142 N.M. 319, 164 P.3d 1018 (providing that “[w]hether a lower court properly dismissed a case as moot presents a question of law, which we review de novo”). To the extent that this appeal requires this Court to interpret provisions of the Act, we also engage in de novo review. Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004–NMSC–010, ¶ 10, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69 (providing that “[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo”).

DISCUSSIONA. Finality

{7} The first issue we address on appeal is whether the County's approval of a preliminary plat application is a final, appealable order within the meaning of Sections 47–6–15(B) and 39–3–1.1. The Tribe argues that the district court erred in concluding that a county's approval or disapproval of a preliminary subdivision plat application does not constitute a final decision that is appealable to the district court. Section 47–6–15(B) reads:

A party who is or may be adversely affected by a decision of the board of county commissioners may appeal to the district court pursuant to the provisions of Section 39–3–1.1.

(Emphasis added.) The Act does not define the term “decision” in Section 47–6–15(B), and here, the parties disagree as to whether a county's approval or disapproval of a preliminary plat application is a decision from which an aggrieved party can seek judicial review. The Tribe contends that the County's approval of Tampico's preliminary plat application in this case constituted a “decision” under Section 47–6–15(B) of the Act and that this is a “final decision” within the meaning of Section 39–3–1.1. For the reasons that follow, we agree.

{8} In interpreting Section 47–6–15 of the Act, “we seek to give effect to the Legislature's intent, and in determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute's history and background.” Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 768–69, 918 P.2d 350, 354–55 (1996); see State v. Nick R., 2009–NMSC–050, ¶ 11, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868 (stating that in interpreting statutes, “we examine the plain language of the statute as well as the context in which it was promulgated, including the history of the statute and the object and purpose the Legislature sought to accomplish” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “We must take care to avoid adoption of a construction that would render the statute's application absurd or unreasonable or lead to injustice or contradiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{9} “The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.” State v. Johnson, 2009–NMSC–049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863. When a term is not defined in a statute, we must construe it, giving words “their ordinary meaning absent clear and express legislative intention to the contrary.” State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880 P.2d 845, 853 (1994). Although the term “decision” is not defined in the Act, it is ordinarily defined as “[a] judicial or agency determination after consideration of the facts and the law[.]” See Black's Law Dictionary 467 (9th ed. 2009); see also Armijo v. Armijo, 77 N.M. 742, 744, 427 P.2d 258, 259 (1967) (defining “decision” as “a determination arrived at after consideration, an opinion formed, or a course of action decided upon”). As the Tribe points out, the review and approval process for preliminary plats set forth in the Act requires a formal review process by a board of county commissioners or its delegate. See§ 47–6–11. The Act specifically requires the subdivider to furnish documentation of various matters, such as water availability and road access, along with its preliminary plat. Section 47–6–11(B). The Act requires the board of county commissioners to seek written input in the form of “opinions” from interested parties and various state entities, including the state engineer, the department of environment, and the department of transportation. Section 47–6–11(F). The Act further requires the board of county commissioners to hold a public hearing to “weigh these opinions [if all are favorable] in determining whether to approve the preliminary plat.” Section 47–6–11(G); see§ 47–6–11(H) (describing the process to be followed where negative opinions are submitted by state agencies, tribes, or other interested parties). At the public hearing, the board of county commissioners is required to “allow all interested persons a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views or arguments, orally or in writing, and to examine witnesses testifying at the hearing.” Section 47–6–14(E). And finally, the Act provides that the board of county commissioners is to render its decision on the preliminary plat “within thirty days of the public hearing at a public meeting.” Section 47–6–14(F). In light of the thorough review and decision-making process set forth in the Act for preliminary plats, it is reasonable to conclude that the approval or disapproval of a preliminary plat application would constitute a “decision” under Section 47–6–15 based on the term's ordinary meaning.

{10} In this case, the County's approval of Tampico's preliminary plat application was consistent with the foregoing statutory scheme. The approval was issued by the Board in the form of a written resolution with incorporated final findings and recommendations submitted by the County's Smart Growth Commission. This resolution followed written input from state agencies and other interested parties, including the Tribe, as well as a series of public hearings before the Smart Growth Commission regarding Tampico's preliminary plat application. Tampico and the Tribe submitted proposed findings and recommendations following the hearings. The final findings and recommendations adopted in the resolution included consideration of several important aspects of the subdivision development and review process, such as water availability, liquid and solid waste disposal, and access. Given the nature of the written resolution and the procedural history that preceded its passage, we agree with the Tribe's argument that the resolution constitutes a “decision” under Section 47–6–15.

{11} In addition, the statutory history of Section 47–6–15 confirms that ...