Com. v. Cauley
Citation | 10 A.3d 321 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Daniel Patrick CAULEY, Appellant. |
Decision Date | 29 November 2010 |
Court | Superior Court of Pennsylvania |
Michael J. DeRiso, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Kelly T. Hammers, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com., appellee.
Appellant, Daniel Patrick Cauley, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas, following his convictionfor driving under the influence, highest rate of alcohol. 1 Appellant contends on appeal that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests. We hold that police officers may conduct sobriety tests after a citizen effectuates an encounter when the officer observes evidence of alcohol intoxication as a result of the encounter, and the officer observed the citizen driving a vehicle immediately prior to the encounter. Accordingly, we affirm.
The trial court adequately stated the facts:
On appeal, Appellant argues that Officer Bell did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Appellant had engaged or was engaging in criminal activity. Appellant asserts that Officer Bell did not witness any motor vehicle violations and that he observed nothing remarkable about the way Appellant operated his vehicle. Appellant contends that, in the absence of any discernible facts to support a suspicionthat he was driving under the influence, Officer Bell did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the sobriety tests. We disagree.
Our standard of review for suppression rulings is well-established:
[I]n addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion [we are] limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Since the [Commonwealth] prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the [Commonwealth] and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 445, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (2003).
The legal standard of proof required by a police officer when engaging or interacting with a citizen varies depending on whether the citizen has been detained, and if so, the degree of the detention and the circumstances surrounding the interaction. See Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 268-69 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 874 A.2d 1214, 1217 (Pa.Super.2005)). There are three basic levels of interaction between citizens and police officers, and the accompanying standard of proof needed for each level is firmly established:
The first category, a mere encounter or request for information, does not need to be supported by any level of suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The second category, an investigative detention, derives from Terry and its progeny: such a detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion because, although it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, it does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. The final category, the arrest or custodial detention, must be supported by probable cause.
Id. (quoting Hill, 874 A.2d at 1217); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Commonwealth v. Beasley, 761 A.2d 621, 624 (Pa.Super.2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Boswell, 554 Pa. 275, 283-84, 721 A.2d 336, 339-40 (1998) (plurality)). "The term 'mere encounter' refers to certain non-coercive interactions with the police that do not rise to the level of a seizure of the person under the fourth amendment." Commonwealth v. Peters, 434 Pa.Super. 268, 642 A.2d 1126, 1129 (1994) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bennett, 412 Pa.Super. 603, 604 A.2d 276, 280 (1992)). For example, a mere encounter transpires when an officer approaches a citizen on a public street for the purpose of making inquiries. Id. (quoting Bennett, 604 A.2d at 280).
In contrast, "[a]n investigative detention occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual by means of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes." Commonwealth v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa.Super.2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 592 (Pa.Super.2005)). In other words, in view of all the circumstances, if a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave, then the interaction constitutes an investigatory detention.See Peters, 642 A.2d at 1129 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harper, 416 Pa.Super. 608, 611 A.2d 1211, 1215 (1992)); Hill, 874 A.2d at 1218-19 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 562 (Pa.Super.2004)). An investigatory detention triggers the constitutional protection of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the prerequisites for such a detention as set forth in Terry, supra.3Smith, 904 A.2d at 35 (quoting Barber, 889 A.2d. at 592).
An investigative detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion. Sands, 887 A.2d at 269 (quoting Hill, 874 A.2d at 1217). "To meet the standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer must point to specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Smith, 904 A.2d at 35 (quotation omitted). In addition, "we must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot." Id. at 35-36 (quoting Barber, 889 A.2d at 593). An investigative detention may last "as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion." Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 A.2d 495, 500 (Pa.Super.2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 58, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000)). Because the level of intrusion may change during the course of the encounter, the record must be carefully scrutinized for any evidence of such changes. Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa.Super.2004) (citing Strickler, 563 Pa. at 58-60, 72-73, 757 A.2d at 889-91, 897-98).
Upon review and in consideration of the circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding Officer Bell had reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant and submit him to field sobriety tests. The initial contact between Appellant and Officer Bell was not initiated by Officer Bell; rather, upon parking his vehicle, Appellant immediately approached the officer and began asking him why he was at that particular location. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/13/09, at 6, 9. A police officer need not possess reasonable suspicion in order to approach a citizen and ask him a question or request information from him. See Beasley, supra; Sands, supra. Certainly, an officer then does not require reasonable suspicion when a citizen voluntarily approaches the officer and speaks to the officer on his own accord. Officer Bell did not detain Appellant when he exited his vehicle nor did he initiate the conversation. N.T. Suppression Hearing, at 6, 9. There is also no reason to require Officer Bell, and other officers similarly situated, to take any special constitutional precautions with citizens who...
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