NEW MEXICO DEPT. OF HEALTH v. Compton

• Decision Date: 14 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 20,356.,20,356.
• Citation: 129 N.M. 474,10 P.3d 153,2000 NMCA 78
• Parties: NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Fred COMPTON, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

10 P.3d 153

129 N.M. 474

2000 NMCA 78

NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Fred COMPTON, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 20,356.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

June 14, 2000.

Certiorari Granted September 5, 2000.

Beth W. Schaefer, Assistant General Counsel, New Mexico Department of Health, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Sandra L. Gomez, Michael C. Parks, Protection & Advocacy System, Inc., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.

Certiorari Granted, No. 26,419, September 5, 2000.

OPINION

WECHSLER, Judge.

{1} Respondent, Fred Compton, appeals from the district court's orders granting two petitions under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code). See NMSA 1978, §§ 43-1-1 to 43-1-25 (1977 as amended through 1999). Respondent argues that the orders should be reversed and vacated because the petitions were not heard by the district court within the statutory deadlines. We affirm.

Background and Facts

{2} The relevant facts in this case are undisputed. Respondent was admitted to Las Vegas Medical Center (LVMC) on February 18, 1999, under the provisions of Section 43-1-10, which provide for emergency, involuntary commitments. On February 22, 1999, the Department of Health (Department) filed a Petition for a Thirty Day Commitment for Mental Health Evaluation and Treatment, under the authority of Section 43-1-11(A), and a Petition for Appointment of a Treatment Guardian for an Adult, under the authority of Section 43-1-15(B). The district court set a hearing on both motions for February 25, 1999, within the seven-day emergency period set forth in Section 43-1-11(A) and within the three-day period set forth in Section 43-1-15(B). On February 25, 1999, however, the district court entered an order continuing the hearing until March 4, 1999, because the trial judge was ill.

{3} At the hearing on March 4, 1999, Respondent's counsel moved to dismiss the petitions on the basis that Respondent had been more than seven days at LVMC without a hearing, contrary to the statutory requirements. The district court asked Respondent's attorney to explain what remedy Respondent had if grounds for commitment existed, and Respondent's counsel replied, "That he doesn't receive the treatment which he, in accordance with the doctor's testimony, requires." The court granted both of the Department's petitions. LVMC discharged Defendant on March 25, 1999. This appeal followed.

Discussion

{4} Respondent raises three issues on appeal: (1) Respondent's rights were violated because he did not receive a hearing within seven days of his involuntary commitment, (2) Respondent's rights were violated because he did not receive a hearing on the appointment of a treatment guardian within three days of service upon Respondent, and (3) this case is not moot, even though Respondent has since been discharged from LVMC.

{5} We review whether the statutory requirements of Sections 43-1-11(A) and 43-1-15(B) are mandatory as a question of law and determine whether the district court correctly applied the law to the facts of this case. See Romero Excavation & Trucking, Inc. v. Bradley Constr., Inc., 1996-NMSC-010, ¶ 5, 121 N.M. 471, 913 P.2d 659.

{6} Section 43-1-10 of the Code provides that a peace officer may detain a person for an emergency mental health evaluation under certain specific circumstances. However, when a person is involuntarily admitted to an evaluation facility under Section 43-1-10, Section 43-1-11(A) states that the person "has the right to a hearing within seven days of admission unless waived after consultation with counsel." Section 43-1-11(A) also states that if the evaluation facility "decides to seek commitment of the client for evaluation and treatment" for a further thirty days, a petition seeking such commitment "shall be filed with the court within five days of admission." Additionally, Section 43-1-15(B) requires that when a mental health professional petitions the court for the appointment of a treatment guardian, "[a] hearing on the petition shall be held within three court days."

{7} LVMC released Respondent on March 25, 1999, thus potentially mooting this appeal. Respondent, however, argues that this Court should reach the merits of this case and that this case is not moot because Respondent's claims "are capable of repetition, raise questions of public importance, and would otherwise evade appellate review" and thus fall within an exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Bunnell, 100 N.M. 242, 244, 668 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Ct.App.1983). The Department does not challenge this position. Therefore, this Court will address the issues presented on their merits. See id.

{8} The parties do not dispute that the court continued the hearing on both petitions, which was timely scheduled for February 25, 1999, because the district court judge assigned to hear the motions was ill. The court reset the hearing for March 4, 1999, fourteen days after Respondent's admission to LVMC and seven days after the original hearing date. The questions before this Court, therefore, are (1) whether the statutory hearing deadlines are mandatory and (2) whether a violation of the hearing deadline gives rise to a presumption of prejudice and constitutes reversible error.

The Statutory Hearing Deadlines are Mandatory

{9} Section 43-1-11(A) states that "[e]very adult client involuntarily admitted to an evaluation facility" in an emergency "has the right to a hearing within seven days of admission unless waived after consultation with counsel." Additionally, if the Department petitions the district court to appoint a treatment guardian for that client, Section 43-1-15(B) states that "[a] hearing on the petition shall be held within three court days" after the petition is served on the client and the client's attorney.

{10} Respondent argues that the Code creates specific statutory rights and that those rights are to be strictly construed and strictly enforced. See State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 440, 457 P.2d 370, 372 (1969)

(stating commitment proceedings "are required to be in strict compliance with the statutory requirements"). Our Supreme Court has emphasized that "[i]f there is any class of cases which should be conducted with the utmost care to observe all of the requirements of the statute, it is those cases conducted for the purpose of determining the sanity of a citizen." Id. In addition, in Bunnell, 100 N.M. at 244-45,

668 P.2d at 1121-22, this Court recognized both that "the State must schedule a hearing [on a petition for a thirty-day commitment] within seven days" and that "[t]he statute does not provide for postponement." While this Court ruled in Bunnell that a "short continuance" should be permitted "when counsel establishes that he has not had sufficient time to prepare his client's case," that ruling was based on protecting the client's rights. Id. at 245, 668 P.2d at 1122.

{11} Respondent argues that the language of Section 43-1-11(A) and Section 43-1-15(B) is clear and unambiguous. Respondent correctly notes that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect by the courts. See V.P. Clarence Co. v. Colgate, 115 N.M. 471, 473, 853 P.2d 722, 724 (1993)

. Furthermore, Section 43-1-15(B) uses the word "shall" in relation to the timeliness of the hearing. Generally, the "use of the word `shall' ... imposes a mandatory requirement." Redman v. Board of Regents, 102 N.M. 234, 238, 693 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1984). We therefore agree that, based on the plain language of the statutes, the statutory hearing deadlines set forth in the Code are mandatory.

The Effect of the Violation of the Mandatory Timeliness Requirement

{12} Because we hold that the statutory hearing deadlines are mandatory, we next address the question of whether a violation of those deadlines requires dismissal of the petitions and thus reversal of the district court's orders. To answer whether dismissal is appropriate, we must determine whether the mandatory timeliness requirement is jurisdictional. See Stephens v. State, Transp. Dep't, Motor Vehicle Div., 106 N.M. 198, 200, 740 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Ct.App.1987)

("[N]ot all mandatory [statutory] requirements are jurisdictional."). If the statutory requirement is jurisdictional, outright dismissal is the proper remedy because the court is effectively divested of jurisdiction. See id. at 201, 740 P.2d at 1185 (remanding for dismissal of driver's license revocation proceedings due to jurisdictional defect). If, however, the statutory requirement is mandatory but not jurisdictional, the proper analysis for dismissal is whether the delay prejudiced Respondent. See State v. Budau, 86 N.M. 21, 23, 518 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Ct.App.1973) (applying prejudice analysis to delay in arraignment); cf. Redman, 102 N.M. at 239,

693 P.2d at 1271 (holding failure to commence and complete administrative hearing within statutory deadline to be reversible error in the absence of waiver or good cause).

1. Jurisdictional Requirement

{13} In New Mexico, the failure to comply with mandatory statutory requirements appears to raise a bar to jurisdiction when the requirement has been essential to the proper operation of the statute. See State v. Gardner, 1998-NMCA-160, ¶¶ 9, 14-15, 126 N.M. 125, 967 P.2d 465

(holding that statutory framework required strict compliance with regulations governing blood-alcohol testing and that results of tests not performed in accordance with regulations were not admissible in evidence).

{14} In Stephens, the Motor Vehicle Code allowed the Motor Vehicle Division to revoke a driver's license without a hearing upon the Motor Vehicle Division's receipt of a sworn statement by a police officer. See Stephens, 106 N.M. at 199,

740 P.2d at 1183. The Motor Vehicle Code required the officer's statement to be verified under penalty of perjury, while showing that to the officer's knowledge, the driver had been arrested for driving while intoxicated and test results...