108 A.3d 1254 (Me. 2014), Yor-14-124, Nadeau v. Frydrych
|Citation:||108 A.3d 1254, 2014 ME 154|
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM|
|Party Name:||ROBERT M.A. NADEAU v. LYNNANN FRYDRYCH|
|Attorney:||On the briefs and at oral argument: Robert M.A. Nadeau, appellant Pro se. Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellee Lynnann Frydrych.|
|Judge Panel:||Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.|
|Case Date:||December 31, 2014|
|Court:||Supreme Judicial Court of Maine|
Argued: December 9, 2014.
Judgment and order awarding attorney fees vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶1] Robert M.A. Nadeau appeals from a judgment of the District Court (York, Cantara, J.) dismissing his complaint for protection from harassment against Lynnann Frydrych. The judgment was entered after a non-testimonial hearing.
[¶2] Nadeau argues that the court erred by determining that he failed to allege three or more acts of harassment pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(A) (2014) or, alternatively, by failing to consider the alleged conduct as harassment by a single act or course of conduct constituting a violation of Maine's stalking statute, 5 M.R.S. § 4651(2)(C) (2014); 17-A M.R.S § 210-A (2014).1 Nadeau also contends that, because his complaint was not frivolous, the court erred or abused its discretion by awarding Frydrych attorney fees and costs, and that the fees as assessed were unreasonable. Reviewing the legal sufficiency of the dismissed complaint de novo and in the light most favorable to Nadeau, see Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710, we conclude that Nadeau alleged sufficient facts to entitle him to seek relief pursuant to section 4651(2)(A). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand for consideration on the merits.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶3] On December 23, 2013, Nadeau filed a complaint for protection from harassment against Frydrych in the District Court pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 4652 (2014). In a twenty-three-page attachment to the complaint, Nadeau alleged that Frydrych had engaged in several incidents of harassment against him since the end of their personal relationship. On February 12, 2014, Frydrych filed a motion to dismiss Nadeau's complaint pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting that Nadeau failed to state a claim of harassment and did not attach a copy of a notice to cease harassment, as...
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