Cherry v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 27 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15–CT–604,15–CT–604
• Citation: 164 A.3d 922
• Parties: Ramon R. CHERRY, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

164 A.3d 922

Ramon R. CHERRY, Appellant,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 15–CT–604

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 7, 2017

Decided July 27, 2017

Matthew J. Peed for appellant.

John W. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Rosalyn Calbert Groce, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before Thompson, Beckwith, and McLeese, Associate Judges.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Appellant Ramon R. Cherry challenges his conviction for leaving after colliding, in violation of D.C. Code § 50–2201.05c (a)(2) (2014 Supp.). Mr. Cherry argues that the trial court incorrectly interpreted § 50–2201.05c (a)(2) and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

The pertinent evidence at trial, which included a surveillance videotape depicting the collision at issue, was as follows. On June 16, 2014, at approximately 9:45 p.m., Mr. Cherry was driving a car on Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue SE. He turned left onto Mellon Street and continued turning, crossing the double yellow line, with the driver's door hanging ajar. The car hopped the curb, onto the sidewalk, and crashed into a wall that enclosed a patio area adjacent to a convenience store. Immediately after the crash, Mr. Cherry got out of the car and walked down the block toward the corner of Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue and Mellon Street, where the convenience store was located. A crowd was gathering at the corner. Mr. Cherry apparently exchanged words with some of the onlookers.

Officer Scott Schmoeller and his partner, who were responding to another call nearby and heard the crash, arrived on the scene within one minute of the crash. As they approached the car, Mr. Cherry and other individuals walked toward the car as well. The officers told the group to back up because the officers were securing the scene. Officer Schmoeller asked the members of the group, which included Mr. Cherry, whether they had seen anything. The group remained silent, and Mr. Cherry did not identify himself as the driver.

Mr. Cherry then walked forward, toward the car and away from the group, while the police were inspecting the car. Mr. Cherry reached out to the driver's side front door and pushed it partially closed. There was conflicting evidence as to whether Officer Schmoeller told Mr. Cherry to step away from the car. In any event, Mr. Cherry did step away. As Mr. Cherry turned and walked back toward the corner, Officer Schmoeller followed behind for several paces. The officer then turned back to the car. Mr. Cherry reached the corner and turned right on Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue, continuing out of view of the surveillance camera and in the general direction of the entrance to the convenience store. At that point, approximately two minutes had elapsed since the crash.

About twelve seconds after Mr. Cherry walked to the corner and out of view of the surveillance camera, Officer Schmoeller did the same. Officer Schmoeller then went into the convenience store. He spoke with people inside the store, who did not appear to be aware of the car crash. Using a monitor in the basement of the store, Officer Schmoeller was able to view video footage from the surveillance camera that had recorded the crash. He recognized that Mr. Cherry had been the driver and was among the group that had been standing near the car when the officers first arrived on the scene. Officer Schmoeller then left the store. Officer Schmoeller did not see Mr. Cherry in the store, although he acknowledged that it was possible that Mr. Cherry had walked into the store while Officer Schmoeller was in the basement.

After leaving the store, Officer Schmoeller walked around the surrounding area, looking for Mr. Cherry. Specifically, Officer Schmoeller walked through the 2900 block and part of the 3000 block of Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue, and through a nearby park. Having failed to locate Mr. Cherry, he returned to the car and rejoined his partner. Approximately twelve minutes after the crash, Mr. Cherry approached the car, politely identified himself to the officers, and acknowledged that he had been driving the car and had hit the wall. Mr. Cherry said that he had left because there were people around. Mr. Cherry was placed under arrest and charged with violating the leaving-after-colliding statute.

II.

A.

This case requires us to resolve several questions about the proper interpretation of § 50–2201.05c (a)(2). That portion of the leaving-after-colliding statute applies if the collision at issue results in property damage. Interpreting that provision, however, requires consideration of other portions of the leaving-after-colliding statute. In relevant part, that statute reads:

(a) Any person who operates ... a vehicle within the District who knows or has reason to believe that his or her vehicle has been in a collision shall immediately stop and:

(1) Where another person is injured, call or cause another to call 911 or call or cause another to call for an ambulance or other emergency assistance if necessary, remain on the scene until law enforcement arrives, and provide identifying information to law enforcement and to the injured person; [or]

(2) Where real or personal property belonging to another is damaged ..., provide identifying information to the owner or operator of the property ... or, where the owner or operator of the property ... is not present, provide or cause another to provide identifying information and the location of the collision[ ] to law enforcement or 911 ....

(b) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of subsection (a) of this section, which the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure to stop or his or her failure to remain on the scene was based on a reasonable belief that his or her personal safety, or the safety of another, was at risk and that he or she called 911, or otherwise notified law enforcement, as soon as it was safe to do so, provided identifying information, provided a description of the collision, including the location of the collision or event, and followed the instructions of the 911 operator or a law enforcement officer.

In finding Mr. Cherry guilty, the magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Cherry was required to identify himself to the officers on the scene and failed to do so quickly enough. The magistrate judge did not explicitly find whether Mr. Cherry had identified himself to the owner of the damaged property. The magistrate judge did express skepticism as to whether Mr. Cherry had gone into the convenience store and identified himself: "If the police are right there, ... and instead of telling the police that's your car, who would go around the corner, into the store, and identify yourself ..., who does that? That makes no sense."

In denying Mr. Cherry's motion to set the conviction aside, the reviewing judge concluded that Mr. Cherry was required to identify himself immediately, either to the property owner or to law enforcement. The reviewing judge further concluded that a reasonable fact-finder could find that Mr. Cherry did not identify himself before he walked out of view of the surveillance camera and that Mr. Cherry therefore failed to act with the required immediacy.

In considering Mr. Cherry's claims, we "apply the same standard of review that the associate judge [was required to apply] to the magistrate judge's order." In re J.J. , 111 A.3d 1038, 1043 (D.C. 2015). We "review the magistrate judge's factual findings ... for abuse of discretion or a clear lack of evidentiary support." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We determine questions of statutory interpretation de novo. E.g. , Freundel v. United States , 146 A.3d 375, 378 (D.C. 2016).

B.

We turn first to Mr. Cherry's argument that the magistrate judge found Mr. Cherry guilty based on the incorrect premise that Mr. Cherry was required under § 50–2201.05c (a)(2) to provide identifying information to law enforcement even if he properly provided identifying information to the owner of the property. Although the magistrate judge's comments in returning the verdict are not entirely clear, we agree with Mr. Cherry that the verdict may well have rested on the view that Mr. Cherry had a categorical obligation under § 50–2201.05c (a)(2) to provide identifying information to law enforcement, without regard to whether Mr. Cherry had already provided identifying information to the owner of the property. We also agree that § 50–2201.05c (a)(2) by its plain terms imposes no such categorical obligation. To the contrary, § 50–2201.05c (a)(2) in the first instance requires the person who operates or is in physical control of the vehicle (the "driver") to provide identifying information to the owner or operator of the damaged property. Only if the owner or operator is not present must the driver provide (or cause another to provide) identifying information and the location of the collision to law enforcement or 911.

Unless the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction (an issue we address later in this opinion), we generally vacate and remand for further proceedings when the verdict in a bench trial may have rested on an incorrect understanding of the applicable law. E.g. , Hawkins v. United States , 103 A.3d 199, 200 (D.C. 2014) (per curiam) ("[I]f th[e] particular basis [for the trial court's verdict] is erroneous but other bases not addressed by the trial court would sustain a conviction, the proper course of action is to remand rather than reverse outright. Therefore, we are constrained to remand this case for the court to reweigh the evidence in the record afresh, and render a new verdict.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The District does not argue that the error in this case was harmless, and we therefore vacate and remand for further...