Quayle v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 1908
• Parties: QUAYLE v. STATE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

192 N.Y. 47

84 N.E. 583

QUAYLE

v.STATE.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 14, 1908.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by Oliver A. Quayle against the state of New York. From a judgment of the Appellate Division, Third Department (108 N. Y. Supp. 361,124 App. Div. 81), which affirmed, as to the first cause of action, a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing a claim, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

William J. Roche, for appellant.

William S. Jackson, Atty. Gen. (Timothy I. Dillon, of counsel), for the state.

CULLEN, C. J.

In pursuance of the provisions of the statute in November, 1900, a contract was entered into by the state officers on behalf of the state and one Williams, whereby said Williams agreed to do the public printing, other than legislative printing, during the years 1901 and 1902, for certain specified prices. With the consent of the public officers Williams assigned the contract to the claimant Quayle, who executed it. In January, 1903, the appellant filed a claim in the Court of Claims founded upon two alleged causes of action: (1) For the alleged balance due him on the printing actually done under the contract; (2) for an alleged breach of the contract, in that the state had given some of the printing to which the claimant was entitled under the contract to third parties. At the close of the evidence the Court of Claims dismissed the claim as to each cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal as to the first cause of action, but reversed as to the second. The claimant has appealed to this court from so much of the judgment of the Appellate Division as affirmed the judgment of the Court of Claims.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is defined by section 264 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which, at the time of the filing of the claim in suit, was as follows: ‘The Court of Claims possesses all the powers and jurisdiction of the board of claims. It also has jurisdiction to hear and determine a private claim against the state, which shall have accrued within two years before the claim is filed. It may also hear and determine any claim on the part of the state against the claimant, or against his assignor, at the time of the assignment; and must render judgment for such sum as should be paid by or to the state. But the court has no jurisdiction of a claim submitted by law to any other tribunal or officer for audit or determination.’ It appears from the opinion of the Court of Claims that that learned court, while conceding that the statute was broad enough to confer upon the court authority to hear and determine all private claims, held that the claim must first be recognized by the state by some statute referring it to the court for adjudication. The theory upon which the court reached this conclusion is substantially this: That, because of the immunity from suit of the state as sovereign, there can be no such thing as a valid claim against the state until it has recognized it as such. We think this view of the effect of the state's immunity from suit is entirely erroneous. The fact that it may be impossible to enforce a claim does not prove that the claim is not valid. The federal Constitution inhibits the state from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and this provision applies to contracts with the state itself as well as to those of third parties. Danolds v. State, 89 N. Y. 36, 42 Am. Rep. 277. Therefore a breach of its contract by the state creates a valid cause of action. Immunity of the state from suit merely prevents its enforcement. When, however, the state confers upon a court jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against it, or all claims of a particular class, the situation in that court is the same as if the claim were against a private individual or corporation. There are cases in which the claims against the state rest not on legal, but on moral or equitable obligations which the state may recognize or refuse to recognize at its pleasure. Such were the cases of Cole v. State, 102 N. Y. 48, 6 N. E. 277;O'Hara v. State, 112 N. Y. 146, 19 N. E. 659, 2 L. R. A. 603, 8 Am. St. Rep. 726; Cayuga County v. State, 153 N. Y. 279, 47 N. E. 288. In none of these cases, even had the state been subject to suit the same as an individual, could a court have awarded judgment against it. The obligation against the state was an imperfect one, which being founded in right and justice this court held the state could recognize and satisfy, but until recognized it had no legal force. Doubtless in cases of this character it is necessary that there should be some statute expressly authorizing the Court of Claims to hear and adjudicate the claim, but in other cases the court has power, without special statute, to determine the validity of a claim unless it is of a character which by the terms of the Code is withdrawn from its jurisdiction.

The Appellate Division, while repudiating the doctrine of the court below, sustained its decision as to the first cause of action on the ground that the qualification expressed in the section of the Code cited, to the effect, ‘But the court has no jurisdiction of a claim submitted by law to any other tribunal or officer for audit or determination,’ withdrew from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims any claim for money earned under the contract. By section 4 of the state finance law (Laws 1897, p. 338, c. 413) it is made the duty of the Comptroller to ‘examine, audit, and liquidate the claims of all persons against the state, if payment thereof out of the treasury is provided for by...