State v. Abdi

• Decision Date: 28 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA–CR 2010–0077.,2 CA–CR 2010–0077.
• Citation: 226 Ariz. 361,248 P.3d 209,602 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4
• Parties: The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,v.Abdulkadir ABDI, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

226 Ariz. 361

248 P.3d 209

602 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4

The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,

v.Abdulkadir ABDI, Appellant.

No. 2 CA–CR 2010–0077.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2, Department B.

Feb. 28, 2011.

Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani and Amy M. Thorson, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellee.Robert J. Hirsh, Pima County Public Defender By Lisa M. Hise, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellant.

OPINION

KELLY, Judge.

¶ 1 In this appeal from his aggravated assault conviction, appellant Abdulkadir Abdi argues the trial court erred in giving two jury instructions requested by the state and in making several evidentiary rulings. Because we conclude the court erred in instructing the jury, pursuant to A.R.S. § 13–419, to presume the victim had acted reasonably in defense of his residence, we reverse.

Background

¶ 2 “We view the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict[ ].” State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App.1999). Abdi met the victim, L., through a mutual acquaintance. At the time, L. lived in a one-bedroom apartment with his girlfriend K. and their young child. Abdi and his girlfriend Callista were looking for a place to stay and L. offered to let them share the apartment temporarily. After approximately four weeks, L. and K. felt the arrangement was not working and K. delivered a letter to Callista asking that she and Abdi move out.

¶ 3 Sometime after moving out, Abdi returned to the apartment and, according to L.'s testimony, banged on the door and threatened to shoot him. L. kept the door locked and Abdi eventually left. A few days later, shortly after midnight, Abdi again visited the apartment. L. testified that when he saw Abdi approaching he tried to close and lock the door, but Abdi forced it open and attempted to enter the apartment. L. further testified he had tried to “push [Abdi] outside” and had stated “you can't come in here.” During the struggle Abdi pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed L. multiple times. Abdi fled and K. called the police. L. was transported to the hospital and treated for his injuries.

¶ 4 Abdi was arrested and charged with aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty of the offense and the trial court sentenced him to 9.5 years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

Discussion

I. Presumption of Reasonableness Instruction

¶ 5 Abdi contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on a person's defense of his or her residence because it lessened the state's burden of proof. Although we review for an abuse of discretion whether the trial court erred in giving or refusing to give requested jury instructions, see State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, ¶ 60, 111 P.3d 369, 385 (2005), we review de novo whether the instruction it gave correctly states the law, see State v. Orendain, 188 Ariz. 54, 56, 932 P.2d 1325, 1327 (1997). Jury instructions are viewed as a whole to determine if they “adequately reflect the law.” State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 10, 870 P.2d 1097, 1106 (1994).

¶ 6 At trial, Abdi claimed he had acted in self-defense and that L. had been the initial aggressor.¹ The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense. In addition, at the state's request, the court instructed the jury that, “[t]he person is presumed to have acted reasonably if the person acted against another person who unlawfully or forcefully entered the person's residential structure.” On appeal, Abdi argues that this instruction, as applied to the victim, “creat[ed] a mandatory presumption that [L.] ... act[ed] reasonably.” Abdi contends this presumption “lessened the [s]tate's burden of proving ... that [Abdi] was not acting in self[-]defense.”

¶ 7 As Abdi points out, the instruction tracks the language of A.R.S. § 13–419. That statute provides a presumption that a person acted reasonably for purposes of a justification defense under A.R.S. §§ 13–404 through 13–408 and 13–418 when acting against someone entering their home unlawfully or forcibly. We must therefore determine whether it was error for the trial court to give such an instruction with respect to a victim's actions rather than to the actions of a defendant raising a justification defense. In statutory interpretation, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Peek, 219 Ariz. 182, ¶ 11, 195 P.3d 641, 643 (2008). “In any case involving statutory interpretation we begin with the text of the statute” because it is “the best and most reliable index of a statute's meaning.” State v. Christian, 205 Ariz. 64, ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003). “When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation to determine the legislature's intent because its intent is readily discernable from the face of the statute.” Id. But, if the statute's language is not clear, we examine “ ‘the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’ ” See Greenwood v. State, 217 Ariz. 438, ¶ 16, 175 P.3d 687, 691 (App.2008), quoting In re Estate of Jung, 210 Ariz. 202, ¶ 12, 109 P.3d 97, 99 (App.2005).

¶ 8 Section 13–419 uses the general phrase, “[t]he person,” suggesting the statute could apply to either a defendant or an alleged victim in a case. But, the historical background of the statute and the language used in describing the legislature's intent at the time of the statute's passage suggest the presumption was meant to apply in favor of a defendant in a criminal action who raises a justification defense. The Arizona Senate Fact Sheet for S.B. 1145, ultimately enacted as § 13–419, describes the background and purpose of the statute. Arizona State Senate, Fact Sheet for S.B. 1145, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (March 8, 2006). The Fact Sheet uses the term “defendant” throughout and explains, “[u]se of force justification laws ... must be raised by a defendant who is charged with using force.” It further provides that the proposed statute “[r]equires, if the defendant presents a justification defense, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification.” Senate Fact Sheet for S.B. 1145. Accordingly, we conclude the legislature intended § 13–419 to apply to a defendant who is charged with using force in response to someone unlawfully entering their home.

¶ 9 We next turn to Abdi's contention that the jury instruction, modeled on the statute, but given in an unintended context, created an unconstitutional presumption that lessened the state's burden of proof. In assessing the constitutionality of jury instructions dealing with presumptions, “we must first determine if the presumption is mandatory or permissive.” State v. Lopez, 134 Ariz. 469, 472, 657 P.2d 882, 885 (App.1982). “In determining the nature of the presumption, the instruction must be interpreted as a reasonable juror could have interpreted it.” State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 457, 666 P.2d 1059, 1066 (1983).

¶ 10 “A ‘permissive presumption’ ... allows the trier of fact to infer the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts, but places no burden of any kind on the defendant.” Id. A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it “ ‘must find the [ultimate] fact upon proof of the basic fact.’ ” State v. Mohr, 150 Ariz. 564, 567, 724 P.2d 1233, 1236 (App.1986), quoting County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (alteration in Mohr ).

¶ 11 We agree with Abdi that the language of the challenged instruction here is mandatory, not permissive. The trial court essentially instructed the jury that, upon the requisite factual showing of an unlawful entry into a home, they were to presume the victim had “acted reasonably” in defense of that home. Because the instruction contained no permissive language and permitted “no room for the jury to exercise its discretion,” a reasonable juror could have viewed the instruction as requiring that he or she find the ultimate fact—that the victim acted reasonably in defense of his residence—upon the state's proof of the basic fact—that Abdi “unlawfully or forcefully” entered the residence. See id. Accordingly, we conclude the instruction created a mandatory presumption. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 515, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (finding instruction “[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts[,]” created a mandatory presumption).

¶ 12 Because L. was the only person in a position to defend his residence, a reasonable jury could only have understood the presumption to apply in favor of L., rather than Abdi. And the instruction, when applied to the victim in this case, is problematic. Once the state proved that L. had “acted against another person who unlawfully or forcefully entered [L.]'s residential structure [,]” the jury was to presume that Abdi's use of force was in response to reasonable action by the victim. Abdi's claim of self-defense was thus unjustified unless he presented evidence to rebut the presumption.

¶ 13 “Justification is not an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove.” State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, ¶ 6, 235 P.3d 240, 242 (2010). Rather, if the defendant presents any evidence of self-defense, the state must establish “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification.’ ” Id., quoting A.R.S. § 13–205(A).² Thus, when applied to the victim in this case, a reasonable jury could have understood the instruction to create a presumption that relieved the state of its burden of persuasion as to an element of the offense. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).

¶ 14 We next consider the instruction in the context of the jury instructions as a whole, as “[o]ther instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a...