Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System
| Decision Date | 26 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-31260,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,00-31260 |
| Parties | (5th Cir. 2001) KATHY HUNT,, v. RAPIDES HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, LLC, doing business as Winn Parish Medical Center, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
Before BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL*, District Judge.
This appeal addresses the responsibility of an employer toward an employee who has taken leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Kathy Hunt appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims that her former employer, the Rapides Healthcare System, L.L.C. d/b/a Winn Parish Medical Center ("Medical Center"), violated her FMLA rights and retaliated against her by refusing to restore her to the position she held before taking medical leave or to provide her an equivalent position. This court reverses in part, affirms in part, and remands the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hunt worked as a registered nurse in the Medical Center's Critical Care Unit ("CCU"). On September 14, 1997, Hunt was in a car accident and suffered chest and lung contusions. During her three-day hospital stay, Hunt talked by telephone to a supervisor at the Medical Center, describing her injuries and requesting family and medical leave. The supervisor told Hunt that she would be placed on medical leave. Over the next month, Hunt had several telephone discussions with Medical Center personnel about her leave status and the Center's need for documentation of Hunt's medical condition from her physician.
On October 17,1997, Hunt met with the Medical Center's personnel manager and received a letter stating that she had been placed on FMLA leave as of September 19, 1997, the first scheduled work day following the accident, and that the leave period would end on December 12, 1997.1 On December 16, 1997, the Medical Center's personnel director sent Hunt a letter stating that her twelve weeks of FMLA leave had expired and that if she did not provide medical documentation to support her leave by December 31, 1997, her employment would be considered abandoned. After she received this letter, Hunt gave her supervisors a copy of a note from her doctor dated November 21, 1997. That note stated that Hunt had been under the doctor's care since September 17 and was released to return to work on December 1, 1997. Hunt returned to work on January 6, 1997, but not in the same position she held before the accident.
During Hunt's leave, the Medical Center assigned her full-time day shift CCU position to a different nurse. When Hunt notified the Medical Center that she was ready to return to work, no full-time day shift CCU nurse position was open. The Medical Center offered Hunt a full-time night shift position at the CCU. Hunt declined the night shift position on the basis of her family situation; as a single parent, she had to be at home at night. Hunt asked to be placed in the Variable Staffing Pool ("VSP"), where she was able to work the day shift in the CCU, but on a part-time, as needed basis. Although other full-time day shift positions subsequently became available in departments outside the CCU, Hunt did not apply, preferring to remain in that unit.
The summary judgment record shows that over the next months, Hunt received a merit bonus. However, while working an average of 45.1 hours in each two-week period, Hunt made less money than she had working full-time, and she lost the health, retirement, and leave benefits of full-time employment. On May 8, 1998, Hunt resigned.
Although these facts are undisputed, the parties vigorously dispute whether Hunt attempted to return to work before December 12, 1997, the date the Medical Center designated in writing as the end of her FMLA leave. Hunt presented summary judgment evidence that in late November, before her leave expired, she told Peters, her shift supervisor, that she wanted to be placed on the nursing schedule in early December. The Medical Center provided testimony from Peters that Hunt did not make any request to return to work until the end of December 1997, after her FMLA leave had expired.
Specifically, Hunt testified that shortly after November 21, 1997, when she received the note from her doctor releasing her to work after December 1, she telephoned Peters and asked to be placed on the December work schedule. Hunt testified that during the conversation, Peters told her that he had already assigned her day shift CCU position to another nurse. Peters offered Hunt the full-time night shift CCU position, which she declined.
By contrast, Peters testified that this conversation with Hunt did not occur until after December 12, 1997. According to Peters, although Hunt may have telephoned him in late November, she did not ask to be placed on the nursing schedule until late December 1997. Peters stated that he told Hunt in late December that he had already assigned the full-time day shift CCU position to another nurse.
If, as Hunt testified, she asked to return to work before December 12, 1997, the FMLA required the Medical Center to return her to her previous position or an equivalent position. If Peters's testimony is credited, the applicable case law leads to the conclusion that the Medical Center did not violate Hunt's FMLA rights because she did not attempt to return to work until after her leave period had expired.
In addition to the dispute as to whether Hunt sought to return to work before her leave expired, the parties also dispute whether the Medical Center offered Hunt a position equivalent to the job she held before her leave. Hunt contends that the full-time CCU nurse night shift position was not equivalent to the day shift position. The Medical Center contends that the positions were equivalent because the compensation and duties were the same. The parties also dispute whether the assignment to the "pool nurse" position was an adverse employment action that can support a retaliation claim. Hunt argues that by offering her the night shift position, knowing she would not accept it, the Medical Center "forced" her to accept the part-time "pool nurse" job, in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. Hunt argues that the decline in compensation and feeling of demotion resulting from the part-time position left her no alternative to resignation; she claims constructive discharge. The Medical Center contends that neither its offer of the full-time night shift CCU position, nor Hunt's decision to accept a part-time day shift CCU position, can constitute retaliation or constructive discharge, as a matter of law.
Hunt filed this suit in October 1999, claiming that the Medical Center had violated the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Department of Labor regulations for proper notice of FMLA leave, by failing properly to designate Hunt's FMLA period and by failing to restore Hunt to her prior position or an equivalent position after she timely sought to return to work. Hunt also alleged that the Medical Center retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave, by assigning her a part-time position with no benefits, amounting to constructive discharge. The district court granted the Medical Center's motion for summary judgment, finding that Hunt did not attempt to return to work until after her leave had expired, relieving the Medical Center of the obligation to restore her prior position. The district court rejected Hunt's testimony that she asked to return to work in November 1997 and accepted Peters's contrary testimony that Hunt did not make the request until late December 1997, after her twelve weeks of FMLA leave had ended. The district court rejected Hunt's contention that under the Department of Labor regulations, her leave extended past December 1997 because the Medical Center could not retroactively designate leave to begin in September by written notice given in October. The district court concluded that the DOL regulation prohibiting such retroactive notice was invalid. Finally, the district court found that Hunt had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA.
This appeal followed.
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 608 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate when there "is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Conoco, Inc. v. Medic Sys., Inc., 259 F.3d 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2001)(citation omitted). The court must view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1999). Credibility determinations are not part of the summary judgment analysis. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 allows eligible employees working for covered employers to take temporary leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a spouse, child, or parent who has a serious health condition, without the risk of losing employment. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) and (2).2 The FMLA has two distinct sets of provisions, which together seek to meet the needs of families and employees and to accommodate the legitimate interests of employers. See Nero v. Indus. Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 927 (5th Cir. 1999); Bocalbos v. Nat'l W. Life Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 379,...
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