Decosta v. Ye Craftsman Studio, Inc

• Decision Date: 03 March 1932
• Citation: 278 Mass. 315,180 N.E. 151
• Parties: DECOSTA v. YE CRAFTSMAN STUDIO, Inc.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

278 Mass. 315

180 N.E. 151

DECOSTA

v.YE CRAFTSMAN STUDIO, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 3, 1932.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Suffolk, Appellate Division; Charles L. Carr, Judge.

Action by Leo DeCosta, p. p. a., against the Ye Craftsman Studio, Inc. Finding for plaintiff, and case reported. From an order of the Appellate Division dismissing the report, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

James F. Casey, of Boston, for appellant.

Edward M. Sullivan, of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

The plaintiff, a minor, seeks to recover in this action of tort compensation for personal injuries received on October 28, 1929, as a result of being struck by an automobile owned by the defendant, insured by it under the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law, and operated by its agent. The writ is dated on January 26, 1931.

1. The first point for decision is whether the action was seasonably brought. The governing statutory provisions are G. L. c. 260, §§ 4, 7, 19. Said section 4 was amended by St. 1921, c. 319, § 1, St. 1925, c. 346, § 10, and St. 1929, c. 29, § 1 (see now St. 1931, c. 458, § 5), so as to read (so far as here material): ‘* * * Actions of tort for bodily injuries * * * the payment of judgments in which is required to be secured by chapter ninety * * * shall be commenced only within one year next after the cause of action accrues.’ The relevant words of section 7 are: ‘If the person entitled thereto is a minor * * * the action may be commenced within the time hereinbefore limited after the disability is removed.’ Section 19 is in these words: ‘If a special provision is otherwise made relative to the limitation of any action, any provision of this chapter inconsistent therewith shall not apply.’ These sections are parts of the chapter of the General Laws devoted in general to the ‘Limitation of Actions.’ In the main that chapter governs the subject of limitations save as other special limitations may exist. These sections, considered by themselves and in connection with the scope of the chapter, are to be construed as constituting an harmonious entity. Thus interpreted, the terms of section 4 must be regarded as modified by section 7 in all cases where the facts render it relevant. Where, therefore, a minor is entitled to maintain any of the causes of action enumerated in section 4, the period of limitations within which such minor might commence the enforcement of his rights in the courts would be extended in accordance with the terms of section 7 as modified by special provisions, if any, as specified in section 19. If examination be made of the relevant sections of G. L. c. 260, alone, plainly the plaintiff would not be barred by section 4 but would be entitled to the benefit of section 7.

The defendant contends that ‘special provision is otherwise made’ relative to the case at bar within the meaning of section 19 of G. L. c. 260, and that therefore the extension in favor of minors contained in section 7 is not applicable. That contention is based on the circumstance that the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law contains such special limitation. That contention involves inquiry into the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and the effect upon it of the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law.

The cause of action here in issue arises under the common law. It is not created by statute. It accrued at the time the plaintiff received his injuries. McLearn v. Hill (Mass.) 177 N. E. 617. Confessedly, also, this is a cause of action, payment of judgment in which is required to be secured by G. L. c. 90, as amended. Elaborate provisions are made requiring compulsory insurance or other financial protection to secure payment of damages for bodily injuries caused by the negligent operation of motor vehicles. St. 1925, c. 346, as most recently amended by St. 1928, c. 381, and St. 1930, c. 340. The statutes to that end were adopted after prolonged study by a legislative committee and careful preliminary preparation of the proposed remedial legislation. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 594, 147 N. E. 681;In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 617, 147 N. E. 680. The framework of that remedial legislation is significant of the purpose of the General Court in enacting it. In this connection it will be sufficient to examine the original act without adverting to its amendments. That act was St. 1925, c. 346. By its first two sections ten entirely new sections are inserted in G. L. c. 90. That chapter relates to motor vehicles. Those sections constitute the essence of said chapter 346. Thereby compulsory security for the payment of damages for bodily injuries, including death, caused by motor vehicles, is established. The remaining sections are ancillary to the first two sections. Sections 3 to 10, both inclusive, are in form amendments to other chapters of the General Laws. Their force and effect are to modify sections of those other chapters so that, in addition to matters theretofore the subject of statutory regulation, are included the new matters required by the compulsory motor vehicles insurance law. By section 3, a board of appeal as to motor vehicle liability policies and bonds is established by adding a section to G. L. c. 26, a chapter relating to the department of banking and insurance. By sections 4, 5, and 6, new or amended sections are added to G. L. c. 175, which relates to insurance. By section 7 amendment is made of G. L. c. 159, § 46, in respect to motor vehicles used by those conducting the business of common carriers of passengers. By section 8, amendment is made to G. L. c. 221, touching corporations engaged in acting as surety on motor vehicle bonds. By section 9, amendment is made of G. L. c. 229, concerning actions to recover compensation for death. By section 10, amendment is made of G. L. c. 260, relative to the limitation of actions. The remaining three sections deal with subsidiary and incidental matters. The frame of the act, therefore, bears unmistakable indication that all its provisions are intended to fit into and become a part of the general statutory scheme already existing. Its dominating sections are a part of the chapter relating to motor vehicles. Its remaining important sections are distributed among other chapters likewise covering specified subjects by general provisions. If a new revision of the statutes were made, no new chapter would be needed to comprehend this subject-matter but all its terms would find places within existing chapters. With reference to the subject of limitation of actions, no special provision is made but existing general sections are modified so as to be adapted to special features of the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law. If that had been the purpose of the General Court, it would have been simple to provide a definite statute of limitations to the effect that no action could be commenced to recover damages for bodily injuries, payment of which was secured under the act, except within one year after the cause of action accrues. No such provision is found. The Legislature chose rather to refer the limitation touching actions for death to the pertinent general section of the chapter permitting recovery of damages for death and the limitation touching all other actions to the pertinent section of the chapter touching the general limitation of civil actions.

The provision of G. L. c. 260, § 4, as finally amended, so far as now pertinent, by St. 1929, c. 29, § 1, is left in its new form otherwise undisturbed as a part of the main statutory provisions as to limitations of actions. There has been no amendment of either section 7 or section 19 of said chapter 260. It would be a forced and unnatural construction to hold that section 7 was not as much applicable to section 4 in its new form as it had been before any amendment. Actions for bodily injuries secured by the compulsory motor vehicle insurance law are by the amendment commingled in section 4 with other actions in respect to which there is no ground for contention that the provisions of section 7...