Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds

• Decision Date: 13 February 1981
• Citation: 416 N.E.2d 1373,382 Mass. 580
• Parties: REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES v. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1373

416 N.E.2d 1373

382 Mass. 580

REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES v. BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Sept. 9, 1980.

Decided Feb. 13, 1981.

Gerald J. Caruso, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff.

John F. Haddigan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and QUIRICO, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This is an appeal by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (registrar) from a judgment of the Superior Court upholding a decision issued by the Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board). The case arose when, acting pursuant to a mandatory revocation provision of G.L. c. 90, § 24, the registrar revoked a driver's license upon the report of the licensee's adjudication as a delinquent child because of motor vehicle offenses. When the licensee appealed to the board under G.L. c. 90, § 28, ¹ the board annulled the revocation and ordered the registrar to reinstate the license. The case on appeal requires a construction of the scope of review granted to the board by G.L. c. 90, § 28, over statutorily required revocations imposed by the registrar.

We summarize the facts. On July 11, 1973, and again on July 30, 1973, as a result of two separate incidents, the licensee was adjudged a delinquent child by reason of using a motor vehicle without authority. See G.L. c. 90, § 24(2) (a), and G.L. c. 119, § 58B. Under G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(b), the adjudication of delinquency by virtue of a conviction of use of an automobile without authority is one of several offenses requiring the registrar to revoke the driver's license of the offender. Unless the court or magistrate in the case recommends otherwise, the registrar is given no discretion under § 24(2)(b); the section mandates immediate revocation. Thus, upon report of the two convictions in this case, the registrar revoked the juvenile's license on December 20, 1973, for the statutorily mandated period of three years. See G.L. c. 90, § 24(2) (a), (b), and (c). ²

The juvenile appealed the revocation of his license to the board pursuant to G.L. c. 90, § 28. After a hearing, the board annulled the registrar's action and ordered the license restored. ³ In its statement of reasons for its decision the board found that the licensee had, in fact, been adjudicated delinquent on two occasions. ⁴ However, the board made no findings as to why his license should be restored prior to the expiration of the statutorily mandated period of revocation.

Following the board's decision, and pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14, the registrar brought an action for review of the decision in the Superior Court. He sought reversal of the board's action and reinstatement of the revocation for the remainder of the statutorily required period. Arguing that the board's scope of review was limited to determining whether on the facts the juvenile had twice been adjudged a delinquent for using a motor vehicle without authority, the registrar also sought a declaration that the board could not otherwise modify or annul the mandatory revocation periods set forth in G.L. c. 90, § 24, and other motor vehicle laws. The case was heard on the basis of the record filed by the board. ⁵ The record did not include a transcript of the hearing, nor findings of fact.

The judge rejected the registrar's arguments, finding the decision to annul the registrar's decision to be properly within the power of the board. However, he criticized the board's summary statement of reasons as "somewhat lacking in detail and precision."

We granted the registrar's motion for direct appellate review. See G.L. c. 211A, § 10(A). On appeal the registrar argues that the judge erred in two respects in upholding the board's decision: (1) because there was no finding by the board that the registrar did not act in accordance with the statute, or that the factual predicate for the revocation the underlying conviction or adjudication did not in fact occur; and (2) because the board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, nor did the board make an adequate statement of reasons for its decisions.

We hold that under G.L. c. 90, § 28, the board in its discretion may affirm, modify, or annul actions taken by the registrar pursuant to the mandatory revocation provisions of G.L. c. 90, § 24(2). Thus, we hold that the judge correctly ruled that as a matter of law the board had the power to modify the registrar's decision. The questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the board's statement of reasons for its decision under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, are discussed later in this opinion.

1. The board's power of review. General Laws c. 90, § 28, allows any person aggrieved by a decision or ruling of the registrar to appeal to the board. The board's decisions are subject to judicial review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14. Poitras v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 356 Mass. 510, 254 N.E.2d 412 (1969). An individual whose license has been revoked by the registrar must appeal to the board before seeking judicial review. See Wall v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 329 Mass. 70, 106 N.E.2d 425 (1952).

In the case of an appeal from a discretionary ruling by the registrar, we have construed the word "appeal" in § 28 "as providing for a new trial on all issues and a full hearing on the merits in no way limited or restricted by what had occurred at the previous hearing before the registrar." Ullian v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 325 Mass. 197, 199, 89 N.E.2d 780 (1950). Furthermore, we expressly approved the appeal of a G.L. c. 90, § 24, mandatory revocation decision to the Board of Appeal under G.L. c. 90, § 28, in Boyle v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 368 Mass. 141, 331 N.E.2d 52 (1975). However, in Boyle, we refrained from deciding what issues are open on such an appeal, holding simply that "at a minimum any issue is open which is essential to a determination that the license revocation is constitutionally valid." Id. at 143, 331 N.E.2d 52. We hold today that "appeal" as used in § 28 and as construed in Ullian applies to mandatory as well as discretionary revocations by the registrar.

The registrar argues that the scope of the board's authority to modify or annul the statutorily mandated revocation in this case is limited to a finding of material factual error or a misapplication of § 24(2) by the registrar. Any other interpretation of c. 90, § 28, he asserts, ignores the legislative intent embodied in § 24(2)(c) that the license of a person who has twice been adjudicated a delinquent by virtue of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle must be revoked for a minimum of three years. The registrar buttresses his argument by noting that the amendment to G.L. c. 90, § 24(2), St. 1966, c. 191, § 1, entitled, "An Act to require the revocation of a motor vehicle operator's license after conviction for larceny of a motor vehicle or conviction for using a motor vehicle without authority," was passed sixteen years after the most recent amendment to the appeals statute. See St. 1950, c. 536. Thus, the registrar argues, the clear legislative intent evidenced in the amended § 24 conflicts with the broad power of review given earlier to the board. He concludes that, to construe the two statutes harmoniously, § 24 must be construed as prohibiting the board from annulling license revocations which are mandated by statute unless the invocation of § 24 by the registrar was factually or legally incorrect.

We begin our analysis with the general rule that "a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated." Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513, 333 N.E.2d 450 (1975), quoting from Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975). Furthermore, where two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, they should be construed together so as to constitute an harmonious whole consistent with the legislative purpose. Board of Educ., supra, 368 Mass. at 513-514, 333 N.E.2d 450. The statutory language itself is the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose. Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977).

Applying these principles, we find two flaws in the registrar's argument. First, even were we to accept his characterization of the amended § 24 as a later, specific statute conflicting with an earlier general statute, we would not accept his conclusion. To do so would amount to impliedly repealing a portion of the board's power of review. We are loath to find that a prior statute has been superseded in whole or in part in the absence of express words to that effect or of clear implication. Rennert v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 363 Mass. 740, 743, 297 N.E.2d 60 (1973), citing Inspector of Bldgs. of Falmouth v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 264 Mass. 85, 161 N.E. 899 (1928). Had the Legislature intended the "use without authority" statute to narrow the scope of the board's review, it could have expressed the limitation in the statute. It did not do so.

Furthermore, "(t)he test of the applicability of the principle of implied repeal is whether the prior statute is so repugnant to and inconsistent with the later enactment covering the subject that both cannot stand." Gregoire, petitioner, 355 Mass. 399, 400, 245 N.E.2d 241 (1969), quoting from Doherty v. Commissioner of Administration, 349 Mass. 687, 690, 212 N.E.2d 485 (1965). A requirement that the registrar must, without discretion, revoke licenses under certain circumstances is not repugnant to a provision allowing appeal...