State v. Cheeks

• Decision Date: 04 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 104,858.,104,858.
• Citation: 310 P.3d 346,298 Kan. 1
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jerome CHEEKS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

298 Kan. 1
310 P.3d 346

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,
v.
Jerome CHEEKS, Appellant.

No. 104,858.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 4, 2013.

Unconstitutional as Applied
West's K.S.A. 21–2512

[310 P.3d 349]

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2. The court evaluates an equal protection challenge using a three-step process. First, the court considers whether the legislation creates a classification resulting in different treatment of similarly situated individuals. Second, if the statute does treat “arguably indistinguishable” individuals differently, then the court examines the nature of the classification or right at issue to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. Finally, the court applies the proper level of scrutiny to the statute.

3. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that states treat similarly situated individuals similarly. The party challenging a law's constitutionality has the burden to prove an individual is similarly situated to members of a class receiving different treatment.

4. A court will uphold legislation subject to a rational basis review if any reasonable basis exists for the differing treatment of similarly situated individuals.

5. When a statute fails on equal protection grounds, a court may either strike the statute or extend the benefits of the statute to include those improperly omitted. However, in considering whether to reform or nullify the law, a court should ask what the legislature would prefer given the choice to strike the entire law or expand the law to cover the improperly excluded group.

Paul M. Dent, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with him on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by MORITZ, J.:

Jerome Cheeks appeals the district court's denial of his petition for postconviction DNA testing of evidence related to his second-degree murder conviction. The district court denied his request because the relevant statute, K.S.A. 21–2512, does not include individuals convicted of second-degree murder among those permitted to seek such testing. Cheeks argues K.S.A. 21–2512 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it permits individuals convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment to petition for DNA testing but denies that opportunity to similarly situated individuals like himself who were convicted of second-degree murder and also sentenced to life in prison. He further asserts he has a right to DNA testing under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution regardless of the scope of K.S.A. 21–2512.

We do not address Cheeks' Fifth Amendment argument because we hold K.S.A. 21–2512 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in that it treats similarly situated individuals differently with no rational basis for doing so. But rather than strike the entirety of the statute, we elect to reform K.S.A. 21–2512 to include persons similar to Cheeks, and we remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1993, a jury convicted Cheeks of malicious second-degree murder, and the district court sentenced him to the maximum possible penalty of 15 years to life imprisonment under the sentencing scheme in place prior to the implementation of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 21–4701 et seq.State v. Cheeks, 258 Kan. 581, 908 P.2d 175 (1995). In two separate appeals,

[310 P.3d 350]

this court affirmed Cheeks' conviction and sentence. See State v. Cheeks, 280 Kan. 373, 374, 121 P.3d 989 (2005) (rejecting motion to correct illegal sentence); Cheeks, 258 Kan. at 595, 908 P.2d 175 (affirming conviction).

More than a decade after his conviction, Cheeks filed a pro se petition pursuant to K.S.A. 21–2512, seeking DNA testing of material collected from the crime scene. Cheeks' petition listed approximately 30 items to be tested, including hair and blood found at the scene and samples taken from the victim's person and clothing. The district court summarily denied Cheeks' petition because the plain language of K.S.A. 21–2512 permits only individuals convicted of first-degree murder and rape to petition for DNA testing. Cheeks appealed.

Discussion

Cheeks asserts two challenges to the constitutionality of Kansas' postconviction DNA testing scheme. First, he argues K.S.A. 21–2512 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because the statute treats similarly situated individuals differently with no justification for such differing treatment. Next, he contends that regardless of the scope of K.S.A. 21–2512, he has a Fifth Amendment procedural due process right to postconviction DNA testing, and the district court's denial of his petition for testing violated that right. Because we conclude K.S.A. 21–2512 violates the Equal Protection Clause, we decline to address Cheeks' Fifth Amendment challenge. See Wilson v. Sebelius, 276 Kan. 87, 91, 72 P.3d 553 (2003) (stating, “[a]ppellate courts generally avoid making unnecessary constitutional decisions”).

K.S.A. 21–2512 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying access to postconviction DNA testing to individuals convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Cheeks argues K.S.A. 21–2512 denies him equal protection of the law by restricting his access to postconviction DNA testing based on his conviction of second-degree murder. Cheeks contends he belongs to a class of persons who received a preguidelines sentence of life imprisonment for murder and, unlike individuals serving life sentences for first-degree murder, the statute denies him, without justification, the ability to petition for postconviction DNA testing.

On its face, K.S.A. 21–2512 permits only those convicted of first-degree murder or rape the opportunity to petition for postconviction DNA testing. The statute provides in relevant part:

“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person in state custody, at any time after conviction for murder as defined in K.S.A. 21–3401, and amendments thereto, or for rape as defined by K.S.A. 21–3502, and amendments thereto, may petition the court that entered the judgment for forensic DNA testing (deoxyribonucleic acid testing) of any biological material that:

(1) Is related to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in conviction;

(2) is in the actual or constructive possession of the state; and

(3) was not previously subjected to DNA testing, or can be subjected to retesting with new DNA techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and probative results.” K.S.A. 21–2512.

Before considering Cheeks' constitutional challenge, we pause to clarify the procedural stature of this case. Because the district court summarily rejected Cheeks' petition based on the face of the statute, the court made no findings regarding the three statutory requirements of K.S.A. 21–2512(a). Therefore, if Cheeks prevails on his equal protection challenge before this court and we extend the statute as Cheeks suggests, he will be entitled to a remand to the district court for a hearing to determine whether he can establish those statutory requirements.

We engage in a de novo review of the constitutionality of a statute. Downtown Bar and Grill v. State, 294 Kan. 188, 191–92, 273 P.3d 709 (2012). Our review requires us

[310 P.3d 351]

to presume the statute is constitutional and resolve all doubts in favor of upholding the legislation. Board of Miami County Comm'rs v. Kanza Rail–Trails Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 315, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a “ ‘weighty’ ” burden. Downtown Bar, 294 Kan. at 192, 273 P.3d 709 (citing Steffes v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, 388, 160 P.3d 843 [2007] ).

Courts employ a three-step process in reviewing an equal protection challenge. First, we consider whether the legislation creates a classification resulting in different treatment of similarly situated individuals. Downtown Bar, 294 Kan. at 192, 273 P.3d 709. Second, if the statute does treat “arguably indistinguishable” individuals differently, then we examine the nature of the classification or right at issue to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny. Miami County, 292 Kan. at 315–16, 255 P.3d 1186. Finally, we apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the statute. Downtown Bar, 294 Kan. at 193, 273 P.3d 709.

Cheeks' sentence to the maximum penalty for second-degree murder makes him similarly situated to individuals convicted of first-degree murder and given the same sentence.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that states treat “similarly situated” individuals similarly. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 602, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008); see In re Tax Appeal of Weisgerber, 285 Kan. 98, 106, 169 P.3d 321 (2007) (statute which treats arguably indistinguishable classes of people differently implicates Equal Protection Clause). The party challenging a law's constitutionality has the burden to prove the person is similarly situated to members of a class receiving different treatment, and in conducting our review, we are limited “by the distinctions argued by the complaining party.” State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 249, 210 P.3d 635 (2009). Determining whether individuals are similarly situated is “not always susceptible to ease of application.” In re Weisgerber, 285 Kan....