313 U.S. 109 (1941), 687, California v. Thompson
|Docket Nº:||No. 687|
|Citation:||313 U.S. 109, 61 S.Ct. 930, 85 L.Ed. 1219|
|Party Name:||California v. Thompson|
|Case Date:||April 28, 1941|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 3, 1941
CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA
1. The Commerce Clause did not wholly withdraw from the States the power to regulate matters of local concern with respect to which Congress has not exercised its power, even though the regulation affects interstate commerce. P. 113.
2. The federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 does not include the regulation of casual or occasional interstate transportation of passengers by persons not engaged in such transportation as a regular occupation or business, § 303(b)(9). P. 112.
3. A California statute requires every "transportation agent," defined as one who sells or offers to sell or negotiate for transportation on the public highways of the State, to obtain a license assuring his fitness and to file a bond securing faithful performance of the transportation contracts which he negotiates. It applies alike to agents negotiating for interstate or intrastate commerce, is not a revenue measure, and does not appear to increase the cost of interstate commerce. Its apparent object is to safeguard members of the public, desiring to secure transportation by motor vehicle, from fraud and overreaching. Held consistent with the Commerce Clause when applied to a person who, without having obtained the
license or furnished the bond, arranged for motor transportation of passengers from California to Texas by.a carrier who, so far as appears, made only the single trip. P. 115.
4. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, overruled. P. 116.
41 Cal.App.2d 965 reversed.
Certiorari, 312 U.S. 672, to review the reversal of a conviction on a charge of misdemeanor.
STONE, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
A statute of California, Ch. 390, Statutes of 1933, p. 1011, as amended by Ch. 665, Statutes of 1935, p. 1833, defines a transportation agent as one who "sells or offers for sale, or negotiates for" transportation over the public highways of the state, § 2, and requires every such agent to procure a license from the State Railroad Commission authorizing him so to act. By §§ 6, 7, and 8, prerequisites to the license are determination by the Commission of the applicant's fitness to exercise the licensed privilege, the payment of a license fee of $1, and the filing by the applicant of a bond in the sum of $1,000, conditioned upon the faithful performance of the transportation contracts which he negotiates. By § 16, any person acting as a transportation agent without a license is guilty of a misdemeanor. The question for decision is whether the statutory exaction of the license and bond infringes the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, when applied to one who negotiates for the transportation interstate of passengers over the public highways of the state.
Respondent was convicted of violation of the statute by arranging for the transportation, by motor vehicle, of
passengers from Los Angeles, California, to Dallas...
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