Necaise v. Chrysler Corporation

• Decision Date: 28 July 1964
• Docket Number: No. 20654.,20654.
• Parties: Eunice Edna NECAISE, Substituted as Administratrix of the Estate of Willard L. Necaise, deceased, Appellant, v. The CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

335 F.2d 562 (1964)

Eunice Edna NECAISE, Substituted as Administratrix of the Estate of Willard L. Necaise, deceased, Appellant, v. The CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Appellee.

No. 20654.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 28, 1964.

Oscar B. Ladner, Gulfport, Miss., Albert Sidney Johnston, Jr., Biloxi, Miss., for appellant.

P. D. Greaves, Gulfport, Miss., Ronald R. Pawlak, Detroit, Mich., Walter E. Workman, Houston, Tex. (Baker, Botts, Shepherd & Coates, Houston, Tex., of counsel), for appellee.

Before BROWN, MOORE^* and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge.

In this products liability case we must review the action of the trial court in sustaining a motion by the defendant, The Chrysler Corporation (appellee), for a directed verdict. The plaintiff, Necaise (appellant),¹ received disabling injuries when a Chrysler-built Dodge pick-up truck which he was driving overturned on a "test drive." Motion for directed verdict was made when the plaintiff rested, but the court reserved its ruling until all the evidence was presented. This is a diversity case which arose in the state of Mississippi.

The plaintiff bases his case on breach of warranty and negligence. In defense Chrysler relies on the following "points": (1) there was insufficient proof that the truck was negligently manufactured "so that such negligence proximately caused or contributed to the alleged injury and damage"; (2) there was lack of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant; and (3) the alleged defect was readily visible to the plaintiff "whose job was the testing and checking of the vehicle in question." In granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court stated:

"Its sic obvious to me that these `U\' bolts according to the record before me were not tightened and had never been tightened by anybody. They were loose and too loose but I don\'t believe there is any substantial evidence sufficient to justidy sic a jury to conjecture and try and see whether or not they can find any liability in the case. I just don\'t think that there is any substantial evidence of any cause or connection sic between that piece of negligence on somebody\'s part if it is shown in this record that such negligence were that of the defendant in the case. For the record I will go on record as saying that I don\'t, however, regard the looseness of those bolts as being a patent defect in the assembly of this vehicle. I think it was a latent defect and one that the average member of the general public wouldn\'t be expected or called on to detect, but that in my opinion doesn\'t have any controlling effect or bearing here. The law of Mississippi is and for sometime has been to the effect that there must be privity of relationship between an injured party and a manufacturer whom he sues for a defect in a piece of equipment."

The truck in question was delivered to the Navy Department at Gulfport, Mississippi. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was test-driving the truck pursuant to his duties as an employee of the Navy Department. When he was instructed to test drive the vehicle, the speedometer registered three miles. At the time of the accident it had been driven approximately ten or fifteen miles.² According to Necaise he was driving the truck alone on the test strip and when he applied the brakes the steering wheel pulled to the left, the truck started skidding, and the vehicle turned over three or four times causing the injuries alleged. At the trial he proved that the "U" bolts which connect the front axle and the springs and secure them to the frame and body of the truck had not been tightened and secured on the left side.³ He testified that it was his opinion that the loose "U" bolts allowed the left side of the front axle to slip backwards when he applied the brakes and that such condition caused the steering apparatus to pull to the left and the truck to skid and turn over.⁴ As usual the evidence was in sharp conflict. Chrysler employees and witnesses testified that "looseness of the `U' bolts" would not have caused the accident. One witness testified that he had test-driven a similar vehicle with loosened "U" bolts under adverse conditions over rough terrain with no ill effects.⁵

Chrysler manufactured the truck, sold it to Chrysler Sales Corporation and gave a warranty as to fitness which was extended to the government through the Navy Department. There was evidence that the Chrysler Corporation made a number of warranty reimbursements on other vehicles involved in the same order by which the truck in question was sold and delivered. A claim was made by the Navy on this vehicle but it was not known whether any monetary adjustment or reimbursement was made on the claim. Finally, in its Post-Submission Brief the defendant concedes that it might be reasonable to infer that the "U" bolts were loose because the nuts were found to be loose or missing.⁶

The defendant further concedes that the plaintiff's evidence established that the nuts on the "U" bolts were loose and that one nut was missing; that there was circumstantial evidence from which a jury might reasonably infer that this defect was attributable to negligence on the part of defendant in the manufacturing process. But, says the defendant, even if such conditions were a possible or probable cause of the plaintiff's inability to control the vehicle, such fact "is capable of proof by direct and positive evidence from one familiar with the mechanics of such vehicles," and that the plaintiff wholly failed to make such direct and positive proof. The defendant therefore concludes that the law presumes, in the absence of such direct and positive proof, that the evidence if presented would in fact destroy the plaintiff's case.⁷

Directed verdicts should be granted sparingly. The right to a trial by jury is a basic constitutional right reserved by the Seventh Amendment and that amendment applies to diversity cases. Revlon, Inc. v. Buchanan, (5th Cir. 1959) 271 F.2d 795, 800, 81 A.L.R.2d 222. We recently had occasion to state the rule as to directed verdicts in Wells v. Warren Company (5th Cir. 1964), 328 F.2d 666:

"The law with respect to directed verdicts is well-settled. The Court should not grant a motion for a directed verdict if there is substantial credible evidence which would support a verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. It is the function of the jury, not the court, to weigh and evaluate the evidence on both sides of a contested question. If there is a conflict in the evidence, the jury must resolve such conflict. If legitimate, contrary inferences may be drawn from the evidence, the choice of the proper deduction is also for the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient. There must be a conflict in substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence of such quality, character and weight as would justify a reasonable person in drawing the inference of fact that is sought to be sustained. If the state of the evidence is such that it presents no conflict, nevertheless, if reasonable minds may draw conflicting or contrary inferences from the same evidence requiring different verdicts, it is for the jury to determine which is the correct inference. For the purpose of this opinion, we must accept as true the credible evidence adduced by the plaintiff Wells. Murray v. Pasotex Pipeline Co., 5 Cir. 1947, 161 F. 2d 5; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Postom, 1949, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 177 F.2d 53; Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Crowder, 5 Cir. 1949, 177 F.2d 633; Audirsch, et al. v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 5 Cir. 1952, 195 F.2d 629; Swift & Co. v. Morgan & Sturdivant, 5 Cir. 1954, 214 F.2d 115, 49 A.L.R. 2d 924; Texas Co. v. Savoie, 5 Cir. 1957, 240 F.2d 674. Such rules are not in conflict with the law of Florida. Southern Express Co. v. Williamson, 1913, 66 Fla. 286, 63 So. 433, L.R.A.1916C, 1208."

See also Lindeman v. Textron, Incorporated, (2nd Cir. 1956) 229 F.2d 273; Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. Futch, (5th Cir. 1958) 263 F.2d 701; Clarkson v. Hertz Corporation, (5th Cir. 1959) 266 F.2d 948; Ford Motor Company v. Zahn, (8th Cir. 1959) 265 F.2d 729, and Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Company, (5th Cir. 1961) 288 F.2d 738. The law of Mississippi is substantially the same. Ballenger v. Vicksburg Hardwood Co. (1960), 238 Miss. 654, 119 So.2d 778.⁸ When the dispositive issue is causation, the above stated principle is especially applicable. In the recent case of Mississippi Power & Light Company v. Walters (Miss.1963), 158 So.2d 2, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated the rule as follows:

"Moreover, when reasonable minds might differ on the matter, the question of what is the proximate cause of an injury is usually a question for the jury, * * *.

* * * * * *

"There may be more than one proximate cause of an injury, * * * and if appellant\'s negligence proximately contributed to the injury, * * * then appellant is liable even though its negligence was not the sole proximate cause thereof." (Emphasis added.)⁹

Applying these principles outlined to the case under consideration, we believe the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict determining that the defect in question at least contributed to the injury. Of course we make no suggestion as to what the jury might have decided, or should decide, or what we would have decided from all the evidence. We only determine that the jury should have been given an opportunity to make a decision one way or the other. On this aspect of the case, we conclude that the court erred in taking the case from the jury.

It is difficult to determine whether the trial judge meant to find that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence presented to make a jury case, or whether having found a lack of causation, he looked no further. At any rate, it is our opinion that sufficient evidence was adduced to take the case to the jury under the res ipsa loquitur doctr...