Marrs v. Barbeau
| Decision Date | 04 December 1957 |
| Citation | 336 Mass. 416,146 N.E.2d 353 |
| Parties | Joe MARRS v. Leon BARBEAU. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Frederick S. Pillsbury, Springfield, for plaintiff.
Edward B. Landis, Springfield, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, COUNIHAN and CUTTER, JJ.
The plaintiff brought this action of tort in a District Court for the alleged conversion of an airplane by the defendant. The judge found for the plaintiff, and a report to the Appellate Division was dismissed. The defendant appealed.
On the basis of facts agreed to by the parties, supplemented by evidence, the judge found as follows: Prior to January 7 or 8, 1953, a Massachusetts corporation, Springfield Feeder Lines, Inc. (hereinafter called Feeder), was the owner of a certain Lockheed airplane. The airplane was registered in the name of Feeder as owner with the 'Recordation Branch of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, Washington, D. C.' (For convenience the Administration will be referred to hereinafter as C. A. A.)
On January 6, 7, or 8 one Rudich purchased the airplane from Feeder, but the sale was never recorded by him with C. A. A.
On January 9, 1953, the defendant, a deputy sheriff for the county of Hampden in this Commonwealth, attached the airplane on a capias writ, dated that day, in an action of law brought by Hawthorne Management Company, Inc. (hereinafter called Hawthorne), against Rudich. The airplane, which was not in a condition to be flown, was chained to the ground by the defendant and subsequently removed to a hangar. 'The attachment was made in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth.' The defendant did not record the attachment with C. A. A.
On or about February 10, 1953, a bill of sale of the airplane, on a form prescribed by C. A. A., was executed and delivered by Feeder to Margal Aviation Corporation (hereinafter called Margal), the purchaser named therein. The transfer was duly recorded with C. A. A. and the airplane was registered by C. A. A. in the name of Margal as owner. Rudich obtained this bill of sale from Feeder by falsely representing to it that the instrument was a certificate stating that the airplane was not subject to any liens or encumbrances.
On March 15, 1954, the plaintiff purchased the airplane from Margal for $5,000 and received from it a bill of sale. The bill of sale was recorded by the plaintiff with C. A. A. and on March 23, 1954, the airplane was duly registered by C. A. A. in the name of the plaintiff as owner. At the time the plaintiff purchased the airplane he had no knowledge of the sale from Feeder to Rudich; nor did the plaintiff know of the attachment of the airplane made by the defendant on January 9, 1953.
On April 20, 1954, the plaintiff, through his attorney, made a written demand on the defendant to release the airplane from attachment, but this was not done. On August 3, 1954, the defendant sold the airplane under an execution obtained by Hawthorne in its action against Rudich.
Numerous requests for rulings were presented to the judge and the questions for decision arise out of his action with respect to some of them.
Under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 it is provided that '(a) The Administrator [of Civil Aeronautics] shall establish and maintain a system for the recording of each and all of the following: (1) Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft of the United States * * *.' U.S.C. (1952 ed.) Title 49, § 52 [49 U.S.C.A. § 523]. Subsection (c) of § 523, so far as here material, reads:
It is apparent that the trial judge decided the case on the theory that the attachment made by the defendant was invalid because of his failure to record it with C. A. A. 1 The Appellate Division, it seems, also adopted that theory. We are of opinion that the finding for the plaintiff cannot be supported on this ground. We find nothing in § 523 that could be construed as requiring the recording of the attachment. The statute requires the recording of 'Any conveyance which affects the title to, or any interest in, any civil aircraft of the United States.' Attachments are not mentioned and if they are to be included in the statute it is necessary to say that they are tantamount to conveyances. In the absence of a binding decision of the United States courts--and we have found none--we decline to place such a construction on the statute. The definition of 'conveyance' under U.S.C. (1952 ed.) Title 49, § 401(18) [49 U.S.C.A. § 401(18)], as meaning 'a bill of sale, contract of conditional sale, mortgage, assignment of mortgage, or other instrument affecting title to, or interest in, property' (emphasis supplied) does not affect this conclusion. Obviously, under familiar principles of statutory construction the italicized words refer to transactions similar in nature to those enumerated. Babcock Davis Corp. v. Paine, 240 Mass. 438, 441, 134 N.E. 342; Board of Assessors of City of Springfield v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 321 Mass. 186, 193, 72 N.E.2d 528.
Although the judge in denying the defendant's seventh request did so on an erroneous ground, the ruling, nevertheless, did not harm the defendant. As will presently appear, the plaintiff, on the facts found, was entitled to recover for a reason quite apart from the defendant's failure to record the attachment.
The attachment of the airplane by the defendant secured for the attaching creditor the interest of Rudich, the judgment debtor. If no other rights were involved there can be no doubt that the attachment and subsequent execution sale could not have been challenged by either Feeder, the seller, or Rudich, the purchaser. As between them title passed to Rudich and his interest was reached by the attachment, which, according to the findings was valid under the laws of this Commonwealth. But the matter did not end in that way. Feeder, through the fraud of Rudich, gave a bill of sale of the airplane to Margal, and this transaction was duly recorded with C. A. A. Thereafter the airplane was transferred by Margal to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
South Shore Bank v. H & H Aircraft Sales, Inc.
...See Marsden v. Southern Flight Serv., Inc., 227 F.Supp. 411, 416 (M.D.N.C.1961).8 The Marsden case, at 417, refers to Marrs v. Barbeau, 336 Mass. 416, 146 N.E.2d 353 (1957), which, at 420, 146 N.E.2d 353, recognized that (under a predecessor of § 1403[c] ) the holder of an unrecorded convey......
-
Southern Jersey Airways, Inc. v. National Bank of Secaucus
...Instrument affecting title to or interest in, property.' (Emphasis ours). See Marrs v. Barbeau, 336 Mass. [261 A.2d 407] 416, 146 N.E.2d 353 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1957), holding that an attachment of a plane is not a recordable 'conveyance or other instrument' affecting title to or interest in an Par......
-
Marsden v. Southern Flight Service, Inc., C-152-G-60.
...Tompkins; supra, First National Bank and Trust Co. of Vicksburg, Miss. v. The Seneca, 179 F.Supp. 847 (La.D., 1960); Marrs v. Barbeau, 336 Mass. 416, 146 N.E.2d 353 (1957); Marshall v. Bardin, supra; Wilson v. Barnes, 359 Mo. 352, 221 S.W.2d 731 (1949) ("actual notice" treated as "personal ......
-
Rockland-Atlas Nat. Bank of Boston v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., ROCKLAND-ATLAS
...* * *.' Under a familiar canon of construction the closing catch-all phrase means: 'in any other [similar] capacity.' Marrs v. Barbeau, 336 Mass. 416, 420, 146 N.E.2d 353. This enumeration and the other signs just noticed speak, we think, of the kind of writings described in the dictionary ......
-
Perfecting Title to Aircraft
..."A" with the power to transfer title to a bona fide purchaser, and, thus, "P" s title was good against"B"s creditor. [Marrs v. Barbeau, 336 Mass. 416, 146 N.E. 2d. 353 (1957).] In Blalock v. Brown, 51 S.E. 2d. 610 (Ga. App., 1949), a subsequent purchaser, without notice of a prior sale whic......