State v. Graham
| Decision Date | 13 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 89869–3.,89869–3. |
| Citation | 181 Wash.2d 878,337 P.3d 319 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jason Allen GRAHAM, Petitioner. |
Steven Witchley, Holmes & Witchley PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.
Mark Erik Lindsey, Spokane County Prosecuting Attorneys, Andrew J. Metts III, Spokane County Pros Offc., Spokane, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 The issue in this case is whether a sentencing court may impose an exceptional sentence downward if the judge finds the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW. We need look only to the plain language of the SRA to conclude the sentencing court has such discretion.
¶ 2 This case results from Jason Allen Graham's methamphetamine-induced shooting spree in January 2002. At about 1:00 a.m., a police officer stopped the vehicle Graham was driving. Over the next several minutes, Graham used an AK–47 to fire at six different police officers during a foot chase through downtown Spokane. Fortunately, he was the only person physically injured in the incident. Graham was convicted by a jury in 2003 of 10 offenses, including 6 “serious violent offenses” for sentencing purposes under the SRA. RCW 9.94A.030(45). He received an aggregate sentence of 1,225.5 months, the result of an increased offender score and consecutive sentences in accordance with RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b), in addition to several firearm enhancements.
¶ 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the original judgment and sentence, but we granted review and remanded to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the firearm enhancements in light of State v. Williams–Walker, 167 Wash.2d 889, 225 P.3d 913 (2010). State v. Graham, 169 Wash.2d 1005, 234 P.3d 210 (2010). On reconsideration, the Court of Appeals vacated Graham's sentence and remanded for resentencing. State v. Graham, noted at 163 Wash.App. 1011, 2011 WL 3570120 (2011), review denied, 173 Wash.2d 1011, 2012 WL 414895 (2012).
¶ 4 At resentencing Graham asked for an exceptional sentence downward of 25 years. He argued RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) —the “multiple offense policy” mitigating factor—permitted both a departure from the standard range and imposition of concurrent sentences. The original sentencing judge expressed regret at the presumptive sentencing range for Graham's serious violent offenses. The judge stated on the record that there was no authority to impose an exceptional sentence:
Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 28–29. The judge imposed a sentence at the low end of the standard range for each serious violent offense to run consecutively, for a total sentence of 82.1 years. Graham again appealed his sentence, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Graham, 178 Wash.App. 580, 314 P.3d 1148 (2013). We granted review to determine whether RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) permits exceptional sentences for multiple serious violent offenses scored under RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). State v. Graham, 180 Wash.2d 1013, 327 P.3d 55 (2014).
¶ 5 As with all statutes, we interpret the SRA de novo to discern and implement the legislature's intent. State v. Jones, 172 Wash.2d 236, 242, 257 P.3d 616 (2011). We look first to the plain language, which, if unambiguous, ends the inquiry. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). We enforce the plain meaning of statutes. If there is no plain meaning and the language is ambiguous, we may glean the statute's intent from its legislative history. Id. at 110–11, 156 P.3d 201.
¶ 6 Under the SRA, a sentencing court generally must impose a sentence within the standard sentencing range. RCW 9.94A.505(2)(a)(i). However, the SRA authorizes a departure from the standard range in some circumstances. See RCW 9.94A.535. Specifically, .535(1) lists mitigating circumstances that a court might rely upon depending on the facts of the particular case. The one at issue here is .535(1)(g):
The “multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 ” that .535(1)(g) references contains five subsections. Those relevant in this case are subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b), which advise sentencing courts when sentences for multiple current offenses are presumed to run concurrent or consecutive to one another.
¶ 7 The State argues “the multiple offense policy of RCW 9.94A.589 ” does not include multiple serious violent offenses under .589(1)(b) because its sole purpose “is to permit consecutive sentences in an otherwise concurrent mandate.” Suppl. Br. at 5. The State contends the legislature intended to foreclose exceptional sentences for serious violent offenses. So we must decide if .535(1)(g) applies equally to subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of .589.
¶ 8 We need look only to .535(1)(g)'s plain meaning to conclude the legislature considered exceptional sentences possible for some serious violent offenses. There is no textual support for the State's position that the phrase “multiple offense policy,” as it appears in .535(1)(g), refers only to multiple violent and nonviolent offenses and not to multiple serious violent offenses. The State does not explain why .535(1)(g)'s broad reference to “RCW 9.94A.589 ” means only subsection (1)(a). All five subsections in .589 deal with sentencing multiple offenses. The legislature knows how to cite specific subsections and twice cited subsection .589(1)(a) specifically, including within the SRA. See RCW 61.34.030 ; RCW 9.94A.525(5)(a)(i). The legislature also separately identified subsections .589(1) and (2) elsewhere in the text of .535, implying its failure to separately identify subsections .589(1)(a) and (b) was a deliberate policy choice. RCW 9.94A.535.
¶ 9 We found the plain text of .535 dispositive in In re Personal Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wash.2d 322, 166 P.3d 677 (2007). There the defendant sought concurrent sentences for six counts of first degree assault, a serious violent offense under the SRA. The State similarly argued .535(1)(g) did not apply because .589(1)(b) mandated consecutive sentences for all serious violent offenses. Id. at 328–29, 166 P.3d 677. We unanimously concluded the sentencing judge could rely on .535(1)(g) to impose concurrent sentences:
[T]he State's argument fails because it pays too little heed to the plain language of RCW 9.94A.535.... Because [.535(1)(g) ] does not differentiate between subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) [of .589], it can be said that a plain reading of the statute leads inescapably to a conclusion that exceptional sentences may be imposed under either subsection of RCW 9.94A.589(1).
Id. at 329–30, 166 P.3d 677. Mulholland is controlling, and this case does not provide a factual or legal basis to reject or depart from our prior interpretation of .535.
¶ 10 We find additional support for our holding elsewhere in the SRA. Unlike sentences for other crimes, the legislature has not expressly revoked discretion to impose exceptional sentences for serious violent offenses. For example, exceptional sentences downward are not available for persistent offenders, offenses with mandatory minimums, or some sex offenses. See RCW 9.94A.507(3)(c)(ii), .540(1), .570. Sentencing enhancements, the lengths of which the sentencing judge cannot modify, also increase some sentences even if facts permit a departure from the standard range for the underlying offense. RCW 9.94A.533. No similar provisions bar exceptional sentences for serious violent offenses scored under .589(1)(b).
¶ 11 The only rationale offered by the State and the unpublished cases cited by the Court of Appeals is the legislature's intent that serious violent offenses carry more severe punishment than other crimes. These authorities often rely on a single sentence in Professor David Boerner's seminal treatise. David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington § 9.12(e) at 9–32 (1985). But if Professor Boerner's comments on the subject are read in context, he suggests only that the legislature constructed the SRA to signal exceptional sentences for multiple offenses “ought to be rare.” Id. This is accomplished not by prohibiting exceptional sentences for multiple serious violent offenses altogether, but by limiting them for presumptive range sentences that are “clearly excessive,” RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g), and where the exceptional sentence is supported by “substantial and compelling reasons.” RCW 9.94A.535. These constrictions refute the State's admonition that Mulholland has stripped .589(1)(b) of practical effect or that we risk returning to the pre-SRA era of disparate sentencing.
¶ 12 We take this opportunity to reaffirm that a sentencing judge may invoke .535(1)(g) to impose exceptional sentences both for multiple violent and nonviolent offenses scored under .589(1)(a) and for multiple serious violent offenses under .589(1)(b).
¶ 13 The State challenges our holding in Mulholland in two ways. First, it argues we erred...
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