State v. Jones

• Decision Date: 30 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 83451–2.,83451–2.
• Citation: 257 P.3d 616
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent,v.Cliff Alan JONES, Petitioner.

257 P.3d 616

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Cliff Alan JONES, Petitioner.

No. 83451–2.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Oct. 19, 2010.Decided June 30, 2011.

Roger A. Hunko, Attorney at Law, Port Orchard, WA, for Petitioner.Jeremy Aaron Morris, Kevin Dwayne Hull, Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office, Port Orchard, WA, for Respondent.FAIRHURST, J.

¶ 1 Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, Cliff Alan Jones challenges the trial court's denial of credit toward his sentence of community custody for time he spent incarcerated in excess of his amended sentence of incarceration. In affirming the trial court's decision, Division Two of the Court of Appeals expressly declined to follow Division Three's holding in In re Personal Restraint of Knippling, 144 Wash.App. 639, 183 P.3d 365 (2008) (Community custody begins at completion of the sentence of confinement; therefore, the offender is entitled to credit toward a sentence of community custody for time spent incarcerated in excess of the sentence of incarceration.). We affirm the decision of Division Two, deny Jones credit toward his sentence of community custody, and disavow Division Three's holding in Knippling.

I. FACTS

¶ 2 Jones pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation committed between November 1998 and November 1999. The trial court sentenced him to an exceptional sentence of 130 months of incarceration and 36 months of community custody. The Court of Appeals affirmed this sentence. The Court of Appeals also dismissed Jones' personal restraint petition challenging his exceptional sentence. Jones subsequently filed another personal restraint petition, this time arguing that the trial court erred when it calculated his offender score by considering his prior “washed-out” juvenile offenses when the law at the time he committed his offenses precluded the trial court from considering them. The State conceded the error, and on January 9, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted Jones' petition and remanded for resentencing.

¶ 3 The trial court amended Jones' original judgment and sentence to reflect an offender score of zero, and Jones was resentenced to 51 months of incarceration and 36 months of community custody. By that time, Jones had already served 81 months of incarceration. The trial court credited Jones with time served toward his 51 month sentence of incarceration and ordered his release. However, the trial court did not credit the excess 30 months of incarceration time toward his 36 months of community custody.

¶ 4 Jones filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that his actual incarceration of 81 months, when added to his sentence of community custody, exceeded the statutory maximum penalty for the offense. In a second memorandum of authorities, Jones raised the additional argument that he should receive credit for time spent incarcerated in excess of his sentence (30 months) toward his 36 month sentence of community custody. The State argued that Jones' sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum because under RCW 9A.44.083 and former RCW 9A.20.021 (1982), the statutory maximum sentence for Jones' offense, a class A felony, was life in prison. The State also argued that the trial court did not have authority to credit his sentence of community custody for excess time spent incarcerated.

¶ 5 On November 2, 2007, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Jones' motion for relief from judgment. The trial court held that Jones' judgment and sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum of life in prison for the offense. Additionally, the trial court held that it had no statutory authority to credit Jones' sentence of community custody for time served in excess of 51 months because, under the plain language of former RCW 9.94A.170(3) (1999),¹ “[a]ny period of community custody, community placement, or community supervision shall be tolled during any period of time the offender is in confinement for any reason.” Clerk's Papers at 45 (emphasis added). Jones timely appealed the court's decision to deny him credit toward his sentence of community custody for excess time spent incarcerated.

¶ 6 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of credit toward community custody. State v. Jones, 151 Wash.App. 186, 188, 210 P.3d 1068 (2009). Noting that the State conceded that Jones was incarcerated beyond his standard range sentence of 51 months, the Court of Appeals identified the central issue as “whether Jones's community custody term began at the completion of his 51–month incarceration term or whether it was tolled until he was actually released into the community.” Id. at 190, 210 P.3d 1068. After analyzing the plain and unambiguous language of former RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) (1999) (SRA provision governing when community custody begins), former RCW 9.94A.170(3) (SRA provision governing the tolling of community custody), and former RCW 9.94A.030(4) (1999) (SRA provision defining community custody), the court affirmed the trial court's decision denying credit toward a sentence of community custody for excess time spent incarcerated. Jones, 151 Wash.App. at 194, 210 P.3d 1068. As the court explained:

Allowing Jones to begin his community custody term before his release into the community would contravene both the plain language of former RCW 9.94A.030(4), which defines “community custody” as “that portion of an inmate's sentence of confinement ... served in the community,” and the “substantial public policy goal” of “improving the supervision of convicted sex offenders in the community upon release from incarceration.” (Emphasis added); see Laws of 1996, ch. 275, § 1.

Id. at 193, 210 P.3d 1068 (alteration in original). Lastly, the Court of Appeals held “the sentencing court did not violate Jones's right to be free from double jeopardy.” Id. at 195, 210 P.3d 1068.²

¶ 7 As part of Division Two's holding on the issue of statutory authority to grant credit toward a sentence of community custody for excess time spent incarcerated, Division Two respectfully disagreed with Division Three. Id. at 191–95, 210 P.3d 1068. In Knippling, Division Three held that excess time spent incarcerated because of a resentencing must be credited against an offender's sentence of community custody. 144 Wash.App. at 643, 183 P.3d 365.

¶ 8 Jones timely appealed his sentence to this court. We granted review to resolve the issue of whether Jones' 30 months of excess incarceration must be credited against his 36 month sentence of community custody, and to resolve the conflict between Division Two and Division Three. State v. Jones, 167 Wash.2d 1017, 224 P.3d 773 (2010).

II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court did not err when it declined to credit Jones' sentence of community custody for excess time he spent incarcerated. This case requires the statutory interpretation of multiple SRA provisions. Interpretation of the SRA is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). When interpreting a statute, “the court's objective is to determine the legislature's intent.” State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005). If the meaning of a statute is plain on its face, we “ ‘give effect to that plain meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). To determine the plain meaning of a statute, we look to the text, as well as “the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. An undefined term is “given its plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary legislative intent is indicated.” Ravenscroft v. Wash. Water Power Co., 136 Wash.2d 911, 920–21, 969 P.2d 75 (1998). If after this inquiry the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and we “may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007).

¶ 10 Two statutes are implicated, former RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) and former RCW 9.94A.120(17). Former RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) is the statute under which the trial court sentenced Jones to 36 months of community custody. Former RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) provides:

When a court sentences a person to the custody of the department for an offense categorized as a sex offense committed on or after June 6, 1996, and before July 1, 2000, the court shall, in addition to other terms of the sentence, sentence the offender to community custody for three years or up to the period of earned release awarded pursuant to RCW 9.94A.150(1) and (2), whichever is longer. The community custody shall begin either upon completion of the term of confinement or at such time as the offender is transferred to community custody in lieu of earned release in accordance with RCW 9.94A.150(1) and (2).

Nothing in this provision authorizes the court to credit presentence or postsentence confinement toward the mandatory sentence of community custody.

¶ 11 Jones argues that a different statute, former RCW 9.94A.120(17), requires the trial court to credit a sentence of community custody for excess time spent incarcerated. Former RCW 9.94A.120(17) states: “The sentencing court shall give the offender credit for all confinement time served before the sentencing if that confinement was solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced.” That statute provides for a grant of credit for confinement time served, but it does not explicitly provide whether it is limited toward a sentence of confinement or whether that credit can also be applied to a sentence of community custody. Having found no express statutory authority crediting a sentence of community custody for excess time spent incarcerated, we analyze the statutory...