Educadores Puertorriquenos v. Hernandez

• Decision Date: 10 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1588.,03-1588.
• Citation: 367 F.3d 61
• Parties: EDUCADORES PUERTORRIQUEÑOS EN ACCIÓN et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. César Rey HERNÁNDEZ, In his Personal Capacity and as Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Education, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

367 F.3d 61

EDUCADORES PUERTORRIQUEÑOS EN ACCIÓN et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. César Rey HERNÁNDEZ, In his Personal Capacity and as Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Education, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 03-1588.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard March 1, 2004.

Decided May 10, 2004.

Francisco R. Gonzalez, with whom F.R. Gonzalez Law Office was on brief, for appellants.

Hector J. Benitez Arraiza, with whom Luiselle Quiñones Maldonado and Llovet Zurinaga & López, P.S.C. were on brief, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and SELYA, Circuit Judge.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

For years, courts in this circuit have required plaintiffs to satisfy a heightened pleading standard in civil rights actions. We recently have retreated from this view in specified instances. Today, however, we are presented with an opportunity to reexamine the propriety of this praxis globally in light of emergent Supreme Court precedent. Because neither the Civil Rules nor any applicable statute authorizes the imposition of a heightened pleading standard for civil rights actions, we disclaim our earlier practice and overrule the decisions authorizing it. Since the district court's determination rests on that heightened pleading standard, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

A brief recitation of the facts suffices to situate the pivotal legal issue. As is always the case on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept as true the factual averments of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiffs' favor. LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir.1998).

Puerto Rico's so-called electoral prohibition — a ban on certain public-sector personnel actions during the two months preceding and the two months following a general election, see 3 P.R. Laws Ann. § 1337 — lies at the heart of this controversy. In the November 7, 2000 gubernatorial election, the voters ousted the reigning New Progressive Party (NPP) and elected the candidate of the rival Popular Democratic Party (PDP). The plaintiffs, all members of the NPP, are career employees of the Puerto Rico Department of Education (PRDE). Each of them was hired, reclassified, reinstated, and/or granted a pay increase by the outgoing administration during the electoral prohibition period. When the new regime took office, its functionaries declared these personnel actions null and void and informed the plaintiffs that they would be returned to the status quo ante.

Dismayed by this reversal of fortune, the plaintiffs banded together and brought suit against the Secretary of the PRDE (in both his individual and official capacities). Their complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged (i) discrimination based on political affiliation in violation of the First Amendment, and (ii) a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These charges were based largely on the plaintiffs' assertion that the pre-regime-change personnel actions were valid due to officially authorized (or at least routinely tolerated) exemptions from the electoral prohibition.

The defendant (appellee here) moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state an actionable claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the district court obliged. See Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Rey Hernández, 257 F.Supp.2d 446 (D.P.R.2003). In reaching its decision, the court applied "the heightened pleading requirement established by the First Circuit in civil rights cases." Id. at 452 (citing Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir.1998)). In the court's view, this standard required the plaintiffs to include in their complaint subsidiary facts sufficient to support their allegations that political animus was the driving force behind the rescission of the favorable personnel actions and that those actions came within exceptions to the electoral prohibition. Id. at 452-53. Because the plaintiffs' complaint failed to achieve this degree of specificity, the court dismissed the action. Id. at 454. This appeal ensued.

II. DISCUSSION

Our analysis begins with an examination of the district court's conclusion that this court has established a heightened pleading standard for some, if not all, civil rights cases. We then turn to the relevant Supreme Court case law and inquire whether the Court's recent pronouncements, especially its decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002), have effectively undermined our allegiance to a heightened pleading standard in civil rights cases. Answering this inquiry in the affirmative, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Historically, this court has expressed concern about the use of skeletal pleadings in civil rights cases. Our concern was prompted in part by a fear that so loose a structure might needlessly embroil officials in contrived litigation, in part by worries that it might facilitate widespread misuse of section 1983, and in part by the desire not to erode the salutary protections afforded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Dewey v. Univ. of N.H., 694 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1982); Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir.1977). Consequently, we traditionally have held plaintiffs alleging civil rights violations to something more stringent than mere notice pleading. See, e.g., Boston & Me Corp. v. Town of Hampton, 987 F.2d 855, 866 (1st Cir.1993) ("[A] heightened requirement of specificity is well established for ... allegations of civil rights violations."); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir.1989) ("[T]he key question is whether plaintiffs assembled specific facts adequate to show or raise a plausible inference that they were subjected to race-based discrimination." (emphasis supplied)). Under this enhanced standard, it is not enough that a complaint give a defendant notice of a plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which that claim rests. Rather, "[t]he alleged facts must specifically identify the particular instance(s) of discriminatory treatment and, as a logical exercise, adequately support the thesis that the discrimination was unlawful." Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir.1990).

Although this heightened pleading standard in some shape or form has proven to be a hardy plant, we have from time to time reexamined the appropriateness of its application. Those reappraisals took place in response to two recent Supreme Court cases. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). We turn next to those decisions.

In Leatherman, the Court rejected a heightened pleading standard imposed by the Fifth Circuit in a case alleging municipal liability under section 1983. Two concerns animated the decision. First, the Court found the heightened pleading standard difficult to square with the liberal system of notice pleading created by the Civil Rules. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Second, the Court found no compelling reason to erect barriers to discovery in a municipal liability action, considering the well-established rule that — unlike various government officials — municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity. Id. at 166-67, 113 S.Ct. 1160. At the very least, Leatherman precluded the use of a heightened pleading standard in section 1983 cases brought against municipalities. Accord Gorski v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 473 n. 6 (1st Cir.2002); Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 35 (1st Cir.1996); Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421 (D.C.Cir.1996); Edgington v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 52 F.3d 777, 779 n. 3 (8th Cir.1995); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc).

Five years after Leatherman, the Supreme Court decided Crawford-El. There, the Court mulled a heightened evidentiary standard adopted by the D.C. Circuit in constitutional tort actions that demanded proof of improper motive and were brought against government officials in their individual capacities. The D.C. Circuit had required plaintiffs in such cases to adduce "clear and convincing evidence" of improper motive in order to defeat motions for summary judgment. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 584, 118 S.Ct. 1584. On review, the Supreme Court ruled that this evidentiary burden was too heavy. Id. at 594-97.

Crawford-El was not a pleading case simpliciter — it dealt with the appropriate quantum of evidence and arose on summary judgment. Nevertheless, the circumstances were sufficiently analogous for us to question whether the Court's comments torpedoed our heightened pleading standard. In Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67 (1st Cir.1998), a panel of this court ruled that our heightened pleading standard survived, at least in a case brought against an individual government official "alleging a constitutional violation calling for proof of an illegal motive." Id. at 73. In reaching that conclusion, the panel placed heavy reliance on dictum in which the Crawford-El Court indicated its awareness of the difficulties inherent in trying to dispose of insubstantial civil rights claims when those claims hinge on an official's state of mind. See id. at 74. In that dictum, the Court stated that "the [trial] court may insist that the plaintiff put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations that establish improper motive causing cognizable injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment." Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 598, 118 S.Ct. 1584 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Based on this statement, the Judge panel concluded "that the five...