Latham v. Udell

• Decision Date: 22 January 1878
• Citation: 38 Mich. 238
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Electa Latham v. Melinda A. Udell et al

38 Mich. 238

Electa Latham v. Melinda A. Udell et al

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 22, 1878

Submitted January 18, 1878

Appeal from Cass.

Bill to set aside deeds. Defendants appeal.

Decree reversed, and the bill dismissed, with costs of both courts.

O. F Bean for complainant and appellee urged that where a deed remained in the control of the grantor, there was no delivery such as would vest title, Hatch v. Haskins, 5 Shepley 391; Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 455; Stillwell v. Hubbard, 20 Wend. 44; Jackson v Phipps, 12 Johns. 419; Church v. Gilman, 15 Wend. 656, and as to undue influence, cited Whelan v Whelan, 3 Cow. 538; Sears v. Shafer, 6 N. Y 272; Seeley v. Price, 14 Mich. 542; Stiles v. Stiles, Id., 72; Case v. Case, 26 Mich. 484; as to testamentary memory, Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482; Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459.

Arthur Brown and Elbert Roos for defendants and appellants. Undue influence to vitiate an act must amount to coercion destroying free agency, Gardner v. Gardner, 22 Wend. 526; Redf. Amer. Cases on the Law of Wills, p. 318. Placing a deed in the keeping of a third person with the understanding that it is to be delivered to the grantee after the grantor's death is a valid delivery, Stephens v. Huss, 54 Penn. St., 20: Wheelwright v. Wheelwright, 2 Mass. 446; Hatch v. Hatch, 9 Mass. 307; Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Met. 412; it is not even necessary that the grantor should have parted with the custody of the deed, Barlow v. Heneage, Prec. Chan., 211; Clavering v. Clavering, Prec. Chan., 235; Naldred v. Gilham, 1 P. Wms., 577; Boughton v. Boughton, 1 Atk. 625.

Campbell, C. J. Marston and Graves, JJ., concurred. Cooley, J., did not sit in this case.

OPINION

Campbell, C. J.

Complainant filed her bill to set aside certain deeds, with a life lease and bill of sale, made by her deceased father, Nathan Udell, in December, 1875, on the grounds of non-delivery, incompetency, fraud and undue influence.

Nathan Udell died in May, 1876, from the effects of a cancer in the face, which had afflicted him for a considerable time, and which by degrees had eaten away a part of his face so as to seriously interfere with his speech, and ultimately with his sight.

On the 24th of December, 1876, he made a life lease to his wife of his real estate, with a bill of sale of most of the household effects, and also made deeds to his children, Henry, Daniel and Cordelia, three of the defendants, of 50, 80, and 30 acres respectively, the three parcels constituting his entire farm of 160 acres. The deed of 80 acres to Daniel provided for the payment to his eldest daughter, Mrs. Latham, the complainant, of $ 200 within two years after her mother's death. These deeds were subject to Mrs. Udell's life lease.

These papers were all duly executed and acknowledged at their date and delivered to Mrs. Udell by her husband with directions to have them handed over to the grantees immediately after his death.

It is stated to us by counsel that the case was decided in the court below on the ground that there was no effectual delivery.

The testimony shows very plainly that these deeds and other papers were given to Mrs. Udell with explicit directions as to what should be done with them. Mr. Udell beyond doubt meant and ordered that they should be delivered to the grantees at his death, and have complete effect. In Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185, and Wallace v. Harris, 32 Mich. 380, this subject was fully considered, and such deeds under the rules there recognized, and under the authorities there cited, must be held operative to carry out the grantor's intent, concerning which there is no uncertainty in the testimony. They are not void for non-delivery.

The objection of want of capacity is without any support. The disease under which Mr. Udell was suffering, though very painful, did not impair his understanding or affect his capacity to comprehend the act which he engaged in. It was done deliberately as a substitute for a former imperfect arrangement. He understood it fully, and it expressed his purposes completely. There is no foundation whatever for any claim that rests on his unfitness to dispose of his property as he chose.

Much stress is laid on the fact that one child is practically disinherited, and the mother made sole possessor of the estate for life.

If the law required property to be disposed of equally among those who would be heirs in case of intestacy, then such an objection might deserve some consideration. But where the law leaves every one to dispose of his property as he chooses the fact that he prefers one to another can have no bearing on the validity of his voluntary and intelligent action. It concerns no one what his reasons may be for doing what he has a right to do. Courts have no right to substitute their judgment for his, or to determine upon the wisdom or justice of his reasons. Whether wise or unwise, just or unjust, they are for him and for no one else to determine. In this case he understood what he was doing, and evidently had reasons which we are bound to assume were satisfactory. There is nothing in his course which has...