Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Committee v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission

• Decision Date: 20 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-1100,80-1100
• Citation: 20 O.O.3d 200,66 Ohio St.2d 192,421 N.E.2d 128
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: , 40 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1404, 20 O.O.3d 200 PLUMBERS & STEAMFITTERS JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, Appellee, v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellants.

Page 192

66 Ohio St.2d 192

421 N.E.2d 128, 40 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1404,

20 O.O.3d 200

PLUMBERS & STEAMFITTERS JOINT APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, Appellee, v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Appellants.

No. 80-1100.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 20, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission is not subject to the 30-day (formerly 20-day) record certification requirement of R.C. 119.12.

2. The findings and orders of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission must be supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Blese A. Richardson, complainant, filed a charge affidavit with the appellant, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter "commission"), alleging that he was discriminatorily discharged on the basis of race from the apprentice program of the appellee, the Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Committee of Akron (hereinafter "JAC"). ¹ The commission, after a full evidentiary hearing, issued an order that required JAC to reinstate the complainant with back pay.

JAC appealed the commission's order to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit County. The court held that the findings and order of the commission were supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The court also overruled JAC's motion for final judgment based on the commission's allegedly untimely certification of the record pursuant to R.C. 119.12.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on two independent grounds. First, the Court of Appeals held that the commission was an "agency" subject to the record certification requirements of R.C. 119.12. The court also held that the findings and order of the commission were not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

This cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Millisor, Belkin & Nobil and Jeffrey A. Belkin, Akron, for appellee.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Joseph M. Oser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

SWEENEY, Justice.

I A.

The procedural question raised in this appeal is whether the commission is subject to the 30-day (formerly 20-day) record certification requirement of R.C. 119.12. R.C. Chapter 119, the Administrative Procedure Act, establishes the procedural framework within which state agencies must operate. R.C. 119.01 defines "agency" in three ways for purposes of the Act. The first category consists of agencies enumerated in the statute. ² The second category includes "the functions of any administrative or executive officer, department, division, * * * or commission * * * specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.) Administrative agencies with the authority to issue, suspend, revoke or cancel licenses comprise the third group of agencies to which R.C. Chapter 119 applies. The statute also exempts certain other named agencies from its coverage. ³

The commission is neither expressly included in nor expressly excluded from the statutory definition of agency. The commission does not engage in licensing activities. Therefore, the only potentially applicable portion of the statutory definition is the second category, and the question is whether the commission is "specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13." See Fair v. School Employees Retirement System (1975), 44 Ohio App.2d 115, 335 N.E.2d 868.

The enabling legislation for the commission is contained in R.C. Chapter 4112. R.C. 4112.05 sets forth the procedures that the commission must follow in pursuing discrimination complaints. R.C. 4112.06 governs judicial review of commission orders. R.C. 4112.05(G) and 4112.05(I) specifically subject the commission to R.C. Chapter 119. R.C. 4112.06 makes no reference to R.C. Chapter 119.

Reading R.C. Chapters 119 and 4112 together leads to an incongruous result. A literal reading of the statutory language reveals that the commission is an agency specifically subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of R.C. 4112.05(G) and (I). Under R.C. 4112.06, however, the commission is not an agency because judicial review of commission proceedings is not specifically made subject to R.C. Chapter 119. We are constrained to hold that the commission's administrative split personality represents the intent of the General Assembly. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the commission is an agency subject to R.C. Chapter 119 for purposes of judicial review.

I B.

The Court of Appeals, upon finding the commission to be an agency subject to R.C. Chapter 119, applied R.C. 119.12, which states in relevant part:

"Within thirty days (formerly 20 days) after receipt of notice of appeal from an order in any case wherein a hearing is required by sections 119.01 to 119.13 of the Revised Code, the agency shall prepare and certify to the court a complete record of the proceedings in the case. Failure of the agency to comply within the time allowed shall, upon motion, cause the court to enter a finding in favor of the party adversely affected."

Since the commission concededly did not certify the record within the then applicable 20-day period, the Court of Appeals granted judgment for JAC, which had timely moved for final judgment pursuant to R.C. 119.12 in the Court of Common Pleas.

The Court of Appeals noted that "(i)f no time limit applies to a late filing, then years could pass before the Commission need file a transcript." Moreover, undue delay would be a denial of due process and could otherwise seriously prejudice the parties. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals invoked R.C. 119.12 and imposed the 20-day record certification requirement.

The Court of Appeals' reliance on R.C. 119.12 and Matash v. Dept. of Insurance (1964), 177 Ohio St. 55, 202 N.E.2d 305, was misplaced because it is R.C. 4112.06(B) which governs certification of the record for judicial review of commission orders. R.C. 4112.06(B), however, provides little guidance for a court to determine whether the commission has timely certified a record. The subsection states in relevant part:

"Such proceedings shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in court as provided in division (A) of this section and the service of a copy of the said petition upon the commission and upon all parties who appeared before the commission. Thereupon the commission shall file with the court a transcript of the record upon the hearing before it. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

R.C. 4112.06(I) also alludes to timing in a generalized manner: "All suits brought under this section shall be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible." The "thereupon" language contained in R.C. 4112.06(B) and the "as expeditiously as possible" language in R.C. 4112.06(I) suggest that the General Assembly intended for the commission to act promptly when its orders are appealed. However, the General Assembly did not specifically set time restrictions for commission appeals in R.C. 4112.06. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the commission to adhere to the strict time limit of R.C. 119.12. Absent a specific reference to R.C. Chapter 119, the directory language of R.C. 4112.06(B) and (I) provides the applicable, although uncertain, standard to determine whether the commission timely certified the record of the Court of Common Pleas.

I C.

The absence of specific time limits in R.C. 4112.06 does not grant the commission unqualified discretion as to when to certify a record for appeal. As the Court of Appeals recognized, undue delay can create serious hardships. Commission orders frequently involve awards of back pay. If the commission acts dilatorily, back pay awards can amount to large sums. Moreover, the longer the delay in resolving a commission complaint, the more difficult it is to make an aggrieved party whole. Consequently, while we do not find that the 92-day period which elapsed between the commission's receipt of notice of appeal and the commission's certification of the record was unduly lengthy or prejudicial in this case, it behooves the commission to follow its legislative mandate and proceed "as expeditiously as possible."

II A.

We must now determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the findings of the commission were not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. R.C. 4112.05(G) establishes the evidentiary standard that must be met before the commission may issue an order requiring a respondent to cease and desist from a challenged practice or to take other affirmative action pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112. R.C. 4112.05(G) provides:

"If upon all reliable, probative, and substantial evidence the commission determines that the respondent has engaged in, or is engaged in, any unlawful discriminatory practice, * * * the commission shall state its findings of fact and conclusions of law, * * *."

"Reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" is not defined in the statute. In previous cases, however, we have determined that federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112. Republic Steel v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm. (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 178, 339 N.E.2d 658; Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907. Cf. Younglood v. Dalzell (1973), 6 EPD para. 8719 (S.D.Ohio, W.D.). Thus, "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" in an employment discrimination case brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112 means evidence sufficient to support a finding of discrimination under Title VII.

II B.

The starting point for judicial inquiry into complaints alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race is McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668. McDonnell established a flexible formula to ferret out impermissible discrimination in the hiring, firing, promoting, and demoting of employees. See Id. at 802...