Heaton v. Moore, 94-1517
| Decision Date | 21 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1517,94-1517 |
| Parties | 129 Lab.Cas. P 33,187, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 801 Joe HEATON; Edward L. Stockwell; Natilee J. Crammer; Donald L. Daniels; Frank H. Parker, Jr.; Robert Smith; Robert D. Norris; Leon D. Maifield; Carmen D. Jenkins; Jerry Giboney; Hazel Elder; Linda F. Winingear; Tina M. Meder; Jack Meder, Sr.; Gary L. Kern; Barbara L. Dolezal; June Cornelius; C.F. Cornelius; Kenneth W. Bennette; Wade R. Beers; Edward Schmidt; Larry C. Jackson; Robert Intrery; Frances Connell; Haldon B. Delo; Moses L. Carbin, Jr.; John Carpenter; Joann Delo; John F. Dobe; Judy Howard; Anita J. Janes; Edward McNeil; Gilman C. Painter; Chester Sutton; John G. Swan; Robert L. Taylor; Roger D. Wheat; Donald G. Hagner; James Hagner; Richard M. Kirschner; Douglas Koenigsfeld; John L. Looten; Edward E. Matteson; C.R. McDonnell; Linda G. Rackers; Travis D. Watson; Clara J. Reed; Larry Mack; Larry Heuman; Donald Barton; Virgil Arnold; Thomas P. Riordan; Patrick Riordan; Gregory M. Lippold; Jerald L. Harrah; James F. Earhart; Corbett H. Fasching, II; Timothy S. Hays; John A. Larmer; Louis N. Mitchell; Anthony L. Patterson; Jackie L. Cobaugh; Gail W. Jackson; Wayne D. Hurley; Carl Hanes; Charlene L. Drake; Philip M. Daniels; Donna E. Long; Jane Richardson; Steve Richardson; Edward K. Marshall; Bill Arndt; Clyde J. Mann; Ron Nunnery; Carl W. Roberts; Betty C. Ponder; Etelka M. Van Winkle; Ruby Tyler; Michael S. Shrout; Dewey Ivy; Lawrence R. Kniser; Vestel M. Yates; John M. Hucke; Wrick C. Essman; David Butcher; James E. Farrow; Edward L. Barron; David A. Fisher; Gerald W. Hobbs; Cedric Spain; Terry Snow; Freddie O. Freeman; Ronald Wainright; Parrish L. Ramey; Phillip A. Davis; Thomas R. Goodrich; Gary D. Baldwin; Donald W. Reinkemeyer; Stephen H. Goodwin; James L. Thompson; Dale E. Gibbs; Ralph L. Allen; Harold K. Jones; George A. Failing; Charles L. Bussio; Lawrence W. Mills; Roy Sunny Shoun; Sherrie Wohlgemuth; Larry Wohlgemuth; James B. Thompson; Laurel B. Beard; Marechal Koch; Elmer J. Winingar, III; Will |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
James Robert Layton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued, (Jack L. Campbell, Karen R. Glickstein and Adam P. Sachs, on the brief), for appellants.
Donald R. Aubry, Kansas City, MO, argued, (Dale L. Ingram, on the brief), for appellees.
Before HANSEN, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, and HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judges.
The defendants, the Department of Corrections for the State of Missouri (DOC) and Dick D. Moore, Director of the DOC, appeal the district court's 1 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, who are DOC employees, on their claim that the defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 201-216. The district court found that the defendants' policy requiring the plaintiffs to use compensatory leave time, accrued by them for performing overtime work, at particular times designated by the defendants violated the FLSA. The defendants contend that the district court erred in concluding that the DOC policy regulating the use of compensatory leave time violated the FLSA. We affirm.
I.
The relevant facts are not disputed. The FLSA allows state and local governments and agencies to provide their workers with compensatory time off for overtime work performed instead of cash overtime pay, if the employees agree to this arrangement either as part of a collective bargaining agreement or in some other agreement with the employer made before they start work. See 29 U.S.C. Secs. 207(o )(1) & (2). All of the plaintiffs in this case agreed to accept compensatory time in lieu of cash paid overtime as a condition of their employment when they began working for the DOC. Indeed, it is a condition of employment for DOC employees.
The DOC regularly scheduled overtime work for correctional officers and credited those employees with an hour and a half of compensatory time for each hour of overtime worked, consistent with section 207(o )(1) of the FLSA. The DOC employment manual stated, consistent with 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(o )(3)(A), that a corrections officer would "be credited with federal compensatory time until that employee has worked 320 actual federal overtime hours which equals 480 hours of federal compensatory time ... [and] shall be given overtime pay for time earned beyond the 480 hours." (App. at 147.) The manual also provided:
Federal Overtime Control: Whenever any covered employee accrues one hundred twenty (120) hours of overtime, which converts to one hundred eighty (180) hours of compensatory time, the institution or office personnel representative shall immediately notify the chief administrative officer as well as the departmental personnel officer in central office. The chief administrative officer or their [sic] designees shall immediately meet with the employee and discuss a plan to reduce the number of overtime hours accrued by the employee. If departmental needs prevent giving such overtime off, the chief administrative officer shall review the employee's schedule every two weeks, and continuously endeavor to reduce the employee's accrued overtime.
(App. at 148.) In furtherance of the DOC's goal of keeping compensatory time balances at a minimum, the DOC also circulated a memo to correctional workers specifically stating its desire to reduce employee compensatory time balances. The memo stated that "all Officers with 100 or more hours of Comp Time, will submit a 1st and 2nd choice Comp time off request, for 40 Hours or more for the following Month" and that "[i]f a request is not received, Comp time off will be scheduled." (App. at 173.) In accordance with this policy, when corrections officers have failed to reduce voluntarily their compensatory time balances, the DOC has required the officers to take compensatory time off at times scheduled by the DOC, even when the officers have objected.
The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging the DOC's policy of requiring involuntary use of compensatory time as a violation of the FLSA. 2 The defendants argued that the policy did not violate any provision of the FLSA and was consistent with the statutory rules on the use of compensatory time. The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs after finding that the forced-use policy violates the FLSA. The defendants appeal.
III.
We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo. Clark v. Groose, 36 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir.1994). This case presents a question of first impression: whether a public employer violates the FLSA by unilaterally imposing a policy that forces employees, against their wishes, to use accrued compensatory time at times scheduled solely by the employer. The resolution of this question turns primarily on the construction of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(o )(5), the only section of the FLSA to address the use of accrued compensatory time. Section 207(o)(5) provides:
An employee of a public agency ... (A) who has accrued compensatory time off ... and (B) who has requested the use of such compensatory time, shall be permitted by the employee's employer to use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency.
The district court found that compensatory time is a "right" under the FLSA, and that section 207(o )(5) entitles employees to use their accrued compensatory time (which they have the "right" to receive) at their discretion, except when their requested use of the time will unduly disrupt the employer's operations. The district court concluded that the DOC's unilateral policy of forcing employees to use compensatory...
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